

The Month in Review

TWO NOTABLE EVENTS recently dramatized the new era which has now inexorably overtaken Eastern Europe in the wake of last years upheavals, despite frantic Soviet and Satellite attempts to obfuscate the issues. One such event was the vigorous vote of condemnation of the Soviet Union and the Kadar puppet regime by an overwhelming majority in the United Nations Assembly for their actions in crushing the Hungarian national uprising. The other event was the belated but significant meeting of Poland's Gomulka and Yugoslavia's Tito, the only two top Communists in the area who not only managed to survive their struggle with Stalin but now challenge, as independent-minded leaders of their countries, Moscow's supremacy in the area. Both occasions reflected the most painful reality the Soviet leaders have had to face in the post-Stalinist years—that "coexistence" and internal "liberalization" have opened new roads not only to worldwide Soviet penetration and renewed strength within the bloc but conversely, and much more vitally, to a gradual loosening of the Soviet Imperial structure.



The Soviets have, of course, gone to extraordinary lengths to preserve the "unity" of the bloc. Using the full measure of all their propaganda machinery and all the means of State and Party control, they have endeavored to disparage and dismiss the United Nation's action on Hungary. Throughout the bloc a saturation campaign on the theme of "interference in Hungary's internal affairs" was mounted, and attempts were made to suggest that the condemnatory Five Members' report on Hungary, the Assembly's debate of the question, and the final vote of censure were all emanations of American imperialism. The necessity for such tremendous efforts at counteraction revealed, in itself, Moscow's awareness that it no longer could act with full impunity in what had been, for almost a decade, its own walled precinct. But even more telling were the latest "adjustments" hurriedly introduced within Hungary in obvious response to worldwide interest aroused by the UN debates. Almost overnight, official announcements of trials, imprisonments, and executions stopped; from one day to the next what had been harsh, uncompromising and revengeful pronouncements by key regime figures turned into much softer talk of "turning over a new leaf," of ending unjustified persecution, of repudiating the hated Rakosi era, of curbing invective-sporting, blood-hungry Communist functionaries. The new stress was suddenly on patience and understanding and even, in some cases, forgiveness.

All this was, in all probability, mostly propaganda, for unofficial reports by persons who recently have left the country all point to continued harshness, to prisons groaning with thousands of prisoners, and concentration camps filled to capacity. Besides, where deemed necessary, Kadar's mailed fist still fell heavily on the country, openly and officially, as in the case of the recent announcement that a "Central Committee of People's Control" had been formed. This new agency, like its hated predecessor, the Ministry of State Control, abolished in 1956 before the Revolt, is to keep a tight watch on the whole public economic domain. Yet the fact that the tone of official propaganda had to be tailored to international requirements is of prime significance, not only because the new line will undoubtedly further disorient the few hard-core Communists who now precariously rule the country under Soviet direction but also because it is symptomatic of the ever-increasing influence of "alien," that is, non-Soviet, trends in Eastern Europe.


Broadly speaking, the same observations may be made with respect to the Yugoslav-Polish talks. Superficially, the Tito-Gomulka talks bolstered Moscow's position in that the two leaders officially endorsed the more important Soviet foreign policy formulations. Each may in fact have "cleared" the meetings with Moscow as part of a larger understanding with Khrushchev following the latter's victory in the Politburo fight this summer. Basically, however, the significant fact is that for the first time since the Soviets spread their tentacles over half of Europe after World War II, two Communist leaders whose programs diverge from Moscow's have met, undisturbed by the Kremlin's agents, to discuss their varied problems of mutual concern. The final communique in fact stressed the bilateral avenues thus opened. Though these avenues may not immediately lead away from Moscow, the important point is that they do not originate in the Imperial city.

The Soviets pronounced themselves satisfied with the results of the talks but their one key reaction did not betoken confidence. After many years of relative silence on the kind of Balkan Federation or Entente once entertained by former Bulgarian leader G. Dimitrov—a suggestion summarily dismissed by Stalin and for which its author may well have paid with his life—the whole scheme was suddenly revived by Premier Stoica of Romania, no doubt acting on instruction from the Soviets. His proposal encompassed the two Western Allies, Greece and Turkey, countries that could not seriously be expected to join, as well as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. The scheme, it seems, was designed to draw Yugoslavia nearer to the bloc to counteract Tito's magnetic exertion on countries within the orbit. The latest reports indicate that the proposed Entente is unlikely to materialize.

Reports in the Polish press on the discussions that took place at the now famous Moscow Youth Festival also suggest that this elaborate pageant designed to dazzle the world dazzled none more than the perturbed youth of the Soviet capital. The latter were supposed to bring new converts to the Soviet brand of Communist faith; instead, many of them apparently succumbed to apostasy. The Polish accounts, though they were cautious not to offend the Soviets, revealed that Gomulka's youngsters spoke their piece forcefully and with telling effect, overcoming their counterparts' ignorance and primitive suspiciousness in a spirited defense of all the freedoms won in Poland and still lacking in the USSR. Having been accepted as *bona fide* Communists, the Poles apparently made more headway than any other delegation.

Soviet Party leader Khrushchev's reaction against the danger of intellectual ferment in the citadel of Communism was the release of speeches made by him, two dating as far back as May, condemning unwarranted departures from the strict limits of "Socialist realism." In the more responsive countries in the orbit, notably in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania, these remonstrances had already been communicated to writers and editors in previous weeks; and they were now again stressed.

While most of the countries in the orbit were thus concerned with real or potential ferment, Poland, the one country in the area where these injunctions might be most applicable was primarily busy with other matters, mostly of an economic nature. Though the recently released half-year plan results seemed to indicate that, as in the past, major industrial strides had been achieved, numerous comments suggest that the prerequisites for a fast economic recovery are still lacking. The core of the matter, it appears, is that the regime has been unable to spark the people into more and better work or, at any rate, into doing those tasks prescribed by the Plan. The press is now full of accounts of frauds, illegal "speculation," mounting alcoholism, disastrous absenteeism from official working places, hooliganism, etc., with many an important Communist official being involved. Thus, while the Polish example continues to inspire hope and ferment among the people of the rest of the area, the Poles themselves appear to be encountering grave difficulties as they slowly progress on their own arduous, "road to Socialism."



The lines drawn on the original photograph of the Polish Parliament show the seats occupied by the various parties. At bottom the Communists (PZPR), above the United Peasant Party (ZSL), then a small square of non-party deputies (bezp), then the Democratic Party (SD), and finally more non-party deputies. In present-day Poland such distinctions have more meaning than elsewhere in the area.

Photo from *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), February 22, 1957

"Non-Communist" Political Organizations

Unlike the Soviet Union, where the Communist Party is the only political organization, the Satellites have a considerable proliferation of nominally non-Communist parties and "fronts." With these they make a great display of the rites and paraphernalia of democracy. This article surveys the reality behind that facade.

THERE ARE NO FREE political organizations in the Satellite area. The national fronts and "mass organizations" which function in all the countries, as well as the parties which exist in Czechoslovakia and Poland, serve only to implement Communist rule. The independence of these groups is mythical, their strength, even as puppets, minimal.

Until the final fruition of Communism, a time of Marxist nirvana which even the Soviet Union does not at present attend, the East European regimes have resigned themselves to the existence of overwhelmingly non-Communist populations. Since these populations cannot be completely immobilized politically, the Communists have chosen to make their own influence as wide as possible, to entice, split, and befuddle, by means of ostensibly autonomous political or-

ganizations. Caution, however, is the rule. There is no competition, no ideological rivalry, permitted from the Left. Genuine Social Democrats lead no parties, and to be a non-Party Marxist is to be (if not dead, jailed, or banished) exceedingly quiet.

Nor is any spiritual competition allowed. Independent religious voices of all denominations have been regularly silenced, and though there is a long tradition of Catholic political activity throughout much of the area, no sizeable Catholic organization now functions, save the Pax group in Poland, which is thoroughly in disrepute with Church authorities, and with most Poles.

Only the peasants have parties which—from the standpoint of composition, though not of doctrine—they can

call their own. Very probably these organizations exist because agriculture is the only major field not fully under State control; private farmers play a vital role in agricultural production. This being so, the regimes find it expedient to use an organization belonging nominally to the peasants, rather than the Communist Party alone, as a tool to encourage and control production. The long-standing traditions of peasant parties in an area largely agricultural are another element in the picture. They help to organize "voluntary" farm brigades, and try to persuade the peasants to fulfill crop deliveries. Most importantly, they recruit for the collectives.

Other activities of the non-Communist groups concern electioneering. The standard single-slate tickets in Satellite countries run under the auspices of the various fronts, whose functionaries campaign for the candidates, get out the vote, and now and then, no doubt, count the ballots too.

The organizations transmit regime policies and propagandize for their acceptance. In a secondary role they add their efforts to those of the Communist Party in urging the working class to greater productivity and to more willing acceptance of the low standards of living.

They also vow allegiance to the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. In some cases this—considering the amounts of time and energy expended—would appear to be their main occupation.

The structure of the organizations is not unlike that of normal political parties, with local district groups under regional bodies which, in turn, are answerable to a centralized national directorate. Size depends upon the success and intensity of recruitment campaigns, also upon the amount of pressure applied by the security forces and the various economic enterprise managements. The organizations may number only a few thousand members, as do the Czechoslovak parties, or, like the national fronts, may count their followers in the millions.

Inducements to join are varied. Many people belong for job security or, during "anti-subversion" drives, to gain immunity from harassment for past political activities. Some become members to achieve status. Others have been in the organizations since pre-Communist days and have never bothered—or dared—to leave. Still others, desiring some minimal participation in the rule of their countries, feel that even these diluted assemblages are preferable to complete a-politicality. Here and there, strategically located, are Communist agents, planted by the Party to guide, dominate, and spy. The leadership of the groups is made up, for the most part, of time-servers, docile men and women, eager to acknowledge Communist pre-eminence and to ferret out all signs of independence among their followers, in exchange for comparatively well-paid jobs.

Background

MANY POLITICAL PARTIES of Eastern as well as Western Europe drew together during the Nineteen Thirties in "popular fronts" to resist the encroachments of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the lesser rightist dictatorships

of the era. During the war these fronts carried on resistance movements in occupied countries and in some cases formed governments-in-exile. Communist Parties and underground organizations proclaimed willingness to cooperate with all "anti-Fascist" forces. Although there was a certain amount of such cooperation against the common enemy, the Communists steadfastly prepared for their eventual dominance by attempting, insofar as they were able, to liquidate all serious rivals for fundamental control. In two cases, Yugoslavia and Albania, this led to the bitterest kind of internecine warfare.

After the war, the parties and organizations which had engaged in the struggle formed, in most cases, coalition governments. These included the Communists, who immediately began their campaigns to obtain sole control over the government mechanism and the life of the countries.

In the West, where free elections prevailed and there was no Soviet Army of Liberation and Occupation, they were never able to accomplish their purpose. In East Europe the results were different. Although the Communists never once won a majority in honest balloting, their power grew steadily. The prime factor was the presence of Soviet troops which put constant pressure on democratic members of the coalition governments to avoid ties with the West and to give control of police and security organs to Communists. Thus, with law enforcement in their hands, the Communists had a clear road. They broadened the definition of "Fascist" to include all opposition and inaugurated an areawide campaign of terror. Independent political leaders were killed or imprisoned as "spies" or forced to flee to the West. The electoral processes were taken over, and non-Communist candidates were either fraudulently deprived of the positions they had won at the polls or prohibited even from running for office. By the end of 1948 Communist control of the area was complete. The prewar non-Communist parties were dissolved or thoroughly undermined, with Communist tools making up their new hierarchy. The fronts were supreme on the ballot, and the fronts were totally dominated by the Communist Party.

But the roots remained. The events of October 1956 in Poland and Hungary rejuvenated the parties, and, in the former country, two of them still exist, although their independence is very partial. In Hungary, after a brief flowering, the free parties were stamped out of sight by the armed Russian intervention.

Czechoslovakia

WITH A TRADITION of democratic government in the pre-war past, the Czechoslovak regime has found it expedient to maintain four non-Communist but completely subservient political organizations.

Two of the puppet groups, the Czechoslovak People's and the Slovak Renaissance Parties, try to appeal primarily to the peasantry. A third, the Czechoslovak Socialists, aims for the former middle class and some trade unionists who cannot accept or prefer to attempt to ignore the party-line vaporings of the Communists. The fourth group,

the Slovak Freedom Party, is so small and little publicized as to be almost invisible.

The peasant-oriented parties recruit for the collectives, help organize "voluntary" agricultural brigades, and attempt to persuade farmers to increase production and fulfill delivery quotas. The People's Party also tries to act as a rallying point for Catholics. The so-called Socialists propagandize for the various industrial plans, aid in forming industrial brigades, and carry out minor tasks in the trade unions. During election campaigns, all the parties are used to get out the vote for regime candidates. All issue frequent statements—used externally on the international propaganda mart and domestically to provide an appearance of internal harmony—praising the authorities and acknowledging the pre-eminence of the Communist Party.

The National Front

The four parties are presently grouped with the Communists and certain mass organizations in the National Front. Originating during World War II, when anti-Nazi elements joined forces to set up a government-in-exile under President Eduard Benes, the National Front went through a stage of semi-independence between liberation

and the Communist coup of February 1948, but is now Party-dominated. In the post-coup elections, no single party of the Front was allowed to put up candidates, but a general slate of Front candidates was advanced. It was the only slate and, since the Communist Party had taken control of the organization as well as the country, it was, in effect, a Communist slate.

Since 1948 the National Front has gone through periods of prominence and decline. Aside from its use during election campaigns, the front conveys directives of the regime to the people and functionally helps to control its component parts, the non-Communist parties and mass organizations, such as the trade unions, the Czechoslovak Youth League, and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League.

The total membership of the parties is small, probably no more than a few thousand in the two Czech organizations and even less in the Slovak groups (exact figures are unavailable). However, both the Socialist Party newspaper, *Svobodne Slovo*, and the People's Party organ, *Lidova Demokracie*, claim circulations of 120,000. The popularity of these Prague dailies may be due to their practice of carrying more non-political domestic and foreign news than the official Communist papers.

The parties are organized—in the areas where they operate—on a community-district-regional plan with central committees and a presidium at the highest level. Party "conferences" occur from time to time, but no party congress has been held for many years.

The Socialist Party

Deriving from Benes' National Socialist Party—the strongest non-Communist political organization before the 1948 coup—the present Socialists are led by their Chairman, Emanuel Slechta, the Vice-Chairman, Alois Neuman, and Secretary-General Miroslav Klinger. (Anti-Communist Chairman Petr Zenkl left the country when the party lost its independence in 1948; his non-collaborating colleagues were arrested or driven into exile.) Approximately 30 Socialist Deputies serve in the National Assembly, but are never identified by party on the election ballot.

An indication of the servility of Socialist Party leadership may be had from the following statement by Slechta reported in *Lidove Noviny* (Prague), May 24, 1954:

"Every loyal Czech and Slovak who has the welfare of the nation at heart looks with love and devotion to the Communist Party as our wise leader and the creator of our better future. It is in this sense that the Czechoslovak Socialist Party conceives its work in the National Front. . . ."

The People's Party

In Czechoslovakia's last free election, in 1946, the electorate gave more than one-seventh of its vote to the People's Party. Now under the leadership of an excommunicated priest, Josef Plojhar, the party still attempts to influence Catholics and peasants. It took a prominent part in the collectivization drives of 1950 and 1953, expressed its "deepest satisfaction" at the hanging of former Party Secretary-General Slansky, December 3, 1952 (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], December 3, 1952), on charges



E. Slechta, fellow-travelling Chairman of the Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia. He is Minister-Chairman of the State Committee for Construction.

Photo from *Ceskoslovenska* (Prague), Vol. VI, No. 6, 1951

largely anti-Semitic and anti-Titoist, and makes frequent obeisances to Communist authorities. Approximately 30 People's Party functionaries are Deputies in the National Assembly.

Pre-coup party leaders Jan Sramek and Frantisek Hala were arrested in 1948 and died under detention. Alois Petr, former Deputy Speaker of the Assembly assumed leadership of the People's Party under the Communist regime. When Petr died in 1951, Plojhar took first position.

The Slovak Parties

Consisting mainly of the functionaries who make up the organizational apparatus and of a limited number of rank and file members, the Renaissance and Freedom Parties perform the same functions as their Czech counterparts. At certain intervals, when the regime wishes to publicize the role of the National Front, the party hierarchies make speeches praising the Communist authorities, and from time to time pressure is brought to bear on small segments of the population to join the parties, thus keeping up the appearance of the National Front.

The Renaissance Party is Catholic and Protestant, the Freedom Party is Catholic. Both campaign for National Front candidates and try to promote regime agricultural policies; both indoctrinate the countryside to the best of their not very formidable abilities.

The Slovak Renaissance Party is all that remains of the pre-coup Democratic Party. Once nearly as large as the People's Party, the organization is now quite small and utterly subservient to Communist rule. *Lud* (Bratislava) is its official newspaper. Its authentic chairman, Jozef Lettrich, went to the West in 1948, and the first collaborationist leader, Jan Sevcik, after serving the regime for five years, received an eighteen-year jail sentence in 1954 for "high treason, sabotage, and theft of State property." The present chairman is Jozef Kysely.

The Slovak Freedom Party is even smaller than the Renaissance group and receives almost no publicity. Its principle functionaries are Michal Zakovic and Vincent Pokojny, and there is an official weekly paper called *Sloboda* (Bratislava).

Poland

ANIMATION CAME TO the non-Communist parties with the advent of the Gomulka regime in October 1956 in what the Poles used to call their October Revolution. Although the Communists retain their ascendancy, there is a good deal more vigor in the expressions and policies of the United Peasant Party (ZSL) than before the October events and a great deal more than in the non-Communist parties of any other Satellite country. While still officially approving collectivization, the ZSL, like the post-Gomulka Communist Party, now opposes forced measures, and, rather than merely propagating Party agriculture doctrine as before, the organization at present gives at least some appearance of looking out for the interests of the farmers themselves. The Democratic Party (SD) too, though less forceful than the Peasants, has shown strength and at least



L. Chajm, at right, Secretary-General of the Polish Democratic Party, with other members of his party, taking the oath of Sejm (Parliament) deputy.

Photo from *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), February 22, 1957

peripheral independence in representing the small tradesmen, handicraft workers and those remnants of the middle class which make up its following.

The new atmosphere in Polish political life was dramatized during a debate in the Sejm (Parliament), February 27, over a motion of support for the Gomulka leadership (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], February 28, 1957). Both non-Communist parties backed the regime, but their manner of declaring their support provided a telling contrast with their former subservience. Indeed, the chairman of the 117-man Peasant Party group of Deputies, Boleslaw Podeworny, aggressively voiced the dissatisfactions of the farm population with past agricultural policies. While in no sense of the word repudiating "Socialism," even for rural areas, he strongly advocated voluntary, rather than coercive methods for establishing collectivization. Dealing with peasant desires for decentralization and more local self-government, Podeworny stated, "We must speed up the elections to the people's councils in order to change their composition in accordance with popular demand."

The Communist Party (PZPR) Parliamentary Chairman, Zenon Kliszko, had passed hurriedly and vaguely over the subject of the people's councils and his stress on purely voluntary recruitment for the collectives was mild. Kliszko's main point was to convince his listeners that the October events had not signalled a revival of capitalism. "We shall always fight for the Socialist direction of the changes in the countryside. We shall always support the development of producer collectives."

In the same Sejm debate, Jan Karol Wende, speaking for the 39-member Democratic Party group, espoused "recognition of the necessity of the existence of small property in towns and villages," another point with which the Communist leader had not dealt directly. Wende too endorsed "Socialism," but devoted much more of his speech to problems of property claims, always from the point of view of the smallholder.

The United Peasant Party

The two parties were formed rather similarly; they are both mergers of pre-war political organizations deprived of their former independence and bogus "non-Marxist" groups presided over by Party-approved fellow travelers. The ZSL developed—or regressed—from the pre-war Peasant Party, which had maintained underground activities from exile during the German occupation, and afterwards had refused to join the identically-named "Peasant Party" set up by the Communists in 1944.

After the 1947 elections, the leadership of the free Peasant Party either fled the country or was imprisoned. Although the chairman, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, asserted that his party actually received 74 percent of the vote, the Communists seized full control of the country and installed their own Peasant Party in a minority position in the Sejm. By 1949 some remnants of Mikolajczyk's organization were forced into the Communist-controlled group, and the merged membership received its new title, the United Peasant Party (ZSL), under which they slavishly followed regime policies until the October 1956 events.

In the years that followed the dissolution of the free Peasant Party, the ZSL concentrated on pacifying and recruiting the middle peasants for the collectives, while the Communist PZPR focussed on the small farmers, but with such lack of success that, little by little, the ZSL was permitted—or directed—to extend its activities to include all the peasants. Membership in the United Peasant Party, which may have reached as high as a quarter million, did not, however, stifle discontent over regime agricultural policies. Nor did it make collectivization any more attractive, as was pointed out in a speech to the ZSL Congress by Chairman Stefan Ignar (quoted in the party newspaper, *Zielony Sztandar* [Warsaw], March 12, 1956). Resistance to collectivization, Ignar admitted, had developed in Cracow, Kielce, Lublin, and other districts; achievements "were rather small . . . and hostile, bourgeois-kulak ideol-



Stefan Ignar, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Polish United Peasant Party and leading speaker at the recent party Congress.

Zielony Sztandar (Warsaw), April 21, 1957

ogy" was influencing the peasants and hampering recruitment.

The mass collapse of the collectives (over 80 percent dissolved in the wake of the October 1956 events) accompanied a grass-roots revolt against Stalinist agricultural policies which was permitted by the Gomulka regime and, subsequently, approved by the ZSL leadership; hence the change in tone of the pronouncements in the Sejm and the press. Whether the ZSL will, in the future, truly speak from the point of view of the farmers—of the governed, that is, rather than the governors—is, of course, problematical. In a recent meeting with the East German Democratic Peasants Party in Berlin (Radio Berlin, July 11), the ZSL spokesmen sounded the same familiar notes as Communist delegations under similar circumstances. However the fact that a Peasant Party group was sent on this chore may argue for the organization's increased prestige.

The Democratic Party

Like the utility room of a rather uncomfortable modern house, the SD was fabricated in 1950 to provide storage space for such "outmoded" independent organizations as the prewar Democratic and Labor Parties which, if left in open view, might have embarrassed the Stalinist householders. One of Secretary-General Leon Chajn's speeches, broadcast over Radio Warsaw, March 16, shows, even after the October events, the essential subordination of the SD: "We speak of the SD as an allied party. . . . This means that we recognize the leading role of another party, the PZPR [Communist Party]."

The area of political activity or pseudo-activity reserved to the SD was indicated by the June 19 issue of *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), the party weekly, which editorialized on the inadvisability of broadening the basis of the organization to include workers and peasants, not merely artisans, intelligentsia, and the former middle class as at present: "Transformation of the Democratic Party into a party of the universal type would mean that a new political party would be formed in Poland. . . . [which would become] a party of opposition toward the PZPR and the ZSL. The Democratic Party is against this. . . . Why should we be encouraged to stand in opposition to these allies?"

Designed originally to funnel dissident artisans and intellectuals of prewar vintage into a malleable mass, the SD has performed a variety of tasks in the past decade and has had no great success with any of them. Its principle efforts went to promote the liquidation of independent craftsmen and to spur the collectivized handicraft workers to greater productivity. The party also attempted to indoctrinate the older non-Communist intelligentsia into greater appreciation of Stalinist dogma.

Its failure in all these missions was made apparent after the October events when increasing numbers of artisans returned to their individualistic practices and the intellectuals refused to defend the pre-Gomulka rulers. Even the now-countenanced proprietors of small businesses, who might have been expected to gather to the Democratic Party, at least under present conditions, have held back,




DIAGRAM OF PAX BUSINESS SET-UP
AFTER ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE (WARSAW), JULY 7, 1957

perhaps in fear that a change in the regime would make such identification dangerous.

National Unity Front

The National Unity Front, comprising all parties and most mass organizations, performed an important function in the January 1957 Parliamentary election. This election was unique among those staged by the Communist regimes: although there was, as ever, only one slate of candidates (called the National Unity Front list), there were more candidates than seats to be filled, and some limited choice among candidates was therefore possible (see *East Europe*, March 1957, pp. 3-12, for an account of this election). It was the function of committees established by the National Unity Front to select the locals lists of candidates from among names proposed by the various parties, trade unions, student groups and other mass organizations. Aside from this activity, the Front's functions are vague.

Mass Organizations

Several mass organizations play roles of importance on the Polish political scene. The new Communist youth group, ZMS, has superseded the pre-Gomulka organization, ZMP, but has achieved neither the membership nor the authority of the disbanded group, although it has garnered much of the ZMP's unpopularity. The Union of Village Youth was

established in February 1957 to quiet Peasant Party demands for the re-establishment of "Wici," the prewar militant association of peasant youth which was suppressed in 1948. The union has much the same outlook at present as the United Peasant Party, but has been somewhat more successful in its recruiting drives. There has been a strong resurgence of the non-political Scout Movement, which during the Stalinist period, was considered merely a Communist vehicle for indoctrinating the youth.

Pax

Also unclear is the present status of Pax, a pseudo-Catholic organization which has built up large industrial holdings to accompany—and help support—its newspaper, magazine, and book publishing enterprises and its social and "religious" activities.

Pax has been guided since its inception in 1945 by Boleslaw Piasecki, probably the ranking Polish "genius" of business manipulation and self-publicity, whose prewar quasi-Fascist background has in no way inhibited the ardor of his postwar embrace of Stalinism. Although active in the Resistance (he was anti-German rather than anti-Fascist), Piasecki's hostility to Communism was sufficiently well known by the time of the Liberation to cause his imprisonment by the Russians. In fact, it was during a period when he was under sentence of death that he devised his scheme for a "progressive Catholic" social organization, which he

detailed in a memorandum to the Soviet security authorities. So impressed were the latter with this right-wing leader's left-wing vision, that they freed him at once and swept aside all obstacles which could have delayed the implementation of his plan. Among those obstacles were the legitimate, anti-Communist leaders, both laymen and clergy, to whom the Catholic population would naturally have looked for guidance. The Soviets were well aware of Poland's predominantly Catholic complexion (over 90 percent) and of the minimal gains Communist recruiters had made in that country in the past. The Pax organization, of course, was to be a means for carrying out Soviet policies.

Whether Pax accomplished very much in the way of indoctrination of the non-Communist population is doubtful. At any rate the group's social activities were soon dwarfed by the monstrous growth of its financial empire. Along with its publishing activities the organization has taken over or founded factories, warehouses, and stores. It employs between four and five thousand people. It dominates whole sections of the construction industry in Poland. Through its industrial-commercial enterprises, grouped under the title of INCO, and its central organization, Veritas, Pax manufactures a bewildering variety of products: tiles, wooden floor pieces, complete one-family houses, religious articles on a mass scale (which it sells in its own stores). Pax book publications range blithely from classic religious literature to Marxist doctrine to the works of T. S. Eliot. Some of the ramifications of the organization were explored by the independent newspaper *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw) on July 7:

"Pax had over 66 million *zloty* in permanent property, over 100 million *zloty* in circulation, including 11 million in hard money in banks and safe deposits of various enterprises, by the end of 1956. . . . In that year it showed a one-hundred-million-*zloty* profit, of which 38 million were spent to cover deficits of socio-political enterprises. This includes the deficits of all publications and allocations for education. . . .

"From a formally legal point of view Pax enterprises retain the character of private companies with limited liabilities [i.e., corporations]. . . . At the same time they have almost every kind of nationalized enterprise privilege . . . such as rations of crude iron and other material. . . . Pax enterprises pay the same insurance rates as nationalized ones, that is, 15.5 percent payment funds, whereas all other private enterprises pay 30.5 percent. . . . But Pax's greatest privilege is its exemption from income tax as well as from any kind of payment to the government treasury from profits."

The Pax daily newspaper, *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw), maintains a circulation between 150,000 and 200,000, and there are several Pax weeklies, the most prominent being *Kierunki*, also published in Warsaw. The influential *Cracow* weekly, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, had been handed to Pax by regime authorities when the Journal refused to publish a laudatory article upon Stalin's death, but has been restored to independent Catholic editorship since the October events. Notwithstanding this affront to the organization, the relationship between Pax and the regime is an ambiguous one.

On July 6, 1957, the Polish Church leader, Cardinal Wyszynski, formally prohibited members of the clergy from writing for any Pax publications.* No paper in Poland was allowed to publish this injunction, however. *Tygodnik Powszechny* did not go to press one week in July in protest, but the regime held firm. Why the Gomulka government should thus protect Pax, in view of the Stalinist policies of the organization, can be only a matter for speculation. As late as May 2, 1957 at the Pax Plenary Session in Warsaw, Piasecki, while paying his respects to Gomulka's personal character, viciously attacked the Polish Communist chief's liberalizing policies (*Slowo Powszechne* [Warsaw], May 10). It has been suggested that the Gomulka regime, like its predecessors, views Pax primarily as a means of dividing the Catholic population and thus preventing its unity under the leadership of Cardinal Wyszynski whose political stature has greatly increased since the government's concessions to the Church, following the October events.

Independent Catholic feelings have been manifest in ZNAK, a Catholic parliamentary "circle" formed after the October changeover. It is significant that the Gomulka regime has refused to allow this group to organize into a parliamentary "club," which would give it more prestige and power. Nor has the regime allowed a Catholic—or for that matter, even an SD—youth group to organize on a unified national level.

Attitude Toward the Non-Communist Parties

In his address to the Ninth CC Plenum on May 15 (*Trybuna Ludu*, May 15-16) Communist Party chief Gomulka stressed his approval both of the new strength of the non-Communist parties and of the reliance the Communists now place on them. But Gomulka's speech also revealed a rather ambivalent uneasiness and a determination to contain the spirit of independence, especially in the United Peasant Party.

"The deviations that were permitted in the past had their effect on the cooperation of the [Communist] Party with the ZSL. The independence of the latter was seriously restricted. The leading role of our Party became a dominating role, and under these circumstances the ZSL was unable to display its own creativity; nor could it exert a really strong Socializing influence on the peasant masses. This fact affected for the worse the worker-peasant alliance and the people's government. . . . We consider the ZSL an independent party. . . . We do not wish to violate—and we do not violate—its political sovereignty. . . . We want its ranks to grow.

"At the same time our Party cannot but show deep concern at the accidental penetration into the ZSL of elements alien and even hostile to the people's government and to Socialism. . . . Openly hostile actions against our Party, against our government, against the cooperation of the

* This was shortly after the Cardinal's return from his trip to Rome. The Vatican's attitude toward Piasecki and his organization has ranged from mere disapproval to outright condemnation in the strongest terms.

ZSL and the Party occur in some ZSL organizations. . . .
This cannot be tolerated. . . ."

Hungary

IN HUNGARY TODAY there are no non-Communist political parties, and even that classic Communist contraption, the national front, barely functions. Control over the restive population now lies entirely in the hands of the security organs and the Soviet occupying forces. The Communists (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in its post-Revolt incarnation) are too busy rebuilding their own organization, which almost completely disintegrated during the Revolt in October 1956, to concern themselves with the subtleties of "opposition" party artifices.

The failure of Communist efforts to liquidate the roots of genuine political parties and the bogus quality of their Patriotic People's Front were glaringly illuminated during the Revolt when prewar parties spontaneously reappeared and the Front collapsed. By October 30, Premier Imre Nagy was telling the country over Radio Budapest that, "In the interests of further democratization . . . the Cabinet has abolished the one-party system and decided to return to a method of government based on the democratic cooperation of the coalition parties as they existed in 1945." The Social Democrats, the Smallholders,* and the National Peasant Party (the latter renamed the Petofi Party), which had been the largest democratic political groups in prewar Hungary, were already in the process of reorganization, seeking, first, a successful culmination of the uprising and, secondly, to represent the interests they traditionally had upheld. The party leaders agreed to serve on the coalition cabinet of Imre Nagy but they also set about reconstructing their own organizations. On November 1, Social Democratic leader Gyula Keleman asserted over Radio Free Budapest: "Hundreds of thousands of organized workers who suffered the bitterness of oppression today are rebuilding the Social Democratic Party." That station announced on October 30 that the national office of the Smallholders' Party had resumed activities at its former Budapest address. The National Peasant Party was reorganized on October 31, and next day three central party newspapers appeared in Budapest: *Nepszava* for the Social Democrats, *Kis Ujsag* for the Smallholders and *Szabad Szo* for the National Peasant Party.

Events progressed so swiftly that on the eve of the November 4 Soviet intervention there were only three Communists in the Hungarian government. Two National Peasants, three Social Democrats, and three Smallholders held the other ministries. Leadership of the non-Communist parties had been returned in many cases to men and women who had spent years in Communist jails: Istvan Bibó and Ferenc Farkas of the National Peasant Party; Social Democrats, Anna Kéthly and Josef Fischer; Smallholders Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, and Istvan B. Szabo.

Although the spontaneous formation of local party organizations took place during the Revolt, untrammelled

political life lay in the future when the revolution would have been secured. The armed Soviet intervention, of course, destroyed all hopes for democratic government; the parties, for the second time in postwar history, ceased entirely to function.

In the postwar free elections of November 1945, the Smallholders, who represented the landowning small peasantry but also had much support in the cities, won a clear majority of the Hungarian electorate and 245 of the 409 parliamentary seats. Second were the Communists with 70 seats, immediately followed by the Social Democrats with 69 (although the latter received a slightly higher total vote than the Communists). The National Peasant Party was fourth in strength with 23 seats.

The coalition government formed after this election — with Smallholder Ferenc Nagy as Premier — acceded to the pressure of Soviet Marshal Klement Voroshilov and assigned the Ministry of Interior to the Communists. Thus, with the vital police and security organs under their control, the Communists were on their way toward total domination of the country. Intimidation, arrests on trumped-up charges of "Fascist" sympathies, and open terror were employed to splinter the Smallholders and the other free parties into disunited factions, many of which soon became submissive to the Communists. In those instances where the Party was unsuccessful in eliminating serious opposition, the Soviet Army intervened, as in the case of Bela Kovacs, Secretary-General of the Smallholders, who was arrested in February 1947 for "military espionage."

Later that year, when the regime organized a new election to consolidate its authority, the three independent parties in the government were leaderless, divided, and virtually under Communist control. Nevertheless, the Communists managed to collect only 100 of the 411 parliamentary seats, while the Smallholders retained 68, the Social Democrats 67, and the National Peasants 36. Non-coalition groups — among them the Democratic People's, the Hungarian Independence, and the Hungarian Democratic Parties — though newly formed, were able to win 140 seats, with much of their support coming from areas which had formerly registered strong Smallholder majorities.

When the Social Democrats charged fraud at the polls, they were subjected to increased pressure and terroristic methods and many of their remaining leaders were jailed. Thus the ground was prepared for the March 1948 absorption of the Social Democrats by the Communists to form the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party.

The coalition with the enfeebled and by now quite docile Smallholders' and National Peasant Parties was maintained as a facade of representative government. However, the election of the deputies of the Hungarian Independence Party was annulled by the Communists on the grounds of "fraud and violation of election law." Pressure continued against the other parties — testimony in the 1949 trial of Cardinal Mindszenty was utilized to slander many non-Communists — and more arrests of opposition leaders took place. By early 1949 all anti-regime figures either had been silenced or had fled the country, and the Communists were able to shed the last vestiges of the multi-party system.

* Next month, *East Europe* will carry an eyewitness account of the re-establishment of the Smallholders' Party during the Revolt.

The Independent People's Front

In April, 1949, a new election law gave the national front organization — renamed the Independent People's Front — power to designate all candidates for office in the May single-slate elections; although the other government parties could still nominate, their candidates had now to be approved by the Front directorate which was, of course, completely under Communist control, as were such subsidiary Front groups and mass organizations as the trade unions, the Working Youth League, and the Women's Democratic League.

The predecessor of the new Front had been created, with the initiative of the Communists and the cautious support of the three large non-Communist parties, in December 1944, as the Hungarian National Front for Independence. Designed for unity in the resistance against Fascism, it was a loosely defined organization and made no large impact on Hungarian political life until the above-mentioned election of 1949 when, in its "reorganized" state, its single slate of candidates, naturally, won an overwhelming plurality. According to official results, 94 percent of the votes cast approved the Front list.

The Patriotic People's Front

An attempt at revitalization of the front movement took place in 1954, during the Imre Nagy "New Course" Premiership. With another name — the Patriotic People's Front — and a fresh effort to gain a real following at the grass roots level, the organization nevertheless failed to revive the old independent parties. When Nagy was banished from the regime the following year, the Front lost importance. During and immediately after the Revolt it was all

but forgotten. However, there have been recent signs of revival. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), the Party organ, in a full-page article on May 3, ruminated upon the inadvisability of permitting the reestablishment of non-Communist parties in Hungary, although admitting their *raison d'être* in Poland and People's China, and then got down to the meat of its message, the journal's dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Patriotic People's Front:

"It is a mistake to believe that mere participation of certain non-Communist individuals in the Patriotic People's Front actually constitutes a real people's front movement. The participation of leading personalities is important, but it is not enough. . . . According to a current definition, the Patriotic People's Front has been classified as an assembly of Socialist forces. This may be a fine-sounding definition, but it is too exclusive. How can we enlarge it to include the millions of individual farmers, small producers, and intellectuals who are not as yet Socialists? These people can in no way be included in the definition of Socialist forces, yet we want them in the Front. . . . All who see eye to eye with the Communists on such main problems as the building of Socialism, the defense of peace, and the raising of the people's living standards must be given an opportunity to make their voices heard and to use their knowledge and abilities for the good of the country. The Patriotic People's Front must become a rallying force and a political arena."

Bulgaria

SINCE THE "LIBERATION" of Bulgaria by the Soviet Union in September, 1944, the electoral system of the country has been nominally controlled by the Fatherland Front, which is at present — not at all nominally — in the grasp of the Communist Party. All independent parties have been wiped out, and the only other political organization of any importance, the Agrarian Union, is subordinate to the Fatherland Front and, of course, to the Communists. However, proscription of party political activity is no unprecedented phenomenon in Bulgaria. For five years before the outbreak of World War II, and for five years during that war, the country was ruled by the semi-totalitarian faction surrounding King Boris III. Bulgaria was allied with Nazi Germany, but because of its vulnerability to neighboring Russia refrained from declaring war against the Soviet Union. Bulgaria's illegal Communist Party was then headed by Georgi Dimitrov, and it was he who called from Moscow, in 1942, for the formation of an underground "Fatherland Front" of all anti-Fascist elements. Two years later, the day after the Soviet invasion, the Front successfully executed a *coup d'état* and took over the government.

At this stage there were four political organizations in the Front: Communists, Social Democrats, Agrarians, and the *Zveno* (a political association of right-wing intellectuals and military men). But the Communists, aided by the Soviet Army, were able to assume control of the security organs and with methodical terrorism slowly decimated the independent parties — and all other opposition — until, by the end of 1947, they were the single power within the Front, and therefore within the regime. The non-



Georgi Traikov, Secretary of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union.
Bulgaria (Sofia), May 1957

collaborating Agrarians and Social Democrats, who had left the Front in 1945, were isolated and without the means to influence the country; those who remained were absorbed into the monolithic organization. The *Zveno* simply ceased to function.

The Fatherland Front, with a membership of 2,900,000, is widely and not very selectively organized. Currently headed by Dimeter Ganeff, it maintains organizations in the cities and in the countryside, recruits members individually and by the gross through mass organizations and trade unions. A National Council is "elected" periodically, from which the Executive Committee is appointed. The Front hierarchy is heavily packed with Communist functionaries and Party Central Committee members but there is a sprinkling of non-Communists—Agrarian Union chief Georgi Traikov is one of them—to lend the impression of broad representation.

The branches of its central administration reveal the Front's functions. There is a Department for Political, Educational, and Cultural Activities, subdivided into sections for Press and Propaganda, Agitation, and Library and Documentation. Another branch, uncomfortably titled the Department of Workers' Initiative, has such sections as: "Mobilization of the Population for State Economic Activities" and "Mobilization of the Population for Communal Construction." There is also a "Cultural Brigade."

At the Fourth Fatherland Front Congress, February 1957, the then Premier, Vulko Chervenkov, characterized the group as "the largest, most accessible public political organization in the country." A resolution of this Congress called the Front, "a living embodiment of the union of the working class with the toiling peasants and the people's intelligentsia," adding later that, "its main task is to educate the people in a patriotic and Socialist spirit . . . and to explain internal and foreign political problems as well as Party and government decisions." The resolution also called for increased work by Front functionaries among members of the collectives and private farmers so as "to insure high yields in agriculture." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia] February 14, 1957.)

The Agrarian Union

Uneasiness over the state of mind of the peasants, and the Front's inability to influence them to greater production and to join collectives, led in 1953 to a campaign to rejuvenate the Agrarian Union. Many Agrarian leaders were released from prison to assume active roles in the organization as well as in the Fatherland Front. These leaders had been arrested during and after the trial and execution of their non-Communist leader, Nikola Petkov, in 1947. In nearly every case the released leaders issued statements supporting the aims of the Communist Party and the regime. Only Dimeter Gichev, who has never recanted, remains, apparently, still in prison.

The function of the Union, which now claims 120,000 members, is to influence the peasants politically, recruit for the collectives, and encourage higher agricultural production. The seriousness with which the Communists view this work can be judged from the fact that the Union is not



Ferdinand Kozovsky addressing the Fourth Congress of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. He is Secretary of the "standing Bureau of the National Fatherland Front Council."

Bulgaria (Sofia), March 1957

required continually to voice its subservience to the Party (as the Fatherland Front must). The Communists in all probability fear that such overt humbleness might detract from the membership recruiting campaigns of the organization. Nevertheless, Agrarian leadership has showed no signs of real independence; the Union's highest functionary, Georgi Traikov, has served the Communists faithfully since he accepted their mastery over the Union in 1947.

There has been no reliable indication of the amount of genuine success achieved by either the Agrarians or the Fatherland Front in their assigned tasks, but, as in other Communist States, there is periodic criticism by Party bureaucrats for the non-Communist groups' lack of initiative and aggressiveness. Whether this sporadic harshness merely serves to hold the organizations in a state of energetic insecurity or whether it reveals time-serving and malinger qualities in the work of the puppet chiefs cannot be determined.

Romania

ALL THAT ROMANIA has to offer in the way of a non-Communist organization is the People's Democratic Front, composed of mass organizations such as the Union of Working Youth, the Committee of Working Women, and the Central Council of Trade Unions. The size of the Front is unknown, its differences with the Party obscure, its accomplishments meager. Save for sporadic bits of electioneering on behalf of regime candidates, it appears little more than a paper assemblage, the least active and effec-

tive of all the East European political contrivances.

The forerunner of the present organization, the National Democratic Front, which comprised the three leading political parties — Social Democrats, National Peasants, and National Liberals — as well as Communists, was founded June 20, 1944; this was two months before the Romanian armistice with the Soviet Union which left Russian troops in occupation. Over the next half year — while the Soviet forces occupied the country — there were three coalition governments led by non-political military men, all nominally under King Michael. This was a period of uncertainty and political connivance. It culminated in a table-pounding visit from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky, from which a more permanent regime emerged, March 6, 1945, with a Communist majority under fellow-travelling Premier Petru Groza, head of the Ploughman's Front, an old agrarian association. Communists took over the police and security organs and immediately began to eliminate their enemies. Both the National Liberal and the National Peasant Parties which, between them, had comprised two-thirds of the electorate in prewar days, were excluded from the government.

Diplomatic pressure from the United States and Great Britain, which refused to negotiate a peace treaty with the Groza regime on the grounds that it was not representative of the Romanian people, forced a slow-down in the Communist march to complete power. However, the election of November, 1946, brought an 84 percent "majority" to the Front ticket, and the Western powers were unable to do anything but protest the terroristic atmosphere in which the campaign had been waged and the fraudulence of the vote count. The National Liberals, National Peasants, and the non-collaborating majority of the Social Democratic Party had each run separate slates in the election, and they — and all other opposition splinter groups — were not represented in the new parliament. By the end of 1947, the National Peasant Party was dissolved and its chairman, Iulio Maniu, jailed as a spy. (He died in prison five years later.) Dinu Bratianu, anti-Communist chief of the National Liberal Party, was jailed in 1948; he died there three years later. Another National Liberal leader, prewar Premier Gheorghe Tatarescu, who had collaborated with the Iron Guard and other Fascist elements in Romania, collaborated also with the Communists as Foreign Minister in their 1945 "coalition" government. He was removed from office in 1947, jailed in 1951. His party was driven underground, and many of its other leaders, as well as those of the non-collaborating Social Democrats — including the founder of the party, Constantin Titel-Petrescu — were imprisoned. King Michael was forced to abdicate, December 30-31, 1947. Two months later the Communists and the fellow-travelling remnants of the Social Democratic Party merged to form the Romanian Workers' (Communist)



Petru Groza, now President of Romania, once head of the Ploughman's Front.

La Romanie d'aujourd'hui (Bucharest), January 1955

Party. From that time there have been no organized non-Communist parties in the country.

(In 1955 Tatarescu and Titel-Petrescu were freed from prison, along with other members of their parties and Ionel Pop, a nephew of Maniu and formerly a leader in National Peasant Party. All the released men purportedly issued statements supporting the regime; they made no attempts to reorganize their parties.)

The Front emerged for the single-slate 1952 election, after which there was another period of quiescence until December 1956, when a Central Committee of the People's Democratic Front materialized to prepare for the elections of February 1957. (If a Central Committee had been in existence during the five previous years, it was totally unpublicized.) The Committee roster sported the names of such Communist luminaries as Party chief Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Premier Chivu Stoica, as well as "independents," like the writer Mihail Sadoveanu; its Secretariat was composed entirely of Communist Party members.

The election campaign featured "explanations" of regime policies, praise for the Soviet Union, and condemnation of revisionism and the Western Powers. After 98.8 percent of the voters had cast ballots for the unopposed ticket, the Front backed again into the shadows.

The Romanian Economy: Thousands of Cobwebs

This illuminating report on the lumbering inefficiencies of the "planned" Romanian economy is based on material furnished by a well-informed Romanian who left that country toward the end of last year.

For the last three years nearly all of Romania's industries have been in financial difficulties. Beginning in 1954, and at six-month intervals, the government was compelled to grant special loans (*alocari de compensare ministeriala*) to the various industries so that they could pay their debts. If the public enterprises had been private concerns, they would have gone bankrupt on such a scale as to cause a national disaster. Even the government is going through a period of serious financial crisis.

Every enterprise has an open account at the State Bank, and payments between one enterprise and another are made by means of "scrip," or endorsements. Even if an enterprise is sufficiently covered by its account in the State Bank, the Bank may order it to reduce its expenditures. Bank operations are subject to postponement, and the natural result is delay in production. If an enterprise asks a certain sum for the transferring of personnel, or other purposes related to efficient operation, the Bank has the power to grant, reduce or deny the request. The Ministry of Finance has given the Bank instructions to decrease expenditures in order to avoid inflation. Consequently credit is artificially limited until it falls below the level of usable funds.

In 1955 a secret decree was issued stipulating that an enterprise which cannot pay its salaries on time because the Bank does not have sufficient cash on hand must postpone them. For instance, suppose that an enterprise has an account of five million *lei* in the Bank and writes a payroll check for two million *lei*. The Bank may decide to wait several days until it realizes the necessary sum through deposits.

The inefficiency of the Romanian economy has led the government to take various clumsy measures in an effort to reduce costs. These have resulted in a state of financial stringency that makes it very difficult for enterprises to cover legitimate expenses. Some factory directors, frightened by the great responsibility of their positions and the danger of not fulfilling the production plans on time, began to store up enormous quantities of raw materials, thus forming "above-quota" or unused stocks. To combat this practice the government has imposed restrictions on working capital which in many cases are arbitrarily narrow. Furthermore, since 1955 the Ministry of Finance has furnished enterprises with their operating funds for the first half of each year only after considerable delay. Another difficulty is caused by late deliveries or late payments, for which the enterprise must pay high fines. Factories also find their debts increasing when their products are refused because of poor quality, for this entails sanctions against them. Constant thefts by employees make things still worse.

All these factors have led to a cumulative blocking of enterprise accounts in the State Bank. The condition spreads like a contagious disease. If one enterprise has its account blocked and cannot pay its bills, this inevitably

leads to the blocking of its suppliers' accounts, for these cannot pay their bills either. In 1954 it was decided to remedy the situation by granting an inter-ministry compensation loan (*imprumut de compensare interministeriala*). With this loan the Bank was able to pay all the enterprises' accumulated bills, substituting one creditor—the State Bank—for many. Payment of the loan was to be spread over a six-month period, and installments were fixed by mutual agreement between the credit inspectors of the Bank and the enterprise directors. But this remedy only produced a temporary improvement. The overall financial situation remained exactly as it had been, and after six months the enterprises were again in difficulties. Now they had to pay their suppliers and, in addition, meet the installments on the compensation loan. Two such loans were granted in 1955, and in 1956 it was rumored that another was being planned.

The campaign for greater economy also leads to arbitrary restrictions on personnel. In spite of the bloated bureaucracy, it is often difficult to hire and retain essential employees. In one enterprise under the Ministry of Agriculture there was only one typist listed, though it needed at least three. As a matter of fact, it actually had three, but two of them were disguised as manual laborers in the workshops. In April 1956 there was a surprise inspection. The trick was discovered and the Finance Ministry debited the director, head engineer and head accountant for the sums which had been illegally paid to the two typists. The decision was appealed to the Mediation Board of the Ministry of Agriculture, which overruled it. The Mediation Board was supported by the local civil court, which ruled that three typists were actually needed "for the efficient operation of the enterprise." Finally authorization was obtained for the hiring of a second typist. The enterprise continued to employ the third typist illegally.

The Romanian Communists have not been able to solve the problem of organized production, the problem of manufacturing products of decent quality at low prices. In Romania today pencil sharpeners break pencil points, erasers do not erase, there is no ink which will not clog fountain pens. The forced pace of industrialization, economic autocracy and efforts to reduce labor costs by means of "Socialist Competition," together with ever higher work quotas and other measures of compulsion, have turned the struggle for greater output into a near disaster.

Nevertheless, the government continues to praise its own economic accomplishments. Charts, posters, newspaper articles and "educational" talks attempt to show a constant increase in production since the war. They show, for example, that the oil industry has surpassed the level of 1938. But they do not admit that the Romanian people have not benefited from the increase, nor do they explain why fuel is so expensive.

The Party

and the

Peasant

This article, the first of a series on Satellite agriculture, surveys the farm problem in Eastern Europe and analyzes last year's peasant victory in Poland. The next article will cover the history and defeat of collectivization in Hungary. Subsequent installments will deal with collectivization in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Baltic States, and will analyze recent developments in agricultural production, crop yields and peasant incomes.



Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), June 9, 1957

Part I: Collectivization

THE STOUTEST obstacle to Communism in Eastern Europe has been that silent man of property, the peasant. During the last ten years the Satellite governments have unlimbered almost every political and economic weapon in the Communist arsenal in an effort to force the peasant into "Socialism," but only in Bulgaria has the campaign achieved victory. Elsewhere in the area the collectivization drives have either slowed down at an early stage or ended in clear defeat for the Communists. The first recognition of the peasant's strength came in Yugoslavia, where the assault was abandoned in 1951. Two years later the Hungarian Communists relaxed their grip upon the countryside only to tighten it again after nearly half the members of collective farms had left them. Poland's bloodless revolution of October 1956 was above everything else a victory for the peasant, resulting in a tacit guarantee that for the time being land policy is to be based on private farming. Hungary's extirpated Revolt has left the peasant in a better position than before, although the Kadar regime still clings to a program of eventual collectivization. Even in Czechoslovakia, strongest of the Satellites, the area of land in collective farms is still less than that in the private sector.

The significance of this failure is not merely ideological. It has serious implications for the whole East European economy. The economic system developed in the USSR was keyed to rapid industrialization, giving priority to metallurgy and machinery, those instruments of twentieth century power, while other types of production were treated as of secondary importance. The function of agriculture in the system was to guarantee an adequate supply of cheap food and industrial raw materials for the burgeoning towns, and to provide a source of foreign exchange through exports. In other words, the economic surplus necessary to finance a rapid industrialization was drawn largely from the land. Such a program would not have been possible in a system based on small-scale private farming of the type generally favored by the European peasant. While the Communists have supplied various ideological justifications for the collective farm, its real function has been to impose a burden on the peasant that he could not otherwise have been made to accept.

The failure to collectivize agriculture in most of Eastern Europe has seriously weakened the Satellite economies. An essential lever of the State has not been hammered into

place. The point is not merely that farm production has failed to increase, but also that the State has not been able to garner its necessary share. The long campaign against peasant proprietorship—lasting more than eight years—has served only to weaken agriculture by penalizing the most efficient producers. It has been unable to offset this by bringing the land under State control. An ironic result is that in 1956 the independent peasants of Poland and Hungary were more numerous than they had been before the war—thanks to the agrarian reforms partly sponsored by the Communists in the early postwar years. The economic consequences of this were shown by a Hungarian Communist theoretician in 1953:*

"The number of small producers is now much larger than it used to be. The [large] producer who used to produce primarily for the market produces half as much today; and today the countryside consumes much more and markets much less than in the past. Our Socialist large-scale farms, partly for the same reasons and partly on account of their still-existing infantile disorders (inadequate management, lax labor discipline), are for the time being unable to make up for the shortage."

The magnitude of the failure can be seen in the fact that Eastern Europe, formerly an area of agricultural surplus, has become one of deficit. Instead of exporting farm produce it now has to import it from as far away as Argentina and Canada. In 1955 Poland alone imported more than a million tons of grain, and in the last several years Czechoslovakia and Hungary have also been net grain importers. The agricultural sector has become a drain upon the economy rather than an asset. The Czechoslovak newspaper *Zemědělské Noviny* (Prague), January 13, 1957 commented on the agricultural deficit as follows:

"Up to now we have been importing much more agricultural produce than ever before, and this import burdens our trade balance. A comparison of two periods will suffice: In 1937 we exported agricultural produce valued at 1 billion 179 million *koruny* and imported produce valued at 1 billion 787 million *koruny*, while in 1955 we imported produce to a value of 2 billion 198 million *koruny* and exported only 522 million *koruny* worth. As good managers we must seek to make up this great deficit in the agricultural balance [by increasing agricultural production]."

Had the Satellite regimes been able to carry out their collectivization in the Soviet style they might have succeeded in transferring the burden of the grain shortage to the peasants. The Soviet State was quite ruthless in doing so: during the great famine of 1932-1933, accompanied by mass starvation in rural areas, the USSR continued to export grain at the rate of more than 1.7 million tons annually. The East European Communists, except in Bulgaria, have been more delicate in their approach to the peasant. While never disavowing the ultimate goal of abolishing private property in land—still proclaimed even in Yugoslavia—the regimes have been forced to tack and turn, to lure the peasant with promises, to persuade and

to compromise. Their lack of success with these policies is now forcing a general re-evaluation of agricultural programs.

The Dilemma

FACED ON THE ONE HAND with the failure of collectivization, and on the other with a decaying agriculture, the Communists have responded in two different ways. Poland, like Yugoslavia previously, has abandoned the effort to collectivize and is seeking to create a viable peasant economy based on private ownership. This involves a variety of measures, including the right to buy and sell land, higher prices for produce delivered to the government, more liberal financial assistance from the State banks, more building materials for the countryside and increased supplies of fertilizer. These all add up to a greater share for the rural sector in national income and investment. A different combination of policies has been adopted in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, where the regimes are seeking to make the best of both worlds: to expand the collectivized area and at the same time give incentives to private farmers to raise production. In Hungary and Romania reforms in the State delivery system are under way. The current Five Year Plans for 1956-1960 call for increases in the share of total investment going to agriculture as compared with actual spending during the preceding five years. And the prime indicator of agricultural progress, grain yields per hectare, is scheduled to rise by substantial amounts, ranging from 15 percent in East Germany to 25 or 30 percent in Czechoslovakia and even more in Romania. The chief means to higher yields will be marked increases in the use of artificial fertilizers.

These policies, except in Poland and Yugoslavia, are basically contradictory in that they call for raising the efficiency of private producers on the one hand and for further collectivization on the other. A recent United Nations study underscored the contradiction with the following words: "Once it becomes clear that the collectivization of agriculture as a whole is for a more distant future, it is impossible to continue a policy which essentially consists in letting private farms vegetate. Governments are then faced with a serious dilemma: on the one hand it appears indispensable to stimulate production in the private sector, not least by increasing the size of farms; and on the other hand such a policy, if successful, might further postpone the day when Socialist forms of production can be introduced in agriculture."*

Poland

IN SEVEN YEARS the Polish Communists succeeded in collectivizing less than 10 percent of Poland's arable land. In 1955 there were 9,790 officially registered collectives, but less than three-quarters of them were of the Russian kolkhoz type. The others were associations in which the

* Mrs. Aladar Mod, *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), April-May, 1953.

* United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, Geneva, 1957, Ch. I, p. 25.



"Before the tractor brigade can go to the fields, the collective farm members must prepare them, mow the corners, etc."

Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), July 5, 1956

peasants pooled their land only for purposes of sowing, tilling and harvesting, and were reimbursed according to the amount of land and labor contributed. Moreover, three-quarters of the total were concentrated in provinces from which large numbers of Germans had been expelled or in which large estates were broken up in the postwar land reform.* Thus in Poland collectivization stopped short of its most difficult task, the incorporation of the small peasant farmer who lives on the land of his ancestors.

Opposition to the Communist land policy was strong not only among the peasantry but even in the ranks of the Party. When the collectivization campaign was announced in 1948 by the Stalinist leadership, the announcement was accompanied by attacks on Wladyslaw Gomulka and other "right deviationists" who were accused of opposing the doctrine of class struggle in the villages. First Secretary Boleslaw Bierut said:

"Gomulka's attitude to the process of development of class forces in the village was erroneous; it resulted in obscuring the perspectives of gradual reconstruction of agriculture along new economic lines which would facilitate and hasten the building of the foundations of Socialism, the basic objective of our Party's program." (*Glos Ludu* [Warsaw], September 7, 1948.)

Gomulka and the heretical ideas he symbolized were sent into political limbo until the summer of 1956. By that time Stalin and Bierut were dead, and the failure of the Six Year Plan, along with the catastrophe at Poznan in June, had shown that the regime was facing economic and political bankruptcy. The anti-Stalinist opposition

became increasingly vocal. The shifting political climate was marked in late summer by the appearance of several articles in the press which sharply criticized the regime's agricultural policies.

The Revisionists

EDWARD LIPINSKI, a professor of economics at the Main School of Planning and Statistics (now a Deputy Chairman of the Council on Economic Affairs), wrote in *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw) on September 9, 1956 that the Party's collectivization policy was based on an "incorrect economic theory."

"In agriculture we have a concrete and drastic example of how a bad theory must result in a bad, harmful policy. This bad, fetishistic, magical theory is composed of the following elements: the wrongly interpreted principle of the supremacy of politics over economics . . . the maniacal-cum-magical division of peasants into kulaks, medium and poor peasants . . . the pseudo-revolutionary ideas about taxes of the Treasury Department . . . the activity of demoralized tax bureaus and officers . . . the fact that for many years the peasants have been deprived of building materials, chemical fertilizers, machines and equipment. . . ."

Lipinski threw overboard Lenin's thesis that an independent peasantry breeds capitalism, and argued to the contrary that even the existence of a "kulak class" was not irreconcilable with "Socialism." "On no account," he wrote, "does Socialism entail . . . nationalizing agriculture where previous capitalist development has not already organized agriculture in the form of great farm factories based on hired labor." The chief aim ought to be higher productivity, which meant supplying agriculture with machinery and fertilizer. Nothing in Polish experience had

* These provinces, and the percentages of the total number of collective farms they accounted for, were as follows: Wroclaw, 17.1; Poznan, 13.4; Bydgoszcz, 10.6; Szczecin, 7.3; Koszalin, 6.0; Olsztyn, 5.5; Opole, 5.3; Zielona Gora, 5.2; Gdansk, 4.2. Based on figures in *Rocznik Statystyczny 1956*, Warsaw, 1956, p. 154.

demonstrated the superiority of large-scale farming under State control; on the contrary, the State farms had shown themselves "a crying proof of pseudo-Socialist inferiority in comparison with the capitalist."

Another writer, Jozef Okuniewski, took a grim look at some farm production statistics and concluded that the official claims of progress in agriculture were false (*Zycie Gospodarcze* [Warsaw], September 2, 1956). He said that the productivity of Polish agriculture had declined since before the war, while during the same period "the capitalist countries made great strides in productivity."

At the end of September a still bolder attack on collectivization appeared in the magazine of young intellectuals, *Poprostu* (Warsaw). In the issue of September 30 a writer named Zochowski charged that the state of Polish agriculture was "much worse than would appear from the assurances uttered by the chief personalities of our political life. . . ." Repeating the conclusions of Lipinski and Okuniewski, he asserted: "It must be generally stated that the average standard of agriculture in the territories between the Bug and the Odra [i.e., Poland's postwar boundaries] is at present much lower than before the war. This is the situation after eleven years of the People's Government, and after nearly seven years of building Socialism in the villages! . . ." The decline of Polish agriculture, he said, began with the collectivization program and the adoption of the "Stalinist method of village socialization," a policy which he implied had been forced upon the Polish Party by its Soviet mentors. "Fear of being called renegades was one of the reasons which made people unquestionably accept Soviet models."

"From the example of Soviet kolkhozes we could have observed in their most striking form all those absurdities and those sad phenomena which we now have in our collectives. These are: small harvests, stagnation [in spite of] constantly increasing mechanization, a halt or even a decline in livestock production, high-handed administration, an excessive number of Party and Government functionaries preying like parasites on the living body of the collective, a low allotted wage resulting in an eager search for private sources of income (the private plot, seasonal work in various industries, speculation). . . ."

The article went on to say that the policy of compulsory collectivization had amounted to legalized robbery. "Most peasants joined the collectives in order to avoid repression and the ruin of their farms through maliciously increased taxes and compulsory deliveries."

"Some of them felt like thieves because the majority of the collectives were given the best land in the village, as a result of the so-called 'land arrangements.' The rightful owners were chased away from these lands: they were medium- and small-holders for the most part. In this way, for example, in the district of Grojec the peasants were robbed of orchards which had been cultivated for generations. . . . Thus conducted, the 'land arrangement' did not arouse any love on the part of the individual peasants for either the collective or its members, and in many districts it created a wall of hate."

But the other method of collectivization, the so-called "voluntary" method which had supplanted the old reliance



A collective farm in Wierzbice.

Spoldzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), July 7, 1957

on force, was really just "topsy-turvy compulsion." By granting credits and tax concessions to collective farms the State only subsidized inefficiency and alienated the "honest, hard-working" peasants whom it should seek to attract.

"As a result of the application of this method it is very often not the best people who join the collective, but the worst farmers in the village who drank away and ruined their farms, and who come to the collective so that the State might spare them their arrears in taxes and deliveries. These are followed by all sorts of scum, seeking in the collective an asylum where they can continue their criminal practices with impunity."

Zochowski described the ways by which the "kulak" farms had managed to survive the discriminatory measures of the State. Although they constituted only 4 percent of Polish farms, they still supplied the country with nearly 25 percent of its grain. They used various methods of evasion.

"The following kulak farms managed to emerge unharmed from the pogrom and to develop their production: (1) well-equipped farms of the capitalist-farmer type (Poznan, Pomorze), conducted on the highest level by enterprising, energetic and cultured owners, who managed to adapt themselves to the policy of 'limitation' by utilizing the opportunities created by the delivery contracts system; (2) farms which had been fictitiously divided, or used concealed land; (3) farms whose owners succeeded in corrupting appropriate offices and thus managed to obtain considerable relief from taxes and compulsory deliveries."

Collapse of the Collective Farms

WHEN GOMULKA made his famous speech of October 20, shortly before his election as First Party Secretary, he summed up the agricultural situation in the following words: "[In 1955] 78.8 percent of farmland was in individual farms; collectives owned 8.6 percent and State farms 12.6 percent. . . . The percentage of total output produced by these three types was: individual farms, 83.9 percent; collectives including household plots, 7.7 percent; and State farms including auxiliary holdings of agricultural workers, 8.4 percent. In estimating the value of overall production per hectare of arable land we arrive at the following

figures: individual farms, 621.1 *złoty*; collectives, 517.3 *złoty*; State farms, 393.7 *złoty*. . . . This is, in brief outline, the economic picture of collective farms. It is a sad picture. In spite of great outlays they have smaller results and greater production costs. I need not mention the political aspects of the problem."

He went on to say: "So far as collective farms are concerned, healthy farms ought to be assisted with investment credits while State subsidies ought to be abolished. Collective farms with no possibility for development, which lose money instead of making profits, should not be given credits. The members of such farms ought to be allowed to decide whether to dissolve them or not." (*Trybuna Ludu*, October 21, 1956.)

In the following two months the rickety structure of Poland's collective farming suffered an almost total collapse. The Party had not officially abandoned its former doctrine that the future of agriculture lay through collectivization; it merely stayed its hand, letting the peasants choose their own course. But the outcome was quite different from the qualified change in policy implied by Gomułka, and dramatized the Party's basic weakness in the countryside. The dissolving of collectives quickly assumed mass proportions, and it was clear that the criterion of efficiency suggested by Gomułka was generally ignored. The reigning consideration seemed to be the peasants' de-



"Good harvesting! The new agricultural policy is already giving results—fallow fields have disappeared—the earth grows much and well. There will be bread from this flour."

Swiat (Warsaw), July 22, 1957



"Members of a collective farm in Wojcieszyc (Province of Zielona Gora) carefully prepared themselves for action in the spring. Can the same be said of your collective farm? Think it over well. . . . In the picture: Collective farmers from Wojcieszyc take fertilizer from the GS storage house in Sobieszow."

Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), March 29, 1956

sire to escape from a system they feared and hated.

A commentator on Radio Szczecin, November 8, lamented the "sheep-like desire to rush out of the collectives, the grabbing of common property, clashes between the members and private farmers, and . . . the willful neglect of the harvest." The broadcast attributed some of the chaos to a spirit of license resulting from the "atmosphere of complete freedom," but also admitted that much of it was the result of past policies. "In many villages one can see outbreaks of collective hatred for all that is old, all that had to be accepted under the threat of imprisonment and rifles." One district in the highly collectivized province of Wrocław lost 79 collectives out of 85 in the course of six weeks (Radio Warsaw, December 9). The flight proceeded in open disregard of the legal procedures for disposing of collective property. "In spite of the fact that [in October] the necessity and purpose of the further development of collective farming on sound principles was stressed with the utmost emphasis . . . in a number of collectives, contrary to the statute and often even without the decision of a general meeting, thoughtless decisions for dissolving collectives are taken. What is worse, there are cases of willful seizing, dividing, and even selling collective property." (Radio Warsaw, November 6.) The extent of the confusion can be seen from the following account by an observer who travelled through the countryside at the time:

"I met a group of peasants in a farmyard discussing

Distribution of Agricultural Land in Poland (Percent)

Sector	1950	1953	1954	1955
State Farms	9.6	12.9	13.1	13.5
Collective Farms	0.8	6.7	8.2	9.2
Independent Farms	89.6	80.4	78.7	77.3

The figures in the table are taken from *Rocznik Statystyczny 1956* (Warsaw). Comparable figures for 1957 are not available, but there has been a considerable shrinkage in the Socialized area. About 80 percent of the collective farms have been dissolved, and some of the land in the possession of State farms is being turned over to settlers.

something. They were arguing about how to distribute the property of the collective. The dispute was not over cows or pigs but over how to divide machines. Nearby another group was busy dividing them. One man took a wheel, another a cross-bar, another an axle or some other part. . . . The peasants demolished these machines passionately, in spite of the fact that they represented the result of their collective work. . . . They preferred to divide these machines among themselves rather than to leave them in the hands of their neighbors, undamaged and ready for use. It would have been perfectly possible to use the machines by turn so that everybody could profit from them. But hatred and passion accumulating for twelve years are more formidable than common sense."

One result of the new agricultural policy was to deprive the Party organizations in the rural areas of one of their chief functions. Although the mass emigration from collectives went far beyond the Party's formal intent, the fact that the new policy abjured the use of force meant that Party officials had no effective way of controlling the process. Their difficulties were enhanced by the hostile attitude of peasants outside the collectives, who were often more eager to speed the dissolution than the members themselves. A collective farm at Jasienica in the province of Szczecin decided not to dissolve, whereupon it incurred the hostility of neighboring peasants. "It is not safe to walk in the narrow streets of Jasienica after dark. 'Stalinist henchmen,' 'lousy beggars' . . . promises to 'break their bones'. . . ." Horses and carts were stolen from the collective. The members appealed to the local authorities for protection, but the hand of the State seemed to have become paralyzed.

"I went to the people's council and the militia, but nothing was done. I went to the provincial authorities, the provincial people's council. An official of the agricultural department . . . told us to tell the members of the collective to read Comrade Gomulka's speech. We said that the members had studied Comrade Gomulka's speech very thoroughly and that they wanted definite help. The answer was that he himself did not know what to do today. He was going to a conference in Warsaw on Thursday, and perhaps he would be able to say something afterward. . . . It seems to me that there is authority only in Warsaw, but not in the countryside. One can find out nothing, either in the district or in the province, for there is no authority." (Radio Szczecin, November 8.)

An article in the Party newspaper *Trybuna Ludu*, on November 25, frankly analyzed the situation in the district of Gostynin near Warsaw. The chief problem, it said, was not the morale of collective farm members—who had fared comparatively well in this area—but the attitude of peasants outside the collectives. "During the whole period of collectivization, that is, for six years, individual peasants were never allotted any building material, were treated like sworn enemies of the changes taking place in Poland. All this time they were made to feel that they were different, unnecessary . . . that they would be treated this way as long as they did not enter the collectives. . . . The countryside became divided, not through its own fault, but because of the specific methods of persuasion applied every day, without respect, by functionaries, officials and district activists from Gostynin." In consequence the members of the collective farms felt isolated. The farm at Kamieniec voted to dissolve, even in the face of strenuous exhortations by Communist officials.

"The gathering in Kamieniec was attended by the president of the Presidium of the district national council. He undertook the heavy task of convincing the collective farm members that their decision was not right. I must admit that he did it with a lot of patience, even persistence. And yet his arguments fell upon empty ears. To every hundred words the answer was always the same, from everyone without exception: No. At first I followed the trend of his reasoning with attention. Then, together with the members of the collective, I felt bored with the similarity and one-sidedness of his arguments, indignant with the threats lying beneath those smooth words.

"One of the members . . . said in the discussion that they feel isolated and lonely. I felt from the discussion

Collectivization in Poland

Year*	Number of Collectives**				Total Households	Total Members
	Type I	Type I-B	Type II	Type III		
1949 . . .	22	—	79	142	—	—
1950 . . .	276	—	647	1,276	16,900	23,300
1951 . . .	301	176	726	1,853	67,100	77,400
1952 . . .	290	506	921	2,761	78,700	85,200
1953 . . .	272	1,465	1,422	4,613	146,500	158,500
1954 . . .	303	2,007	1,604	5,408	175,100	192,400
1955 . . .	314	2,221	1,596	5,659	188,500	205,200
1956 (June)	—Total of 10,600—				—	—
1957 (March)	—Total of 2,162—				35,000	—
1957 (August)	—Total of 1,926—				30,000	—

* As of December 31, except where noted.

** The genuine collective farms are Type II and Type III. The others, Type I and Type I-B, are more properly called associations because the members retain the use and possession of their land and other property. A large proportion of the "collective farms" still remaining in Poland are of the latter kind. The number of true collectives now in existence is not known, but it is relatively small.

Sources: Years 1951-1955 from *Rocznik Statystyczny 1956*. Other data from *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), August 7, 1956; *Zielony Sztandar* (Warsaw), March 14, 1957; Radio Warsaw, July 6, August 6 and August 7, 1957.



"The organization of work is much simpler when harvesting by combine, but the transport equipment, the straw gatherer, the drier, etc., must be prepared in advance. Did you think of all this?"

Spółdzielnia Produkcijna (Warsaw), July 5, 1956

that they understood and even approved of the attitude of the villagers [outside the collective]. Because they recognize that their incomes are not the result of an economic victory of cooperative management over individual management, but the result of an overdeveloped system of privileges which the State spread around them."

A Polish News Agency reporter in lower Silesia—a relatively highly collectivized area—found the Party apparatus very passive. Collective farm members told him that "not a single district or provincial activist has visited them to explain the possibilities and conditions for the continued development of collective farms. It seems that it is high time for political activists and members of national councils to abandon their passive attitude and explain to the peasants the attitude of the Party and government on collectives and to help the members in their choice of a form of farming suitable for them." (Radio Warsaw, Dec. 9.)

The confusion in Party ranks reached such a point that some activists argued that it was better to assist the peasants in dissolving the collectives rather than to do nothing. In Nowogard, according to one account, "One might have gotten the impression from the speeches that the most important thing was the proper disbanding of collectives." In the district of Ostrzyca "the Party members started convincing the members of collectives without waiting for

instructions from above." (*Rada Narodowa* [Warsaw], November 24.) This bandwagon attitude was even sanctioned by an article in *Trybuna Ludu* on December 8, entitled "The Absent Are Wrong." The writer admitted that the dissolution of collectives had become "a stormy drive," passing beyond the bounds of economic logic, and argued that Party members could only recognize it and try to lead.

"In weak collectives, with no prospects for development, even in those which are functioning fairly well but where the peasants are determined to disband, the Party organization should not wait for developments but should take the initiative and handle these affairs, even if disbanding of collectives is their only course. We shouldn't let the others do it; demagogy shouldn't replace an objective appreciation, chaos shouldn't replace order; we shouldn't let the peasants think that by disbanding the collective they are entering into conflict with the Party."

Present Policies

BY THE SPRING of 1957 there remained 2,200 collective farms in Poland out of 10,600 in June 1956. For all practical purposes Poland had abandoned collectivized agriculture, although official spokesmen still gave it lip service. Thus Minister of Agriculture Edward Ochab told a com-

mittee of Parliament on March 26: "We will patiently strengthen the existing collectives and create an atmosphere and environment in which new collectives will be established, based on permanent foundations and on the true initiative of the peasants." (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 27.) At the same time the Gomulka regime was fostering new policies designed to encourage the independent peasants. The formal program outlined by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party and the Executive Committee of the United Peasant Party in January (Radio Warsaw, January 8) made no reference to "kulaks" or class struggle. It stated that "the road to the Socialization of agricultural production leads through diverse forms of communal production, accompanied by an intensification of peasant husbandry, introduction of an increasingly higher degree of mechanization, and an increase in culture and prosperity in the countryside." But the emphasis of the document was on increasing the incentives of the private farmer:

"The State must support the peasant masses and the small and middle peasants, first of all by insuring the profitability of production, by supplying the means of production, by credit policy, and by furthering contracts. It is also necessary to remove those restrictions hampering the development of production on the larger peasant farms. . . . With regard to ownership, rental, purchase, and sale of land originating from legacies, family divisions or individual cooperative land received from the land reform, it is necessary to remove existing restrictions and to observe the principle of free turnover in land. . . . The settlers in the Western territories and in other resettlement areas ought to be given, if possible, an opportunity to increase the area of their farms to the maximum of 15 hectares, and of breeding farms up to 20 hectares, through the allocation of land from the State land fund. . . . Uncultivated land at the disposal of the State land fund ought to be let, first of all, to small and middle peasants under advantageous conditions, on the principle of a rental period of no less than eight years. In order to consolidate the feeling of ownership it is necessary to complete the work connected with the issue of property deeds as early as possible."

Another section of the statement called for various measures to reduce the share of the national burden carried by the countryside: the reduction of compulsory grain deliveries in 1957 by one-third, and a doubling of the price paid for them;* a less steeply progressive land tax on large farms; increases in the prices for raw hides and lamb wool; and the extension of social insurance to permanent hired hands. Departing from past practice, it promised that credit policy would be revised to extend credits to all farms, though collective farms would continue to receive credit under "particularly advantageous conditions."

Another departure from the past occurred in the provisions for the distribution of agricultural machinery. The

* Compulsory deliveries of milk had been abolished as of January 1. Compulsory deliveries of grain and potatoes were abolished on July 13 for farms under two hectares, and reduced for the majority of other farms. The total volume of grain deliveries was estimated to have been cut by 32 percent or 660,000 tons (see *Trybuna Ludu*, July 15, 1957). Compulsory deliveries of meat were also abolished for farms under two hectares.

A Collective Farm Dissolves



— A to pozostawimy już jako mienie niepodzielne...

"And we will leave this as the indivisible property of the collective. . . ."

Szpilki (Warsaw), April 14, 1957

monopoly of the State and local authorities on the possession of large machines was to be abandoned. Collective farms, peasant cooperatives and other groups would be permitted to buy tractors. Private farms would be allowed to buy harvesters, threshing machines, cutting machines and motors. The county machine stations (GOMs) were to be broken up, their machinery sold to the peasants and collectives. And the Machine Tractor Stations (POMs), which had formerly been the State's mechanism for controlling the collective farms, were to lose their administrative functions and become primarily maintenance and service establishments.

"The increase in supplies of agricultural machinery and tools to collective farms will alter the role of the POM's with respect to the collectives. The task of the POM's will be the overhaul of collective machines, work connected with the mechanization of breeding stations, and the performance—at the request of the collectives—of various kinds of field work. All POM functions connected with the administration and management of collective farm activities should be eliminated."

Upsurge in the Countryside

THESE NEW POLICIES had been anticipated long before the two parties framed their resolution. The resolution was in fact only a recognition of the peasant victory that had occurred in October. As early as December 12, *Trybuna Ludu* reported sharp increases in the prices of land and livestock as peasants sought to expand their holdings. The average price of horses rose by 50 percent compared to 1955. In the province of Olsztyn a journalist reported thousands of applications for uncultivated land (*Poprostu*, April 14). In this area, formerly part of East Prussia, there had been upwards of 25,000 hectares of uncultivated land in 1955, not to mention another 59,000 hectares of decaying, little cultivated farms.

"In view of this discouraging situation, the peasant movement to return to the land, begun during the winter, is a very positive phenomenon. Applications for land come to the local and county councils and often directly to the province and the Council of State. It is difficult to determine the number. According to my observation, they average 500 per county. The majority ask for more land, a large number ask for the return of a previously abandoned farm or for clarification of the land granting acts, and there are also applications from peasants working in the cities and now unemployed who wish to return to work on the land. Almost all of them indicate specific farms or tracts of land which they would like to take over. These are either abandoned farms or uncultivated or poorly cultivated land belonging to the State farms. In several applications the settlers expressed the desire to invest, with their own means, in improvements on the land they might receive. This proves, I think, not only a return of interest in agriculture but also a considerable rise in confidence in the policy of the Party and the government, and belief that the situation created is of lasting character and that it is possible to stabilize one's fate within its framework."

Rebirth of Agricultural Circles


To replace the disintegrating structure of Communist agriculture the Gomulka regime has encouraged the revival of Poland's old agricultural circles or "kolka rolnicze." These groups, which had their origin in the latter half of the nineteenth century, functioned as social, cultural and trading organizations. When the Communists took power after the war they were dissolved and replaced by collective farms, cooperatives and the Mutual Aid Association. Since October the number of agricultural circles has grown rapidly. By the end of January there were 800 of them (Radio Warsaw, February 9). In late February the number had risen to 3,600 (*Trybuna Ludu*, February 26), in March to 6,000 (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 14) and by mid-April to 8,000 (*Trybuna Ludu*, April 19). Radio Warsaw stated on June 6 that there were 9,000 of the circles and that they had about 300,000 members. The circles are to be organized in county and provincial associations, with the eventual formation of a national association (*Zielony Sztandar* [Warsaw], March 24). The circles will be allowed to own agricultural machinery, brickyards and sawmills. The statement of agricultural policy issued in January (see above) said:

"In agricultural circles peasants can participate in various kinds of activities, such as machinery sections, planters' circles, seed growers' circles, fruit growers' circles, stock-breeders' circles, beekeepers' circles, experimental circles, land improvement and pasture circles, agricultural education circles and others which directly contribute to a higher level of farming. . . ."

While the increased interest in farming and the rapid growth of agricultural circles were promising signs for the future, an immediate and measurable rise occurred in peasant incomes. Minister of Finance Tadeusz Dietrich told the Sejm on March 9 that the net income of the rural population will be about 2.5 billion *zloty* greater in 1957 than in 1956 (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 11). Gross income is expected to rise by 5.5 billion *zloty* as a result of lower quotas for compulsory deliveries, higher delivery prices, and the decreased proportion of compulsory deliveries in total State purchases. Other improvements in the condition of the peasant were foreshadowed by more generous supplies of State credit and a greater allotment of building materials for the countryside.

Meanwhile, the promised transfer of surplus land from State to private ownership was proceeding apace. Radio Warsaw stated on August 24 that 12 percent of the land in State farms—some 384,356 hectares—was scheduled for eventual transfer. Of this amount, 70,934 hectares had been handed over by the end of June and another 133,243 hectares were to be transferred by the end of the year.

On August 23 the Party's newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* took inventory of the first six months of 1957 and claimed that the correctness of the new policies was demonstrated by greater farm production. Compared to the first half of 1956, the State had been able to purchase 6 percent more grain and nearly 10 percent more livestock. Deliveries of milk and potatoes were substantially above the planned level. "This year's good crops," said the editorial, "are due not merely to good or bad weather conditions; the main reason is the new agricultural policy of the Party and people's government and the new attitude of the peasants toward their work." Basic to the development was the restoration among the peasants of "the feeling of permanent ownership and use of the land."



"Why are you crying so, has somebody died?"

"No, but our collective farm is being dissolved and now where will we get State credits for fodder?"

Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), November 29, 1956

What Happened to the Plan

Condensation of an article by Aleksander Szerwentke in Gospodarka Planowa (Warsaw), January 1957.

THE SIX YEAR PLAN provided for a very high rate of investment in comparison to national income. It must be admitted that the planned level of investment required, in practice, a much greater effort from the economy than had been foreseen. The basic reason was that although the economy as a whole did not achieve the planned results (particularly the agricultural sector), and although the national income rose by only 82 percent instead of the 112 percent planned, investment outlays were not correspondingly decreased. The share of net investment in the national income rose from 16.4 percent in 1949 to more than 22 percent in 1953 and 1954. We must also take note of the very low investment outlays in the non-Socialized sector of the economy, mainly in the villages. In the Six Year Plan these outlays were set at about 18.6 million *zloty* (1955 prices). They were carried out (according to estimate) by only a half of this amount.

The execution of the six year investment plan may be divided into two distinct stages. The first stage included the years 1950-1953, and was characterized by high investment outlays, exceeding even the goals foreseen for this period. The second stage, covering the years 1954-1955, was characterized by a slower tempo of investment.

Closely connected with the general magnitude of investment is the structure of investment, particularly the share allotted to new construction and the share allotted to machinery and equipment. As compared with the Six Year Plan provisions, the outlays for construction (referring to centrally planned investments) were fulfilled 123.5 percent. The other outlays, consisting chiefly of the purchase of machinery and equipment, reached only 74.5 percent of the planned level. In this way the execution of the investment program was constantly overstrained by the demands of construction and presented much greater difficulties than those foreseen. It should be stressed that the six year period may also be divided into two stages with respect to the structure of investment: the first four years were characterized by a constantly increasing share of investment for industry and a decreasing share of investment for agriculture, building, and social and cultural facilities.

It appears that one of the basic reasons for the changes in the structure and proportion of investment was that the Six Year Plan was unrealistic, i.e., it did not provide the necessary means for carrying out the projects included in the Plan. The first reason for this was that the scope of many investments was inadequately defined, with a tendency toward narrowing it. Thus, for example, the preliminary planning of a factory did not provide for the installation of such facilities as water, electricity, connecting roads, or the construction of auxiliary installations necessary for production. The second reason was that the costs of investment were underestimated. This meant that in order to complete many projects it was often necessary to spend half again or even twice as much as planned.

The Six Year Plan had allotted 76 percent of total industrial investment to heavy industry and 24 percent to light industry and consumer goods. Actually, 85 percent was spent for heavy industry and only 15 percent for light industry and consumer goods. Perhaps the most significant change was in the building materials industry, which received only 5.7 percent of the total instead of the 8.7 percent planned. The consequences of this are now being acutely felt in a lack of basic building materials. A second disproportion, also very harmful, resulted from concentration on manufacturing industries to the almost total neglect of investment in raw material industries.

Differences also appeared in the execution of the Plan in other sectors of the national economy. Investment in agriculture was 14 percent less than planned. Only 424 new MTS were established instead of the 820 planned, and only 3,600 villages were electrified instead of the 8,900 planned. In housing, the target for towns and workers' settlements was fulfilled by 106 percent so far as the number of new rooms is concerned; on the other hand, expenditures exceeded the Plan by 26.5 percent. House building was concentrated in big urban centers connected with industrial development.

In the social and cultural sector, only 60 percent of the planned investment was carried out. The number of hospital beds completed was only a third of that planned.

What were the fundamental causes of the mistakes made in the investment program? It seems to me that one of them was a lack of economic analysis. The Plan was based mainly on political considerations and on the requirements of the semi-war economy that functioned during the first four years. Where investment policy did reflect economic considerations, the analysis was often superficial and did not always allow for the needs of the whole economy.

In many cases it would have been possible to postpone certain projects, or to carry them out on a smaller scale by using facilities that already existed. The reason for this sort of error was the underestimation of existing productive capacity. As a result, many plants in the iron and steel and machinery industries have excess capacity which we shall probably not be able to use for a long time to come.

A basic error in some industrial projects was that they were founded on old and even obsolescent techniques. For one thing, not enough attention was given to the technical achievements of capitalist countries, and Soviet methods were imitated instead. In the second place, some projects took so long to build that when they were finished—after six or seven years or more, instead of the intended two or three—the technology involved was already obsolescent.

Finally, we must note the excessive dispersion of investment projects: Because of rising costs and delays in completion, it would have been much more profitable not to have begun a certain number of projects, or to have suspended them at an early stage, instead of continuing the whole program at a slower tempo.

An Engineer's Account

A description of the Communist economy in action, from the point of view of a trained industrial engineer, who left Hungary after the Revolt. This is another in the series of personal reports by men who have recently left the area. Next month's issue will carry an account of the re-constitution of the Smallholders' Party in Hungary during the Revolt, given by one of that party's leaders.


THERE WAS a celebration to honor the new factory. A platform was set up, flags and slogans displayed, the brass band played a stirring march. Prominent functionaries from all over Hungary were in attendance, faces beaming, lips muttering soundless little rehearsals of the Communist clichés they would soon declaim to the assembled workers.

These workers did not look happy, nor did the engineers who had labored with them on the new building. For that was all it was—a building; as a unity of production, it did not yet exist. The place was not exactly a shell; there was a certain amount of machinery inside, though non-functioning, incomplete, unassembled. However, the deadline had been met. There would be no production for another two months, but the factory had been scheduled to open on a certain date, and open it did. Delay would have meant scandal and loss of bonuses to the management. It would have brought disciplinary measures from the very dignitaries who were now about to commend so heartily; censure from the same newspapers presently heaping praise on this "finished product" of "Socialist" planning.

The factory *did* appear to be producing. A wood fire was blazing in the furnace (of course, wood does not burn with enough heat to be of any use in most milling processes). And the rolling mill, though it did not yet roll, had at least been made to look as if it did. Sheets of metal had been heated in the old factory next door, hurriedly transported piece by piece to the new building, and dropped into the furnace with its wood fire to emerge in record-breaking time at the proper opening and roll uselessly, though harmlessly enough, through a line of machines which did not function, but made fine mechanical noises.

The functionaries, who thought they were seeing the birth of an industrial giant, had a grand time. The construction workers, who understood what had been done,

"Solution to the Problem"



"Come on, come on, we've got to get it set up by the end of the month."

"We'll never make it."

"Well, all right. I'll report that we're ready here. After all, the parts are all made, all we have to do is put them together."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), August 11, 1955

were bored or disgusted, according to their natures. However, the band players were happy to have such a large audience, and a cynical anarchist of this author's acquaintance was quite ecstatic.

Some of the engineers who had arranged the fakery were sick with shame for the betrayal of professional standards. The name of the factory is well known in Hungary, but I cannot divulge it. The authorities would be able to learn my name by checking the engineers then on duty at the plant against the list of those who have since left the country. There would be reprisals against my family. It is enough to say that I was employed by key Hungarian industrial agencies from the introduction of the Communist economic system in 1948 until November 1956. During that time I became thoroughly familiar with the machine industry and also had extensive contact with planning and executing agencies.


The Educational System

TO BE AN engineer in Communist Hungary is a frustrating experience. While the prestige is fairly high and the pay is not had compared to that in the other professions (physicians, for example, earn less), the working conditions are likely to destroy an honest technician, morally if not physically. For this and other reasons which will be discussed later, there is, even now, a shortage of engineers in the country and a positive dearth of properly schooled ones.

In the years following World War II, the government had perfected—on paper anyway—its first Five Year Plan,

"A Nice Example of Thrift"

"(Attention the Klement Gottwald Power Works)"



"Do we have to send two trailer-trucks just to pick up a hypodermic needle?"
 "You're right. Have them take off the trailers."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), August 2, 1956

set to begin in 1950. They had imported grandiose outlines and precise diagrams from the Soviet Union. They had optimism, will, and ambition. But they simply couldn't come up with any engineers, at least none they could "trust." For the few trained technicians at their disposal were, almost to a man, middle class; their upbringing—indeed, the very education which made them invaluable—was gained under non-Marxist instructors in "non-Socialist" countries.

To produce a breed of "trustworthy" engineers, the regime reorganized the educational system. Determined to train 10,000 engineers and sparing no expense, they established technical institutions all over the country. The old University of Technology was shaken up, vibrated, if not vitalized. Night classes were established, to turn out finished technicians in three years.

The effort was on a grand scale; indeed it was hugely successful, except for the fact that the men and women graduated from the new schools were not good engineers. Also the instructors were poor; and the school buildings weren't much to brag about either.

Of course the progress of the pupils depended to a great extent on their teachers, and these, although some of them had fair training in their fields, were as a rule completely inexperienced in handling a classroom and guiding students. There was considerable confusion in administering the schools too. Methods of teaching, subjects, and textbooks were constantly and unreasonably changed. Often arguments were still in progress in late September and October as to what courses should be offered during the Fall term.

During the first year of the "new education" there was a general drop in scholastic standards, which the regime promptly blamed on the teachers. "Studying circles" were initiated and the members of these circles came under considerable Party pressure to better their grades. Concur-

rently, and quite idiotically, the teachers were given bonuses based on the good marks of their pupils. As a result, the students' marks rose precipitately. Actually the teachers were not expected to give just grades, and failing a pupil was discouraged. The failure had to be explained in writing by the teacher! Moreover, students who either were expelled or left school on their own initiative were supposed to be fined quite heavily (1000 to 5000 forint) to compensate the State for expenses incurred on their behalf.

A special Technological Teachers' College was established for the training of instructors on the lower levels. This college recruited its pupils from those who had been unable to meet the requirements of the technical schools. Since those requirements were minimal, the Teachers' College did well to find students who were capable even of ordinary expression on every-day subjects.

If intellectual capacity thus played little part in the se-



"Look, comrade, on this piece I saved two lbs. of material and a half hour in production time, and the slightly lower quality hardly shows. Shall I figure it for the save materials drive or the speed-up production drive?"

"Figure it for reject."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), June 16, 1955

lection of students for most schools, family background did. Proper working-class parentage almost automatically qualified young people for Hungarian technical institutions. And as for Party-backed students, Party members, sons and daughters of members, they naturally had little difficulty in entering the schools of their choice. In fact, while some middle-class young people were denied higher education, youths with a proletarian background were sometimes forced to enroll against their wishes.

While all these engineers (or semi-engineers) were being schooled, there was an immediate need for trained personnel which the regime filled by choosing "reliable" workers and promoting them to supervisory positions. Among these engineers-by-decree there were many intelligent men who refrained from interfering in purely technical matters. Others, however, perhaps in appreciation of the honor bestowed on them, perhaps in the belief that their elevation carried with it an automatic, even a psychic under-

standing of scientific principles, caused considerable damage. For example: though every foundryman knows that the Bessemer steel production method is not economical in Hungary, one freshly-appointed factory manager obtained permission to build such foundries. He had seen one in operation in a Soviet movie and had been very much impressed.

Indoctrination

All the "technical intelligentsia," including the interim "engineers," as well as the distrusted ones who had been educated in pre-Communist days, had to undergo ideological training. Seminars were the usual field of learning, the type to be attended being determined by local officials. One seminar or another was always mandatory and the supply was inexhaustible. Even if a man graduated from all of them, he would have been forced to start again from the first.

The system of seminars is one of the most wearing institutions in the "People's Democracies." The educational background of the average seminar leader is primitive, that of the outstanding one, mediocre. Most instructors prepared from hour-to-hour and knew only the strictly outlined material. They grew uneasy when a student paraphrased the textbook in his own words. Questions on matters not immediately applicable to the topic at hand embarrassed them. A student with an original turn of mind rendered them melancholy for days.

Once the instructor of a course in Marxist economy was asked a hypothetical question: would the employee of a privately-owned enterprise be exploited if he received 30 per cent higher pay than an employee of the State? The instructor was baffled, indignant; he floundered helplessly. But within a week's time (as soon as a pretext could be found) the man who had asked the question was dismissed from his job. After the 1953 events (the Nagy New Course) the regime placed great importance on "discussions" in the seminars, but the questioning was limited and the debate so circumscribed as to be a mockery of honest argumentation. It was a frequent and depressing occurrence in those days for two friends, agreed in their secret detestation of Soviet doctrine, to be forced publicly to discuss Marxist concepts with hypocritical approval.

Bureaucracy

MAKING SURE factory personnel was on time for work became more than a preoccupation of the administration; it reached the proportions of fetishism. Time clocks to be punched on arrival and departure were installed in the new buildings before there was adequate plumbing, and, in some cases, before the machines themselves were set up. The clocks appeared in the smallest tool shops, in offices, even in the universities and scientific museums. A man who was late to work had to surrender his identification card to the guard at the door (there are almost as many guards as doors in Hungary), and he could retrieve it only from the factory manager's office or from the personnel department. On such occasions he considered

himself fortunate to escape with a tongue lashing. Many factories featured billboards set up in prominent places with life-sized caricatures of a Neanderthal man (or perhaps of Churchill or John Foster Dulles), the jagged-toothed mouth open and from it coming the words, "To-day I helped the imperialists." There was a large white patch on the belly of the caricature on which the names of late-comers were prominently written. In one factory the names were displayed on the lid of a coffin!

The regime also takes a deep and righteous interest in the factory cafeterias, not in the quality of the cookery, but in that rather despicable institution known as "the mealtime conversation," considered a time-wasting relic from the bad old days. The only discourse looked on with favor in the cafeterias is that done by bureaucrats sent there to talk against talking.

The distrust is at least democratic. It extends to every person in the factory, often causing awkward or comical situations. One key engineer who was responsible for the investment of forty to fifty million forint was required to account for every penny (right down to the amount deposited in a pay-toilet) which he spent on an official trip. The same man had to get permission in writing to leave his place of work on factory business; in fact he had to hand this written permission to the doorman. When he visited a distant plant, he needed a certificate from its manager stating that he had actually been there, and,



"Rest assured, comrade, our production costs will be very low. That's the only problem we're working on now."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), September 8, 1955

when submitting the certificate to his home office, he had to attach his used railway ticket.

Such time-wasting red tape plagues the engineer in all his duties. The avoidance of disciplinary action not only uses up hours of his valuable time each week, it also hampers his efficiency and that of his plant. For example, a machine broke down in a factory in which I was employed. In theory, the plant engineer who is head of maintenance produces the blue print, locates the damaged part (in this case, a broken anchor bolt), and the purchasing man takes care of the rest. In practice, things went very differently.

Since it was slightly above-average size, government regulations stated that the bolt had to be made by specialists. An order was placed with a spool factory; serial number, size, and other specifications were sent on. The factory replied that it did not possess the correct gauge for the spool and asked for a blueprint. The blueprint was sent. The factory then said that it had just received an urgent order for transportation equipment and could not get to the bolt for another eight months. All this correspondence and telephone conversation and decision-making had taken up ten valuable days. My own factory now turned to the Ministry for permission to manufacture the bolt on the premises. The Ministry pondered for two days, then directed us to the Machine Factory in Angyalfold. A courier was dispatched with the order; he returned bearing the news that Angyalfold didn't have the correct gauge either. The factory manager then decided to have the bolt made in his own factory, in spite of the regulations to the contrary. He risked severe disciplinary action, but got his bolt ready in two days. However the entire contretemps had consumed thirty days, during which time the machine had been idle and factory production had dropped as a result. Incidentally, the manager was censured for this drop; he couldn't win either way.

Security and "Socialism"

REGULATIONS are just as senseless, if a little less likely to be violated, in the security and "vigilance" field. I once witnessed an outstanding engineer being heavily fined for leaving on his desk the manuscript of an article he had written for a technical magazine. Though the article was to appear publicly, the engineer was punished because any technical manuscript is considered secret until it actually appears in print.

There is a permanent fear of "foreign agents." Anyone coming to a factory is closely questioned and sometimes forced to wait hours, even though the call is being made at the factory's request. And confusion is rampant and often ludicrous. For years the Danube Iron Works had a gate, but no fence. Guards armed with machine guns stood by the gate, examining the passes of anyone who was foolish enough to bother with that entrance to the plant. Twenty-five yards distant, people could come and go as they pleased through the open fields.

Another ludicrous phase of the industrial operation is the "labor competition." This is fostered in strange and wonderful ways. At the approach of "Socialist" holidays, for

example, the workers are often required to make pledges. There are forms for these, and one of them, as I remember it, went like this: I, Mihaly Kovacs, make the following pledge in honor of the Seventh of November:


1. I shall complete Job Number 123456 with 36 per cent greater speed.
2. I shall improve the quality of the work by 15 percent.
3. I shall teach Istvan Nagy my working methods.

Points 1 and 2 are, of course, quite meaningless, except for their demonstration of the shrewdness of the pledge-maker and his knowledge of the kind of phraseology which lulls the Communist bureaucrat. Point 3 is clear enough, if a bit ominous to the regime. Another worker like Mr. Kovacs will make life no easier for the "Socialist" planners.

Contests are often built around these pledges, and a "contest warden" is relieved of all other duties to supervise the competition. Pledges are filed away and promptly forgotten; even the winning one is seldom seen after its originator has carried off his trophy and cash award (usually two to three hundred forint). Now and again there is a half-hearted attempt to put some spark into the contests by lionizing the winning pledge-writer. On these occasions the latter responds, if he is in the amiably ironical tradition of Mihaly Kovacs, with the expression of sentiments about "loyalty to the working class," and "the example of the revolutionary laboring masses who overcome all obstacles. . . ."

Planning Offices

UNDER such conditions it is no wonder that most engineers flee whenever possible from the factories to the planning offices where the atmosphere, though frustrating enough in its way, is less harrassing. Here he finds the "innovation movement," whose original purpose was to unearth the creative urges of both engineers and ordinary workers. At the beginning a mere idea was rewarded, but



"Two Production Lines"

"At left, one helps; at right, [marked 'inspector'] one hinders."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 5, 1956

later, bonuses were made dependent upon the economic value of the project, which had to be tested before the reward was paid. Under the strained working conditions, the capacities of both laborers and engineers were already taxed to the limit, and there was rarely time for experimentation. When this difficulty was noticed, a special factory was set up to try out new ideas.

But the factory operated on a rigid "Plan" and it took years to bring unheralded innovations to the attention of its managers. "Connections" began to play a part in the system and outright bribery soon became the rule of the day. By bribing the various officials in charge of the innovation departments, awards could be had for almost any idea. One man won a considerable amount for recommending the use of a steel-cutting machine which had become obsolete forty years previously. On the other hand, an innovation of great importance, an anti-friction bearing which would have reduced costs in the transportation industry, was not accepted because the manager of the interested factory submitted a similar, though much inferior, recommendation. Since the manager himself was the final judge in the matter, the outcome was never greatly in doubt.

Bonus System

The system of bonuses carries beyond the innovation program to include the entire Soviet doctrine of "financial interest in production." Plant managers are paid partly according to the output of their factories. Bonuses (anything above the basic 1,400 to 2,000 *forint*) are withheld if production fails to rise (or in special cases, as will be illustrated later, if it rises too much), if deadlines are not met, if financial affairs at the factory have gone awry, if one of the various technical plans has misfired. Also, the managers suffer if "the general technical level has not been complied with." This mysterious phrase can be used as a sort of catch-all to serve as grounds for punishing any plant manager who has displeased the regime.

"Financial interest in production" often creates ridiculous situations. In a factory in Budapest, I noted with great surprise that the automatic head valve had been removed from a new, imported machine-tool apparatus. The replacement was a primitive manual valve, which increased production cost and lowered quality. The change was made because the maintenance crew was unsure of its ability to repair the newer part in case it broke down, and because the factory management, anticipating an idle machine while the maintenance men fumbled the repairs, preferred lowered production. In this particular case the management got its bonuses not on amount of production, but on the number of machines in action.

Bonuses for planning engineers provide the regime its greatest opportunity for inspired and original nonsense. Since it is impossible to measure objectively how much thought has been put into a new project, or indeed how much of the project is really "new" and how much of the "newness" is worthwhile, there has been an attempt to work out a bonus system based on index numbers. For example, originality had an index number in one plan of



"Finding space for the bloated administration."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), May 26, 1955

0.8; other factors—time-saving, labor-saving, application of Soviet methods—also received their appropriate numbers. When a project was completed and ready to be rated on its merits, the numbers were added together, appended to the technical knowledge and personal prejudices of the judges, and a bonus awarded or withheld. Perhaps it wasn't such a foolish method at that; it certainly made complaints rare. People who got bonuses accepted them in surprised silence, and people who didn't could make no case for themselves because they were unable to understand the system.

A particularly awe-inspiring example of official thinking in connection with planning-project bonuses was the use of the "density index number" for judging the amount of work put into blueprints. Specially-prepared charts and diagrams were used to determine how dense a drawing was, that is, how densely the paper was covered with ink. Naturally the plans were rife with unnecessary details and excessive shading. Since scaling was taken into consideration too, the bonus-hungry "planners" made all their blueprints on the smallest possible scale.

In reality it was usually decided well in advance how much the engineers working on a particular project should make, and the index figures were shamelessly manipulated so that the final figure should not be exceeded. All this required a host of bookkeepers and administrative personnel. Often ten to fifteen percent of the personnel of an enterprise was kept busy juggling figures. Highest Party circles were well aware of the situation and experimented constantly with new methods (at least six different ones were used between 1948 and 1956), but the basic principle remained the same and all the methods were unsatisfactory.

Other Difficulties

DEADLINES were another problem. They were never set at the factories concerned, but by the Ministries which

were removed from such local problems as constant shortages of raw materials and difficulties with overburdened and obsolete machines. Failure to meet these arbitrarily set deadlines meant a loss of bonuses for all concerned and therefore often led to unreasonable and expensive measures. On one occasion a one-day delay menaced the bonuses of key men in four different plants. Lengthy railroad transportation made impossible the meeting of this deadline; a 35-ton machine was therefore loaded on special trucks and transported to its destination 200 kilometers away at a cost of eight times what it would have been had the railroads done the job. The men, however, got their bonuses.

Another harassment for the planning engineer is the sudden and unexpected question from the Ministry. A project may have been planned for months, the work done, blueprints drawn, data filed. At this stage the Minister will often ask for certain changes in the project and demand to know the cost of the changes in, say, two days. An accurate response would entail a survey of the entire project (impossible in two weeks, let alone two days!). So a meeting is called and an estimate is figured, based on experience, hope, and the ever-present, ever-mysterious "index figures." The Ministry receives the estimate and for reasons of its own is dissatisfied; it calls for more information, more precise data. Finally a compromise is worked out and the project commenced. Work goes on for several months, until it is decided, for good or bad reasons, or none at all, that the entire job is uneconomical. Work is stopped. New plans are made. Work is started again. Another request for change comes from the Ministry, and the cycle is in motion again. On the average only 25 percent of the plans formulated are actually completed.

Many fruitless jobs are performed. For instance, certain machine tool equipment was designed on foreign patterns featuring a so-called Fiat conical wheel, widely used abroad, but capable of manufacture in only three Hungarian plants. But it so happened that each of the three plants refused to supply the Ministry with the ten wheels they needed for the machine tool equipment. They claimed they were overburdened with other work, and probably they were. At any rate the Ministry wasn't united enough behind the project to force through compliance, and after a twenty-seven man meeting of engineers who had to use valuable time travelling from all parts of Hungary to attend, it was decided that an entirely different wheel would be used.

Another horror for the engineer was "rationalization," supposedly the intelligent and logical shifting of work projects from one factory to another better equipped, as well as mass transfers of workers and machinery to plants where they would be best used. However, the result of most of the "rationalization" schemes was arbitrary change-for-the-sake-of-change and well-dispersed confusion. For instance, a factory which had excelled for decades in the production of hauling installations was turned to making threshing machines, while the efficient threshing plant was ordered to produce combines. Transportation equipment was given over to a gun factory. The general drop of quality was, of


course, blamed on the bewildered engineers of the various factories.

One final burden the engineers carried on their backs was of Soviet import. It was customary for the designs of the more valuable installations which had not yet been used in Hungary to be sent in from Russia. Theory had

(continued on page 36)


HÁROM KÉRDÉS

Miért nem megy ebben a gyárban az önköltségcsökkentés?



Mert a vezetője két kézzel szórja a pénzt,

Miért laza ebben az üzemszervezésben a munkafegyelem?



Mert az üzemszervező behúnyt szemmel jár,

Miért sok ezen a gépen a selejt?



Mert a gazdája fejellenül dolgozik rajta.

Top: "Why don't production costs get cut in this factory?"—"Because the manager throws money away with both hands." Middle: "Why is work discipline lax in this factory?"—"Because the manager walks around blindfolded." Bottom: "Why does this machine produce a lot of rejects?"—"Because its operator works without his head."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), June 9, 1955

Marek Hlasko:

"We Take Off for Heaven"

A short story by one of the most widely admired young Polish writers. From his collection *Pierwszy krok w chmurach*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1956. Another Hlasko story, and a biographical note on him, were published in last month's East Europe.

SATURDAY IS A JOLLY DAY. On Saturdays people in all parts of the country have a shorter workday; the suburban factories blow their whistles two hours earlier; turners, milling machine operators, mechanics and technicians wipe their greasy hands and utter the blessed words: "It's over." Offices, factories, building sites, shipyards and ports become deserted. Tired and yawning, people return home on crowded streetcars, lazily jostle each other in busses which they perpetually resent, and doze on suburban trains, thinking about the pleasant prospect of Sunday grass. As everyone has noticed, people become better and more agreeable on Saturdays. Never do we see so many smiles as on Saturday afternoon: balding bookkeepers smile at the thought of Sunday when they can walk around the house in undershorts; sports fans anticipate the pleasures of the field; district Party activists delude themselves about having two extra hours of sleep; girls shut their eyes and imagine delightful Sunday walks through the forests; ath-



Drawings by Jerzy Cwierinia, *Poprostu* (Warsaw), November 11, 1956

letes, employees of the security police, routine-ridden clerks of the national councils, professors, old men, children, foremen, pilots and dentists all smile readily on Saturday, a day when everyone has the greatest number of plans, ambitions and hopes.

The nation lives for Sunday. Only the transportation depots do not share the general satisfaction. On the contrary, work in such places sometimes lasts even longer on Saturdays. In a burst of cleanliness, the drivers wait in long lines before the pumps to wash their trucks; then they sprinkle them with oil and rub them with soft rags, trying to make the battered vehicles, which have carried bricks, lime and cement for the past week, shine like mirrors. On Saturday afternoons, the drivers bend over their motors and try to discover their imaginary and real defects: they clean the distributor points, burn the carbon from the spark plugs, remove the sediment in filter cups, adjust the ignition, change the diaphragms in fuel pumps, seal the gas lines and adjust the valves. Simultaneously, they quarrel fiercely with the mechanics—those men who were not fit to become drivers—and display the utmost ingenuity in ascertaining the legitimacy of their assistants, the depot managers, foremen and dispatchers—the actual masters of their lives and wages. Then, casting a longing look at the rows of shining trucks, now ready for use, they say: "A driver's life is a broken reed, indeed it is. I should have become a carpenter as my father wanted me to. . . ." And if it is not payday, they return to their homes. But even there they try to explain to their wives the difference between the clutch and the gear shift. Few occupations have so great an attraction for man and are so inseparably linked with his days and nights; and perhaps no other occupation is so much loved and hated. This, more or less, is how Saturday afternoon looks at a transportation depot. On paydays, however, it is slightly different.

On one payday, a warm, fair Saturday afternoon in June, driver Tadeusz Jablonski returned to his base at about two o'clock and drove slowly through the yard, keeping his foot on the clutch, despite regulations. He looked closely at the row of parked trucks and asked his assistant:

"Where do we park?"

"Over there," replied his assistant, a red-haired youth with a good-natured face. He waved his hand: "Behind that Studebaker. There's an empty place."

"That's where Boratynski always parks. If I take his place, he'll start yelling as usual. I hate quarrels. Everyone is back so early today."

"It's payday," the assistant said tersely.

"That's true," Tadeusz said.

He rode a few yards farther, shifted into neutral, stopped the truck and jumped off. He was a tall, lithe young man, with fair, short hair, and a rather expressionless though pleasant face.

"Park it next to the Ursus," he said. With his hand still on the steering wheel, he rested his foot on the running board; the motor was idling, and the wheel shivered like a frozen dog. "Just clean and grease the bearings and take off. If the nozzle doesn't go in, remove the bushing and



From Hlasko short story collection

push the wire through. Don't overload the motor. Take care of yourself."

He took his foot off the running board and turned to go.

"Mr. Tadeusz," the assistant said, "What about that thing?"

"What thing?"

"Shall we do it?"

"I have no time," Tadeusz said. "I have a date and can't come."

"Whatever you say," the assistant said. He looked disappointed, and shook his head, repeating, "Whatever you say."

Then he shifted, grinding the gears, and, releasing the clutch awkwardly, drove off. For a while Tadeusz stood motionless, looking after the truck. It was a big military American GM "Banjo," the kind Warsaw drivers call "James." It is big, beautiful and belligerent-looking, with an open cab, a powerful bumper, ten wheels and three differentials; the motor is resonant and deep, like some powerful bells. Now, only a few of them are in use, but from 1945 to 1950 every young driver dreamed of having a "James."

Tadeusz stuck his hands in his pockets and walked over to the dispatcher's office. Handing his delivery receipt book to the dispatcher, he asked: "What about the money?"

"It's right here," said the dispatcher, a stout, grey-haired man with a flabby face. As a rule dispatchers are former drivers who ruined their health on the job but, unable to face being separated from it, fill in the itineraries of other drivers and tell long stories about the defects of their old trucks.

"How much do I get?"

"Just enough," the dispatcher said, passing a thick finger over the payroll. Then he winked knowingly. "I have the feeling you will float like a gondola today."

"Not at all," Tadeusz said. Being in a great hurry, he shifted impatiently from one foot to another. "I won't drink today. How much do I get?"

"Six hundred twenty four *zloty* and thirty *groshe*," the dispatcher said, struggling with his pen, glasses and a huge sheet of paper. "Here, sign."

Tadeusz counted the money and signed. He returned the payroll sheet, which bore the trace of grimy fingers, and said, "Goodbye, Mr. Konopka. See you Monday. What time do you want me?"

"At six. Are you leaving already? Why are you so nervous?" The dispatcher put his glasses on his forehead. "All you young men are very nervous nowadays. In my day, we had nerves of steel. Nerves are the most important thing. I remember in 1928 I was driving from Piotrkow to Czestochowa. . . ."

"Mr. Konopka," Tadeusz said furiously, "I have something important to do and I can't. . . ."

At that moment all the loudspeakers in the yard sounded: "Attention, attention, today at 1630 in the Union reading room a lecturer from the Association of Popular Science will deliver a lecture entitled: 'How and When Will We Fly to the Moon.' The lecture will be illustrated with slides and followed by discussion. I repeat: today at 1630. . . ."

"If only one could silence that parrot," the dispatcher said angrily. "He is shouting as if a Jew were about to be born. I am busy with my payroll and he is talking about stars. If I make a mistake who will compensate me? Am I right or not, Mr. Tadeusz?"

"It means," someone behind them said meditatively, "that there is a possibility. . . ."

"What possibility?"

"Of flying to the stars."

"Nonsense," Tadeusz said lazily and without conviction. He turned to the speaker and suddenly his eyes grew wary and angry. "What do you want here, Zawadzki?" he asked. He took his hands out of his pockets and blushed.

"Come on," Zawadzki said. He was a short, stout man, with a lean, nervous face; his eyes were small and very light. "I'm waiting for you," he said, looking at Tadeusz. "I returned with my truck two hours ago and have been waiting for you ever since."

"What do you want?" Tadeusz said hoarsely. His face grew even darker, and there was a tickling coolness in his throat, as was usually the case before a quarrel.

"Not here. Let's go outside. Goodbye, Mr. Konopka."

"Goodbye, Mr. Konopka," Tadeusz repeated mechani-

cally. His only thought was: be calm, you must be calm at any cost.

They passed through the gate arm in arm. Tadeusz felt like a taut string. Zawadzki was calm and collected. Only a keen observer would have noticed that the small blue veins on his lean face had grown more visible.

"We'll go to the field," Zawadzki said after a while. Tadeusz winced, interrupted in his thoughts. "To the field," Zawadzki repeated, "that'll be the best place for us to talk. Besides, my brother-in-law is waiting there."

"Two against one?" Tadeusz asked, with a disagreeable laugh.

"Don't be silly, Tadeusz," Zawadzki said, looking at him with contempt. "It's something else."

"What is it, then?" Tadeusz shouted. Again he took his hands out of his pockets.

"I'll tell you all right," Zawadzki said. "Come on."

"Don't make it too long."

"You can be sure I won't dally with you."

They left the street and cut across the field. It wasn't really a field but an empty lot adjoining the transportation depot. Broken bottles, empty cans, cigarette wrappers and all sorts of trash were scattered on the ground. Near the fence, on ingeniously arranged bricks and stones, people sat drinking heartily, for Saturday, and not Sunday, is actually the workers' sacred day. They were yelling, embracing one another, arguing and convincing themselves. Someone sang in a hoarse baritone: "I shall not forget your burning eyes." Almost every enterprise has such an ugly lot in its vicinity.

"Tadek," someone shouted over the fence. "Give us ten *zloty* and we'll have us a good tune. Mr. Zawadzki, come here for a minute."

"What a stupid ass," Zawadzki said. "After we. . . ."

Tadeusz didn't hear the rest of the sentence. "Attention, attention!" the loudspeakers roared again. "Today, at 1630, in the Union reading room a lecturer from the Association of Popular Science will deliver a lecture entitled: 'How and When Will We Fly to the Moon?' The lecture will be illustrated with slides and followed by discussion. I repeat: today, at 1630. . . ."

"What do you want?" Tadeusz asked, after the loudspeaker stopped.

"I'm just about to tell you. Let's sit over there."

At the far end of the fence a man was lying on the grass. They went up to him and sat down on the bricks. The man jumped up. For a moment he stood drowsily, rubbing his eyes. Then he asked:

"Shall we take up a collection for a bottle?"

"Wait awhile, Rysiek," Zawadzki said, and the man obediently lay down. He was small and dumpy. Zawadzki looked at Tadeusz. "I know everything," he said after a while.

Tadeusz said nothing. His heart was beating heavily and painfully. He moistened his lips and asked with difficulty:

"When did she tell you?"

"Today."

"Just like that?"

"How else? I didn't beat her."

"And now what?"

"You can both do what you want."

"We shall," Tadeusz said. He was recovering his spirits. Leaning against the fence, he stretched out his long legs. "You don't hold it against me, Zawadzki, do you?"

"No," the other answered quietly. He plucked a blade of grass and started to chew it. It was fragrant with sun and well-trodden earth. "Tadek," he said, looking ahead with empty eyes. "Do both of you know what you want to do?"

"I'm not asking you for advice."

"Do you yourself know what you want to do?"

"I know that I love her. That's all I care about. I know you are a good man, and I'm damn sorry she's your wife. I can't look you straight in the face. But understand this: life is life. There is no life for me without her. I'd rather kill myself. And if you hold it against me, say so right away, for then there's no use in talking."

"Tadeusz," Zawadzki said, looking at the ground. "Life means nothing to me any more. I've had my share of it and I don't wish it on anyone, not even my worst enemy. But listen to me. You'll take the woman and child from me—and then what?"

"We'll be together. Things will work out somehow."

"No," Zawadzki said. He pulled the grass out of his mouth and threw it away. His brother-in-law was dozing again. "No," he repeated, "it's damn rare that things work out. Nothing good will come of it. Do you have an apartment, Tadeusz?"

"That's not important. We'll live in a hostel."

"Yes," Zawadzki said, "in a hostel. In a hostel where five people live in one room; in a hostel where drunkards come home with whores every night; where a day doesn't pass without a brawl; where you won't be able to kiss one another without having ten witnesses present; in a hostel where you'll long for each other like dogs; where you'll meet at nights in a passageway; where others will constantly bother her. Will you live in a hostel, Tadeusz?"

"We love each other. One can take a lot. Why are you trying to frighten me? I'm not afraid of life," Tadeusz said.

He fell silent. From all along the fence came irritating screams; on the adjacent railroad siding there was the jarring sound of cars being shunted and the piercing blast of horns. Zawadzki was looking at the ground and Tadeusz could not see his face. Zawadzki's brother woke up and said: "Shall we take up a collection for a bottle?"

Zawadzki drew closer to Tadeusz. His face was perspiring.

"Don't tell me how much a person can stand," he said quietly. "I stood much more than you think. I was in a concentration camp and saw things they will tell children a hundred years from now. I don't want your pity. I won't tell you that this woman and this child are all I have

in the world. I shit on your pity. But you won't be able to stand it. You're young, you may have to live and enjoy yourself. And this will be the end of it. It's hard nowadays. She'll give you ten cigarettes a day and ten *zloty* each payday so that you can have a drink with your pals out in the free air. But you won't be able to treat your friends to vodka because you'll know that your wife is waiting for you at home, that you have another man's child whom you also have to support, and that your wife can't work because she is tied down. And you'll have plenty of regrets. One day you'll say to yourself: 'To hell with it all.' You'll rebel and go out with your friends and say: 'Where's my youth? Where's my pleasure?' And you will be right to say that. Nobody will blame you for it. But she will reproach you and beg and cry, and one day you'll look at her with hatred; you'll see that she's no longer young and pretty, and then, for no reason, for the first time, you will hit my wife."

He fell silent. Musing, he looked at his scratched, oil-bitten hands. The jarring sound of trains could still be heard. Voices of various soloists drifted over the fence; one, stronger than the others, sang the tango, "Do you remember, my love?" The rattling of the last trucks returning to the depot acted as an accompaniment. The sun had already dropped behind the houses of the town, roofs shone red and gold, and shadows grew long and violet. The broken bottles and cans strewn over the lot gleamed like diamonds. The heated earth was redolent with damp; the wind light and dry, smelling of lime, pitch and wet sand—nearby they were building a large development. Against the darkening sky, red walls dried in the sun. Zawadzki's brother-in-law got up and asked:

"How about a bottle?"

They had no time to answer. A powerful voice resounded in the early evening silence: "Attention, attention," the loudspeakers roared. "Today at 1630 in the Union reading room a lecturer from the Association of Popular Science will deliver a lecture entitled: 'How and When Will We Fly to the Moon?' The lecture will be illustrated with slides and followed by discussion. I repeat. Today at 1630. . ."

"Let's each give ten *zloty*," the brother-in-law said, after the loudspeakers had stopped. "Now we have enough for a bottle." He took the money and left.

"I can't stand it," Tadeusz said in despair. "I've never had anyone—no mother, no friends. . . . I've always believed in love. How will I live without her? How? For what?" He looked at Zawadzki with bloodshot eyes. "I suppose you're going to tell me that I'm young and that I'll find hundreds of others, aren't you? Is that what you're going to say? Speak up!" He was shouting. "Come on, speak up! Why don't you say something?"

"For Christ's sake," Zawadzki said. He stretched out his arm, describing in an arc the scene before them. "How long will these lots last, these hostels, these five-*zloty* collections for vodka, these lists of malingerers, these crowds in street-cars, these lines for butter? How long will lovers have no place to live, how long will people have to part because of an apartment, washing, and trash like that? If I didn't know how things were before, I would think I was in hell now. I don't believe in hell, but if there is such a place,



From Hlasko short story collection

these bottles, these lines for meat, these girls at the hostels—they're worse than hell."

Tadeusz raised his head. He was crushing the grass with his heel. It was only now that he understood clearly that his love, his desires, and the most sacred words, come to nothing—not because of unfaithfulness, separation, or death, but because of all the petty, annoying, wretched things this man had mentioned.

"Christ," he stammered hoarsely.

A red mist rose before his eyes. He straightened up and looked haggardly about him. Then he started to run. Stumbling on the empty cans, jumping over improvised tables, breaking bottles, crushing cucumbers, herrings, rolls and sauerkraut, falling, getting up, he kept on. Hearing outraged shouts and realizing that he was being chased, he suddenly changed course; he ran towards the railway siding, where they were shifting cars. When he finally reached the deserted track, he saw an empty locomotive coming. "None of this is true," he thought, "none of it." The people behind were gaining on him, and he had the sensation of hot breath at the back of his neck. Uncoiling like a cat, he was about to throw himself under the wheels; at that moment, a superhuman voice shouted: "Attention!" Tadeusz halted mechanically—the locomotive went by, and he saw the driver's face, covered with sweat. "Attention," the voice repeated. "Today at 1630 in the Union reading room a lecturer from the Association of Popular Science will deliver a lecture entitled, 'How and When Will We Fly to the Moon.' The lecture will be. . . ." He heard no more, for the people had caught up with him and knocked him down.

Hypnosis

A joke told in Poland:

A hypnotist is putting on a show in a theater. The first volunteer seats himself on the stage. The hypnotist peers into his eyes and says, "You are in Equatorial Africa. The heat is unbearable. You have had no water for days." The subject sways in his chair, clutches his throat, sticks out a swollen tongue, gives every sign of extreme thirst. The hypnotist snaps his fingers and the subject regains consciousness, perfectly normal.

A second subject sits down. The hypnotist says, "You are in Siberia. The cold is intense. Your hands and feet are stiff." The subject shakes with cold, his face turns blue, he rubs his hands and feet. The hypnotist snaps his fingers and awakens him.

Third subject. The hypnotist says, "You are in America. You are out of work. You have nothing to eat. You are dressed in rags. You live in one miserable room."

The subject opens one eye, and says, "You snap your finger at me, buddy, and I'll break your arm."

(continued from page 30)

it that the plans were to be drawn according to Hungarian realities. In practice the Soviet engineers knew little about conditions in our country and appeared to care less. The Russian plans were never completely correct. In fact, sixty to seventy percent contained serious errors which in some instances made assembling of the machines quite impossible. Yet, correction of Soviet mistakes is, for obvious reasons, difficult in a "Peoples' Democracy"; the most extreme tact is called for, and large-scale changes are absolutely ruled out.

Examples in point are the suspended bridges at the (Dunapentele-Sztalinvaros) Coking Works. These bridges are used neither by pedestrians nor for motor transport; they serve merely to hold the conveyor belts between the various factory buildings. Therefore they need no side walls and certainly no roofs. At Dunapentele they have both. The roofs are compact and the walls are solid brick; naturally the frame is heavier and far more expensive because of this unnecessary weight. But the Soviets planned the bridges, and the "Socialist" fatherland could not be disputed.

The last irony of the Dunapentele bridges came when it was discovered that even in Russia such covered bridges were used only in the extremely cold arctic regions. In the end even the local Ministry agreed, unofficially, of course, that a mistake had been made by the Soviet engineers.

The Pyramid Builders

IT IS PERHAPS AT FIRST surprising that, under these conditions, any industrial construction succeeded in Communist Hungary. There were, in fact, notable strides toward industrialization. The Sztalinvaros iron and steel complex, for example, is a reality, and an impressive one at that.

The point is that these successes were obtained at an

"The Reject-Champion's Question"



"What do you think of that piece?"

"Well, you know, I really can't say exactly that it's a work of art."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 21, 1955

incredible waste—of material, of time, of energy, above all, of human life. The entire country was strained and racked to build installations many of which, it was later admitted, should never have been envisioned for Hungary. But these modern pyramid builders were interested not in Hungary nor the welfare of its people, but in the expression of their own megalomania in the terms of their dogma.

It is striking that the Soviet Union has recently admitted its industry to be in need of a complete reorganization. If in the Soviet Union, after forty years time, this failure is admitted, how much greater the failure, and the crime, in the countries upon which the Soviet Union has imposed its nightmarish and fantastic system.

The Fifth Wheel

THE BEST automobile tires in Bulgaria come from Western Europe and the United States. The Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Works recently published a set of "unified norms" for the durability of tires (*Izvestia* [Sofia], April 12, 1957). Western tires were generally allotted higher norms than those of Bulgarian or Soviet make. For example, *Pirelli* (Italian) and *Continental* (West German) truck tires are expected to last up to 40,000 miles under average conditions, while *Dimitrov* (Bulgarian) tires are given less than 19,000 miles. Though the *Dimitrov* tires are made in a range of sizes, they are consistently ranked below other brands. Among passenger car tires, higher norms are set for *Semperit* (Italian), *Michelin* (French), *Dunlop* (American) and *Continental* (West German). Of the Soviet tires listed, the *Batum* is classed with Western brands but the *USSR* is considered inferior. Size 5.50-16 tires made by *Continental*, *Michelin* and *Batum* are expected to last 16,000 miles, whereas the *Dimitrov* and *USSR* tires of that size are given an average of 13,000.

Current Developments

Area

Polish-Yugoslav Meeting

On September 10, First Party Secretary Gomulka, Premier Cyrankiewicz and Agriculture Minister Ochab led a Polish delegation to what may prove to be an historic conference with Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. Since both States have Communist governments, and since both have rejected, to the extent made possible by their geographical positions, total domination by the USSR, their rapprochement, after years of Soviet-dictated enmity, was a logical step. Nevertheless, it raised at least one potentially hazardous problem; the negotiations between the two countries, and their future relationship, would have to be carried on in such a way as to reassure the Soviet Union that no hostile East European bloc was forming against it. Caution would also have to be exercised on the touchy subject of Poland's membership and Yugoslavia's non-membership in the Warsaw Pact.

Another uncertain aspect of areawide diplomacy was dramatized on the first day of the meeting when Tito, who has exchanged no diplomatic mission with the German Democratic Republic, announced his support for the Oder-Neisse boundary line between East Germany and Poland. This certainly pleased the Poles, who have settled the formerly German territory with Polish citizens—many of them from the eastern Polish provinces taken over by the Soviet Union—but it drew an immediate protest from West Germany.

Both Polish and Yugoslav newspapers featured articles on the conference. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), the official organ of the Polish Party, wrote on September 9:

"The Polish community observes with deep satisfaction the propitious development of Polish-Yugoslav relations. . . . A turning-point occurred in relations between Yugoslavia



"He is well armed against rightist deviation."

Polityka (Warsaw), August 7-13, 1957

and the other Socialist countries, when an end was put to everything which in the past poisoned these relations."

Borba (Belgrade), the Yugoslav Communist Party newspaper, on the following day, commented as follows:

"There is no doubt whatsoever that the still closer rapprochement between Socialist Poland and Socialist Yugoslavia . . . can be only in the interest of all Socialist countries. . . . It is likewise indisputable that this can only serve world peace and active coexistence, expressed in the strongest possible cooperation between all countries."

Joint Declaration

The meeting ended on September 16, and a joint communique was issued. It supported Soviet policy on disarmament, German reunification and the Near Eastern problem, and called for Western recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary. However, the declaration purposefully and carefully reiterated that relations between Communist countries and Parties should be based on "equality, friendship and non-interference in internal affairs," and applauded a variety of "roads to Socialism"; these are the watchwords of relative independence from Moscow.

Although the September 16 *Politika* (Belgrade), prominently reported Tito's statement that he had no intention of establishing a separate "faction inside the Socialist movement," and although Gomulka had issued similar assurances almost daily throughout the conference, the Soviet Union

In the Diplomatic World

"ULAN BATOR, September 7, 1957—USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Mongolian People's Republic V. M. Molotov arrived here today. Also today V. M. Molotov handed his credentials to Sambu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic.

"In the course of this ceremony Sambu and Molotov made speeches." (Radio Moscow, Sept. 7.)

still, seemingly, felt the necessity of a counter-move. The method used was a proposal by Romanian Premier Chivu Stoica, September 10, for a conference of Balkan countries (leading to a Balkan Pact) to include Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Radio Belgrade, on September 17, announced Tito's unenthusiastic acquiescence, but it is expected that Greece and Turkey, because of their NATO loyalties as well as their present estrangement over Cyprus, will not join the meeting. Thus, in any conference or pact, Yugoslavia would be outnumbered by Satellites subservient to the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev Reprimands Writers

As indicated in last month's issue of this magazine there had recently been a noticeable increase in the volume and intensity of the criticism directed at "erring" Communist writers and at intellectuals in general. This kind of criticism was not novel, for it formed the core of the regimes' evaluation of the origins of last year's upheavals in Hungary and Poland; what was new was the uniformity of the campaign in those countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania—which have long been most responsive to Moscow's dictates and in which, paradoxically enough, little intellectual ferment had actually taken place. Also remarkable was the fact that the new intellectual repression had come at the very time when major personnel changes had taken place in the Soviet Union involving the elimination of men such as Molotov and Shepilov who, in the past, had been in the forefront of the "anti-liberal" campaign. In two of the countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the new edicts came simultaneously with the demotion of a number of top Party functionaries. All in all, it appeared therefore that both Moscow and its Satellites wished to make it known that the latest changes in personnel, and particularly Khrushchev's victory in the USSR, did not signify a relaxation in "ideological vigilance." Now, the latest news from Moscow indicates that this was indeed the case and that the whole series of outbursts originated with the Soviet Party chief himself.

On August 27-28 Radio Moscow broadcast extensive summaries of three different speeches delivered by Khrushchev dealing with the limitations of literary expression. Two of the speeches, one delivered to a conference of writers at the Party's Central Committee, the other to a reception for writers, painters and composers, dated from as far back as May 13 and 19. The third talk was given by the Party head to activists sometime in July, presumably as a direct follow-up to his victory in the Politburo and Central Committee. The fact that all three speeches were lumped together, released and stressed at this particular time indicates that it was intended to point to continuity in policy—more precisely, that no matter what changes are to be introduced in the economy and other spheres of life, ideological permissiveness is definitely ruled out.

Khrushchev singled out the novelist V. Dudintsev, author of "Not By Bread Alone," for attack. According to the Communist leader, the novel, which among other things castigated Soviet bureaucracy, "purposely overemphasized and gloated over these shortcomings." Not content with



Miss Jadwiga Madejczyk, a Warsaw office worker (and winner of the Warsaw beauty contest), one of the 1,200-strong Polish delegation to the Moscow Youth Festival. There were many reports of disagreements between the Polish delegates and their Soviet hosts (see p. 47).

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 8 (36), 1957

denouncing the writer, Khrushchev turned his wrath on those responsible, in their capacity as both publishers and censors, for preventing the publication of the wrong kind of literature:

"One can only regret that this unhealthy and harmful tendency was not noted in time and that some literary-artistic magazines and publishing houses did not evaluate it in time and reject it. The editorial offices of *Novy Mir* have allowed the pages of its journal to be used for publication of various works similar to that of Dudintsev. The editorial offices of a number of literary-artistic magazines and the heads of some publishing houses were not up to the mark, and in a number of cases slipped from positions of principle. . . . We cannot entrust press organs to unreliable hands; they must be in the hands of the most faithful and reliable workers, politically sound and devoted to our cause.

"The publication *Literaturnaya Moskva* also printed works which were ideologically wrong. . . . It would be quite erroneous to think that in our Soviet conditions it is possible to serve the people without taking an active part in the implementation of the policy of the Communist Party. It is impossible to want to go along with the people without sharing the views of the Party and its political line. He who wants to be with the people will always be with the Party. He who stands firm on the positions of the Party will always be with the people."

Having thus dispelled any illusions of freedom which Soviet writers might have recently been cherishing, Khrushchev apparently decided to make the point that the check on freedom of expression had, nevertheless, not plummeted all the way to Stalinist depths:

"We are also against those who create tinsel, sugary pictures that offend the feelings of our people; for our peo-

ple will neither accept nor tolerate falsehood. The Soviet people reject such essentially slanderous works as Dudintsev's 'Not By Bread Alone' along with such sickening sweet works as the films, 'The Unforgettable Year 1919' or the 'Kuban Cossacks.' . . .

"In Comrade Dudintsev's case, I consider that with our aid and his own desire he will be able to strike the right course. . . . Everybody can make mistakes; we must concentrate not merely on what a person did yesterday, but what he will be able to do tomorrow, and—this is the main thing—we must help such a person realize shortcomings and overcome them as quickly as possible."

In the same speeches Khrushchev attempted once again to put Stalin into perspective. He also dealt with the "exposure and ideological routing of the anti-Party group of Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov and Shepilov, who joined them." Excerpts from the political sections of the speeches follow:

"They [the purged men] worked against the Leninist course laid down by the 20th CPSU Congress. . . . The situation was complicated by the fact that Stalin's personal shortcomings were used to advantage to the detriment of the Party and the people by their sworn enemy the provocateur Beria. Much of the blame for this lies with Malenkov, who was completely under Beria's influence. He was Beria's shadow, a weapon in his hands. Although he occupied a high position in the Party and government, Malenkov not only did not restrain Stalin, he very skillfully took advantage of Stalin's weaknesses and habits in the last years of his life. . . . It cannot be denied that errors

were permitted during the last years of the life of Josef Stalin, because of the personality cult. . . . Criticism of the personality cult by no means signifies indiscriminately denying the worth of Stalin's role in the life of our Party and country. Stalin had great defects, but he was devoted to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and he was a staunch and loyal revolutionary."

Traffic in Delegations

The Czechoslovak regime, playing to the hilt its role of faithful Soviet "ally," backed up the latter country's Middle-Eastern foreign policy by a series of conferences and agreements with Syrian and Egyptian representatives. One Syrian governmental delegation arrived in Prague, August 7, another, September 4, the day after an economic delegation had made its appearance in the same city. Syrian scholars returned to their own country from Moscow by way of Czechoslovakia on August 30. An Egyptian delegation was in Prague September 2.

An agreement was signed August 7, whereby Czechoslovakia pledged to send experts and technicians to Syria and to train Syrians in Czechoslovakia in connection with industrial projects destined for Syria. A trade agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, September 2, calls for considerably increased commercial relations between the two countries. The Czechoslovaks will send unspecified amounts of engineering goods in exchange for cotton.

Announcement was also made of two Czechoslovak delegations to China. The first, a scientific-technical mission



Vilian Siroky, left, Czechoslovak Premier, on his visit to East Germany last May. With him are East German Premier Grotewohl, center, and East German Party leader Ulbricht, in goatee. *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), August 1957

arrived in Peking on August 30. The second, a Parliamentary group to be headed by National Assembly Chairman Zdenek Fierlinger, was to depart at the end of September for visits to Mongolia and North Korea, as well as China.

Bulgaria was host to a Polish Parliamentary delegation August 5, an Albanian delegation August 22, and to a vacationing Communist Premier, Otto Grotewohl of East Germany, on August 24. A Mongolian delegation arrived in Sofia, August 31—one day after the announcement of V. M. Molotov's appointment as Ambassador to their country—and departed for Romania on September 4. The Mongolians received support in both countries for their campaign for membership in the United Nations (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], August 30; *Scinteia* [Bucharest], September 4).

Three top Romanian Party officials, Deputy Premier Emil Bodnarus, Foreign Minister I. G. Maurer and alternate Politburo Member Leonte Rautu, made a visit to Yugoslavia, which was announced August 29, only after they had been in that country for several days.

Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam President and Party chief, concluded his visits to the East European area—he had already been in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—with a five day sojourn in Yugoslavia, ending August 9, followed by journeys to Albania on the same day, Bulgaria, August 13, and Romania, August 17. He left the latter country on August 21 and went home by way of the Soviet Union.

Bill Against "Parasites"

As it has throughout the USSR, the machinery for possible deportation and resettlement of minority nationalities has now been set up in the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic). Radio Moscow reported on August 21 that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet had received for "examination" from its legislative committee a bill "to strengthen the struggle against anti-social and parasitic elements." According to the broadcast, such persons may be deported "for a period of 2-5 years with compulsory labor at the place of exile." Under the similar measures passed in other sections of the Soviet Union, Balts, Bessarabians, citizens of Soviet-annexed Eastern Poland and others who are not considered sufficiently "communized" may be deported to areas of the USSR where they will be less able to retain their national feelings, and where they can be utilized for forced labor. The measures may also be used against white collar workers, technicians and university graduates to force them into employment outside their native countries and districts.

An Outrageous Remark

Eleven workers have been dismissed in Szombathely, because they "were said to be counterrevolutionaries." One of them was deemed a "counterrevolutionary" when "he declared several times that only experts should be put into leading positions." (*Nepakarat* [Budapest], the trade union daily, August 4, 1957.)

Hungary

Furor Over UN Report

As a prelude to the September UN General Assembly debate on the report of the committee which studied the Hungarian Revolt, the Kadar regime loosed a torrent of abuse. The report was termed "an encyclopedia of slander." (Radio Budapest, August 19.) The committee chairman was called "the number one traitor of Norway," and the Ceylonese delegate on the committee was referred to as "scum." (*Nepszabadsag*, August 25.) The mass of the scorn and calumny was reserved for the United States and for the contents of the report. Soviet and Hungarian officials fulminated against the documented evidence, and the press carried daily diatribes of hate. Various groups of citizens were also pressed into service as puppets. For example, *Nepszabadsag*, on April 15, stated that "The workers of Eger . . . demand that the UN delete the so-called 'Hungarian Question' from the agenda." The same paper went on to quote "an official protest" from the workers of the Csepel Iron and Metal Works (where anti-Soviet resistance during the revolt was particularly bitter) who "were particularly incensed at the falsifications in the report and indignant at the report's reference to the counterrevolution as the national fight for freedom."

The Kadar regime reiterated the Soviet position that the Revolt was an internal affair, that the "summoning" of Soviet troops to crush the freedom fighters was quite justified, and that the entire affair was beyond the UN's jurisdiction. *Nepszabadsag*, on August 23, made this stand clear:

"The Hungarian government wishes to emphasize that all events and measures taken in connection with last Fall's counterrevolutionary attack against the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic, supported and prepared by foreign imperialists, are matters which concern solely the Hungarian people. . . . The placing of the so-called Hungarian question on the UN agenda, and even the appointment of the special committee must be considered not only a gross violation of the domestic affairs of Hungary, but also a violation of the United Nations Charter. . . . The counterrevolutionary attack . . . seriously endangered the legal Hungarian government, and therefore justified that government in turning for help to its friendly ally, the Soviet government. Consequently the Soviet government acted in full accord with the United Nations Charter and at the request of the legal government of Hungary."

Certain developments within Hungary were probably connected with the preparation for the UN debate. In speeches during the latter part of August and in early September, and in articles in the Communist press, regime officials took a noticeably less "Stalinist" position on many internal matters, and, for the first time since the Revolt, strongly criticized the Rakosi era (see accounts of Kadar and Dobi speeches below). Even more notable has been the sudden silence in the press on the subject of arrests, convictions and executions of "counterrevolutionaries." The publicizing of these repressive measures, as done until recently, would, of course, make the task even more difficult



Illustrations for a Hungarian periodical's story on problem children and juvenile delinquency. Girl at left is a sixteen-year-old prostitute. The thirteen-year-old boys in the center ran away from home to go to America. At right, a fifteen-year-old girl who escaped to Austria last November, later returned because she missed her mother.

Nok Lapja (Budapest), January 31, 1957

for the Soviet and Satellite defenders of the Kadar regime in the UN debate.

Trials and Executions

The blare of admonitory publicity which has resounded in Hungary since the Revolt was considerably lessened in the month preceding the UN debate (see above). Where previously reports of arrests, long jail sentences and executions had been circulated daily by the press and radio to terrify the population into obedience, this month the press accent appeared to be on "counterrevolutionaries" already dealt with. The Budapest Public Prosecutor announced that "public security had been consolidated in the capital, and most of the criminals set free by the counterrevolutionaries last October have [already] been arrested." (Radio Budapest, August 12.) On August 3, *Nepszabadsag* stated:

"In the main, leaders of parties formed during the revolution have been arrested. These include 12 members of the executive committee of the Christian Hungarian Party, leaders of the Christian Front, National Bloc of Non-party Adherents, Hungarian Democratic Union, Christian Democratic People's Party and Hungarian Freedom Party."

The August 25 edition of *Nepszabadsag* featured an editorial entitled "Let's Put an End to It," which urged greater moderation and more order in calling people to account for the October events. The road to political development, the paper averred, consists of "putting an end to the personal aspects of October on the basis of justice, law and humanity." The official Party newspaper also stated: "Those who committed crimes should be punished, those who wronged others should make amends, those who erred should get a good dressing-down, and above all, everyone should be told what he has to answer for."

The silence on repression (which of course has no necessary relation to the reality of concentration camps and tor-

ture chambers) was broken in a few cases. Radio Budapest announced on August 15 the execution of two men who were called, "murderers of a commanding officer of the forces of public order and of two old women." The same broadcast hailed the opening of the trial of a man described as a supporter of Cardinal Mindszenty, a "blackmailer," and one who had "taken part in several armed acts of terror during the counterrevolution, killing several Soviet soldiers."

Speeches Show Areas of Mildness

On August 20, Party Chief Janos Kadar and head of State Istvan Dobi addressed a mass gathering at Kisujszallas. Aside from rantings against the UN debate on the Hungarian Revolt, the tone of their speeches was somewhat milder than in the recent past (very possibly in consideration of the spotlight of the UN session), and the "mistakes" of the Rakosi regime came under stronger attack than has been the case for some time. Dobi struck a note on "Socialist justice" that was indeed moderate—for a member of the vengeful Kadar regime. His words on this subject, as broadcast over Radio Budapest, August 20, went as follows:

"I agree with those who are of the opinion that the counterrevolutionary affair of last October ought to be closed as soon as possible. The guilty must be punished, but now primary attention should be concentrated on building for the immediate and distant future."

"We can read in the press day after day articles condemning and unmasking irresponsible reports to the authorities about the unwarranted molestation of the people. Countless reports of this sort are also addressed to me. Comrade Kadar can tell you that even more people turn to him for help in similar matters. Let us put an end to such things. . . . We, too, are humane. Let us not persecute

those who in October and November omitted to do what we, too, omitted. Many people did wrong, but let us pursue and punish only those who sought to overthrow the people's power.

"I mean this for writers in the same way as for peasants. He who erred and regrets it and is prepared to take his share in Socialist construction should be relieved from worries paralyzing his working capacity."

Kadar took a similar line (Radio Budapest, August 20). He also had some non-Stalinist things to say about higher living standards and more consumer goods. The Communist boss conceded that "more nylon underwear can be bought in the shops of Austria than in Hungary . . . that they can sell more refrigerators, and there are a few other goods of which they have more to offer." He then passed judgement in the following manner:

"I say this is bad. We must work, and we shall work, and in the end we will have even more nylon underwear than they. But at present they have more."

Forcible Collectivization Repudiated

Kadar's mildness was especially noteworthy on the subject of collectivization, and he gave at least the appearance of repudiating future coercive measures:

"I wish to emphasize that we condemn . . . and shall prevent in every instance pressure on even a single peasant to join a collective against his will. We have confidence in the force of the Socialist ideal and in the good work of the collectives. We believe that if the Hungarian peasant is able to think calmly, without pressure or vexation, the development of the collective movement will be speeded, rather than retarded as it was during the period when good organizational work was often coupled with stupid acts of violence."

The Party chief chided some of his fellow Communists on their abuse of power: "The Communist who behaves as if he were master over the people, or as if he stood above them, is not a good Communist." Kadar then added the following pious historical note:

"When the working class acquired power, when individual Party members felt there were no rivals, they believed that it was no longer quite so essential to convince people, that it was enough to shout at people, because they dared not answer back. . . . Everyone should understand that the force of power can never supplant the force of conviction."

Kadar repeated this theme on Miner's Day, September 1, over Radio Budapest. "Now that the State power is again firm," he said, "Party members and public functionaries must not be permitted to talk to people rudely, roughly or order them about." His emphasis on the "firmness" of the State may also indicate a change, at least in the propaganda line. Previously, the wave of repressive measures was always justified by the publicly expressed danger of another "counterrevolution."

There was considerable discussion of living standards in this speech, which was directed at the miners. Kadar said that the miners of the Tatabanya area had increased their



A Hungarian delegate to the Moscow Youth Festival, center, with delegates from India, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Orszag Vilag (Budapest), August 13, 1957

wages by approximately 35 percent in the first seven months of the year, and that their production had jumped from 117,000 tons in January to 198,000 tons in July. He laid this improvement to Party decisions taken in July 1956: "Had we been able to work properly," he averred, "without material losses, damages, and without having to imprison a few people . . . we would be much further ahead than we are now." It appears that at the moment the Kadar regime is attempting to mask the underlying reality of repression with fair words and soft promises; in this regard, at least, it differs from the Rakosi period of most evil memory.

Silence from the Writers

Since the Revolt many of the country's most prominent writers have refused to publish their work in the Hungarian press. The weekly literary magazine *Elet es Irodalom* took cognizance of this state of affairs in its August 9 issue, admitting that "a healthy literary life has not yet started." The magazine explained the situation as follows:

"Some writers, have not yet learned to face reality, and refuse to take their place in literature. Thus they create the impression that they push the cart of counterrevolution. Then there are those who still refuse to admit their mistakes, to acknowledge the historic truth. They find it difficult to shake off the era of illusion and romanticism. All this creates confusion, increases rumors and the sense of insecurity. It is high time that this unhealthy situation came to an end."

The following week the magazine was reiterating its arguments. "The number of writers who keep nursing their grudges is enormous," the journal stated, and then added, "A small republic could be formed . . . from those who swear by their twisted views."

New Control Law Drafted

Continuing to tighten its repressive grip on a restive population, the government is drafting a bill that will establish a Central Committee of People's Control. According to *Esti Hirlap* (Budapest), August 24, the Committee

will work through a national organization of People's Control with representatives "in all county and district centers, in every district of Budapest and in every large town. These representatives will be chosen from among the most active members of the various social organizations . . . who are most familiar with local conditions and . . . also fully versed politically." The new organization will replace the Ministry of State Control, abolished in 1956 before the Revolt. Explaining the necessity for the new organization, the paper said that "public property is, in many places, regarded as property under nobody's care" and complained that the Revolt and its aftermath had "greatly increased the loosening of discipline in almost every sphere of public economy and life."

Reductions in Scholarships

In a move aimed at university students, who, as a group, were the leaders in sparking last year's Revolt, the regime has sharply reduced scholarship payments, with the effect of markedly cutting down the country's student population. According to *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) of August 23, "In the past, almost 90 percent of the students received scholarships from the State." The journal states that this easy policy was a "mistake . . . as the students considered the support was something due to them . . . and they were not aware of the full value of State support." *Nepszabadsag* describes some of the provisions of the new

Comment on Nagy's Book

COMMENT ON THE IMRE NAGY book—excerpts of which were published for the first time in the Western World in the July issue of *East Europe*—appeared in the Budapest weekly, *Magyarország*, and was broadcast over Radio Budapest, August 26. The comment took the position of muted praise for the book, and was forced to fall back on accusations of inconsistency in order to condemn the man:

"We judge the author who does nothing but write, purely on the basis of his writings. The theoretician is judged by his theories. But the author-theoretician who is engaged in active politics is, above all, judged by the practical implementation of his policies, by his deeds and not by his theoretical reasoning. When we read Imre Nagy's writings and compare them with his deeds in October-November 1956, we must conclude that, although the former Premier is sometimes wise in his writings, he is the world's champion of contradictions between words and deeds . . .

"Was there ever greater contradiction between words and deeds than between the quotations from Imre Nagy's book and his actions in October-November 1956? When one begins to meditate on Nagy's nice-sounding words, one comes to the conclusion that he was a great Party leader while, thanks to the Party, he filled the post of first man in the country. However, when it became dangerous and difficult to fight for the Party, he was the first to turn his back on the Party. Does this attitude not conform completely with the idea of treason?"



A meeting of the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front, June 16, 1956. The speaker is former PPF president Paul Szabo: former Party boss Rakosi is seated at his left.

Photo from *Nok Lapja* (Budapest), June 21, 1956

policy as follows:

"In the 1957-58 school year scholarships to the amount of 100-150 *forint* per month* will be granted only to students with reasonably good marks. . . . There will be no scholarships for students whose legal supporters earn over 3,000 *forint* per month. . . . There will be free meals for those whose supporters make less than 2,500 *forint* per month. . . . Who will be qualified to receive funds? Apart from scholastic considerations, mostly the children of workers and peasants, if the income of the head of the family does not exceed 1,600 *forint*. . . . A very special scholarship will be granted to 150 students yearly. This will amount to 700 *forint* per month. . . . Under the new system, tuition is set at 1,000 *forint* per half-year."

The time taken for a university education has been increased to five years instead of four, as prevailed before the Revolt, although there has been no increase in the number of courses, Radio Budapest, August 27 announced. The same source stated that the number of students accepted by colleges and universities this year is 5,000. This is almost 50 percent less than in previous years.

Front "Revival" Continues

Hoping to create an instrument by which its complete isolation from the people may be lessened, the Kadar regime took further steps in August and September to strengthen the Patriotic People's Front. On August 20, there were more than 100 meetings of the organization throughout the country, and on September 2 an important meeting took place in Budapest, presided over by Chairman Antal Apró. The latter spoke on the necessity for the Front to participate more fully in the national life and asked for greater "cooperation" with his organization from both the Communist Party and the government (Radio Budapest, September 3).

(Continued on page 46)

* Average industrial worker's income: 1,200 *forint* a month.

"No More Curfew in Budapest"

Following are major excerpts from an article on Budapest by a Yugoslav reporter returning there for the first time since the days of the Revolt. It appeared in Ljudska Pravica (Ljubljana), May 5, 1957.

The girl customs officer at the Kelebija frontier station gently put her hands into my travelling bag and very adroitly went through my belongings. A non-commissioned officer apologized meekly for having to look underneath my seat. The conductor began to talk about the "Ferencváros" soccer club. All this looked like normal life again, I reflected. Six months ago I passed this same frontier post when there were no guards, no customs officers, and very conspicuously no railwaymen of any kind.

Three hours later I was in the heart of Budapest, in the famed Ferencváros [workers' residential] District. This was six months after I had left a smoking, agitated and blood-stained Budapest where during 17 memorable days I witnessed incredible destruction. What am I to see now?

I went to the Hotel "Beke" where I had spent those troubled days. The hotel was intact. All the rooms were taken, the porter told me, because tomorrow was Easter, "but we shall try to find something." The same porter, the same elevator boy, the same valet as before. We all knew each other. After that, I went out into the streets. It was nine o'clock in the morning. Work and life begin in the city at about that hour. I strolled down the main street which had resumed its old name "Lenin Circle." The former "Stalin Avenue" has been re-named "Avenue of the Hungarian Youth." It has kept the name given to it in the October days. Here and there some trees were putting on fresh green. On one of them, I remember, I had seen a man hanging, surrounded by a wild cheering crowd. On the tree next to it, too, I remember, had been another. . . .

The Ninth District of Budapest, Ferencváros, has suffered most. Not a single house there is undamaged. Wooden scaffoldings support whatever could be saved, and workers are mending walls and windows. But life is going on. Streetcars are rolling again along the old street tracks which in those October days were used for barricades. They tell you that no one in Budapest has died of hunger or frozen to death. So life is continuing its course. Even the street traffic is what it was before, lively and nervous. . . .

Here is the Kossuth coat of arms! It is mounted above the main entrances of the larger buildings, or stares at you from posters. The Kossuth crest suddenly turned up in October—and remained. On a poster topped by the crest one reads:

"Work, chins high, relentlessly,
As long as the light of life burns—
We declare that no one can be happy
Unless he is a worker who builds—
Have faith in your government—The people and the
government have but one goal: peace, order and inde-
pendence."

I jotted down some of the slogans and posters with

which Budapest is plastered:

"For a strong proletarian power!" is written beneath an enormous clenched fist hammering down on five frightened people.

"Tremble, counterrevolutionaries, hiding in the dark and spreading rumors!" is splashed underneath a picture representing an armed police guard swinging a clenched fist.

"Long live the Worker-Peasant Government! Down with counterrevolutionaries!" thunders from a wall.

There is no wall in the town, and no street, without one or another of these slogans. It was like that six months ago when they were calling out the general strike, or urging the people to register with the Peasant and the Catholic Parties, or demanding the expulsion of the Russian Army.

In a film newsreel, Marosan [Kadar's Minister of State] is addressing the workers of Csepel:

"We want the dictatorship of the proletariat!

We have fought always for it!

Have we not made generals of you [workers], and diplomats, and Ministers! We must become stronger than ever!

See what democracy and Rakosi's liberalism brought us!"

"Join the Union of Communist Youth!" This is one of the slogans most frequently seen, and is addressed to the university students, especially to those from workers' families. . . .

Then I went on, and on—into pastry shops, market places, stores, churches, playgrounds, the Stadium, restaurants, movies, theaters, and public bars, looking, talking, buying newspapers, magazines. . . . Six months ago I left these people in a state of fury and excitement. When I look at them now I see the old Budapestians again. Poorly dressed men and women. The women are wearing hats again, but nylon stockings are still rare. Sports shoes, with thick triple-soles, still predominate. Good overcoats are a rarity. In one of the shops raincoats are suddenly on sale! 450 forint for a lady's taffeta raincoat, 616 forint for a man's trenchcoat. Just half of an average month's wage. Immediately a line forms . . . the first one I saw in Budapest.

I went into several shops. . . . The shops carry a variety of small articles . . . but it is difficult to find larger industrial products. They are sold "under the counter" to relatives and friends, and for hard cash. . . . The new production is still too feeble to be able to put on the market enough to satisfy everybody. . . . The food market is well stocked. Prices are stable and one has the impression that the Hungarians have never eaten better in their country. The most appreciated articles are chocolates and nylon products which are sold "around corners," but openly, in the streets. . . .

In a special newsreel theater you may see films from

all over the world—with the exception of the US. . . . In between are inserted documentaries on the October days. These show hangings, people being hunted down, trenches being dug in front of the Parliament Building when they were out to find the hidden mystery chambers of the AVH. In the midst of it all—the smiling face of Nagy. The people watch all this with a bored indifference. No one here speaks about the October events. A real conspiracy of silence, indeed.

Now, we have only the evening left. . . . I went to the "Duna" dance hall. A beautiful blonde with a bare back and bosom sang a melancholy song about "stay here, don't

go away . . . in Vienna, Paris and Madrid you will not hear any Hungarian songs . . . and they have no gardens so full of flowers as ours. . . ." A little puzzled by the song, I asked the waiter where it came from. He replied contemptuously: "Propaganda—all propaganda to make the people stay home and not go running abroad." . . .

It is Easter Sunday today. The Bishop spoke in his magnificent basilica on the Resurrection, and urged the faithful to rejoice and be glad. The security police agents strolled peacefully in the streets carrying new, heavier clubs and new automatic guns across their chests. Two weeks ago the curfew was discontinued. Life in Budapest flows again quietly along its course.

Important Defection from East Germany:

Kantorowicz: "Dictatorship of the Functionary"

In August, Professor Alfred Kantorowicz, 58, holder of a chair of modern literature at the East German Humboldt University in Berlin, Communist since 1931, hero of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, defected to the West. On the night of Thursday, August 24, he broadcast over Radio Free Berlin, setting forth the reasons for his flight, and asking asylum in West Germany. Below are excerpts from his speech:

"As of today I have abandoned the orbit of power of the Ulbricht regime of violence. . . . I must say farewell, for a long time, if not forever, to friends, co-fighters from the time of the common resistance against the Nazi blood-rule, to those comrades who, believing they were fighting in a just cause, risked their lives with me in the International Brigade in Spain on the fronts of Madrid, Proza-blanca, Teruel (mark well, not in the offices of Albacete, Valencia and Madrid), comrades with whom I later spent time in concentration camps and prisons. . . . All these will now be forced to spit at me, to denounce me, to curse me as a traitor and renegade and who knows what else, because I have attempted to remain true to myself by this necessary resignation from the Ulbricht regime.

"You must understand that I have put off this extreme decision for years and years, in the desperate hope that the excesses of brutality, stupidity, violence, the unending mud-stream of lies, the throttling of spiritual freedom—all these, I hoped, were only the convulsions of a transitional period and that out of this labor would be born a new society, in which there would be a beautiful balance of personal freedom and social justice.

" . . . After the events of recent years, from June 17 [1953; the date of the East Berlin uprising] to the . . . depressing and nerve-racking Hungarian tragedy and after the new wave of terror, particularly against the intellectuals, let loose by the mercenaries of the Ulbricht apparatus, I have now lost the last hope, what am I saying, the last illusion, that a new and better world can possibly be born from such scum. Now I can no longer deny to myself . . . the tragic paradox that I have contributed to situations against which it was my intention to fight: the lawlessness, the exploitation of workers, the spiritual enslavement of the intelligentsia, the arbitrary rule of an unworthy clique which shamed the concept of Socialism just as the Nazis once shamed the name of Germany. No, I could no longer close my eyes to the almost incredible phenomenon that while we had faithfully fought for freedom and justice and against the Fascist barbarian, Fascism and barbarism had again risen in our rear in word and deed, and largely in the offices of the Party bureaucrats. Our fight had been intended to bring about the rule of the people, and instead we found ourselves enmeshed in the dictatorship of the functionary. The People's Chamber [parliament] had become the chamber of the functionary. The welfare of the people had become the welfare of the functionary. The people's factories had become factories belonging to the functionaries, in which the workers lost their basic rights, for which they had fought and suffered for a full century, and where they are driven by functionary-overseers to a state of semi-servitude, always to new special shifts, overtime work, maximum performance. . . ."

(Continued from page 43)

Trade Union Council Meets

The "Council of Free Trade Unions" met in plenary session on August 16 in Budapest. Sandor Gaspar, the Secretary-General, delivered a report in which he outlined the Kadar regime's program for the unions. He said that average industrial wages had risen 25 percent in the last year and the wages of workers in general by at least 10 percent. The key task of the unions, he said, must be to raise production. He laid stress on the new system of incentive wages that was announced in July in place of the post-Revolt practice of paying time wages (see September issue, p. 39). In an effort to palliate this return to the hated old system he emphasized a plan for profit sharing under which workers would share in the profits of enterprises according to their earnings and their length of service. He also said that the unions ought to share in certain—unspecified—decisions of management.

The Council passed a resolution embodying these proposals and also laying emphasis on labor competitions as a means to greater production. It was announced that the next Trade Union Congress will take place by March 31, 1958 (Radio Budapest, August 17 and 18).

Figures on Youth Organization

KISZ, the Communist Party youth organization, now has 160,000 members in its 5,000 branches, according to *Nepszabadsag*, August 25. The same source also announced that 35,000 peasant youth had "resigned" from the regime-sponsored EPOSZ organization to join KISZ.


If the *Nepszabadsag* figures are correct, the youth group contains 10-15 percent of the young people of Hungary. Both KISZ and EPOSZ were formed after the Revolt to replace the detested youth organization DISZ which disintegrated during the period immediately before the uprising. KISZ was to embrace young workers, EPOSZ to be for young peasants. The latter organization has apparently been a disappointment to the regime, showing tendencies toward independence, and its members are now being "encouraged" to join KISZ.

On August 14, *Nepszabadsag* announced the intention of the regime to form "Young Workers' Councils" within the KISZ organization. These councils will be apportioned among the various branches of industry and "will study the position of young men in the factories and workshops . . . and look into their general living conditions."

Obsolescent Machines

Hungary's technological backwardness was cited by *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, August 7, as the chief reason for its foreign trade difficulties. The underlying cause, it said, was that Hungarian industry had made very little progress since 1952 either in output or in technical efficiency. In certain fields such as industrial machinery there had even been a deterioration.

"For example, the average life of machine tools is considered to be 18 or 20 years, but in the Agricultural Machine Factory of Mosonmagyaróvár it is 25 years, while



The red star, which was ripped from the House of Parliament in Budapest during the Revolt, being once more put in place.

Erdekes Ujsag (Budapest), August 10, 1957

in the KGM plants, producing consumer goods, it is 26 years. The average age of our textile machines is 50 years (many of them were bought second-hand by the capitalists) and our steam boilers are definitely obsolete. Even in plants with relatively modern machinery, certain aspects of work such as the moving of material and goods is still done in a very primitive manner."

The paper said that for this reason "many products which we could easily sell in the past we are now able to export only with great difficulty and at considerable loss."

Poland

Gomulka Speaks in Cracow

Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, delivered a temperate and undoctinaire speech in Cracow, August 17, during ceremonies commemorating the 1937 Peasant Strike. As broadcast the same day over Radio Warsaw, Gomulka's words had as their main point the necessity for continuation of industrial investment in order to answer Poland's most pressing economic and agricultural problems. "One must remember," he stated, "that two fundamental factors influence and will continue to influence the shaping of our economy." These factors Gomulka named as "the natural increase in population" and the scarcity of new jobs in the towns. He went on to elaborate as follows:

"In the whole country the population increased last year by 526,000. Children are being born, but the land does not increase. To prevent the augmentation of excess manpower in the countryside, the whole natural increase of peasant population should go to work outside agriculture, that is, first of all, in the towns. But in the towns there are no ready jobs waiting. These jobs must be created and

their number must be constantly increased. To do this we must increasingly invest funds in our economy and first of all in industry. . . . Further industrialization of the country is the one road which must be followed in order to develop our nation and insure conditions for the further improvement of the living conditions of the working people in towns and villages. This refers equally to workers and peasants."

Gomulka then spoke of what he considers the "necessity" to continue substantial taxation on the peasants and—though on a reduced scale—compulsory deliveries:

"The taxes and compulsory deliveries are not a tribute exacted from peasants by the State. They are the capital to equip peasant sons on the road toward a new life in factories and towns. They are the dowry for their daughters who must also seek employment in professions outside agriculture. They represent the help given to the State by the peasants to provide new places of employment for their children."

Tax on Vodka

The Party chief also dealt with the necessity to continue mechanization of agriculture, in order to raise production and to lead the countryside "out of the state of backwardness." He also mentioned the rise in vodka prices to obtain funds to "regulate" some workers' wages. "In order to give to some, it was necessary to take away from others," he said, "and what has been taken away will do no harm, for one can drink less and even manage not to drink vodka at all." Foreign credits came under attention also:

"A considerable part of the increase in wages and in the income of the rural population is now met from foreign credits. . . . [But] it is impossible to live for very long on credit. Only when an equilibrium on the goods market has been achieved through an increase in production and productivity can a further increase in production be earmarked for further regulation of wages."



A Polish soldier (right, in British Army uniform) shaking hands with an American soldier after the World War II battle of the Falaise Gap. This was one of the illustrations from an article in the Polish magazine celebrating the anniversary of the battle (July 29-August 4, 1944). Only in Poland, and there only since the Gomulka regime, is there permitted reminders that the entire war was not fought by Soviet troops.

Photo from *Swiat* (Warsaw), August 11, 1957

The Party leader warned "loafers," and "troublemakers," among whom he singled out some "within the ranks" of the Lodz transport strikers, that "the end [in such a strike] is always the same; the workers return to their jobs without obtaining a raise." Such people, he stated, "do not care that the State must provide every year 200,000 to 300,000 new jobs in order to employ growing youth." Gomulka stated that aside from those whose wage raises had already been earmarked from the vodka fund, "no one else can count on obtaining a pay raise in the immediate future." He also warned that "those elements which are organizing campaigns for pay raises outside the trade unions are misleading and deceiving the workers."

No Forced Collectivization

The Communist chief then returned to a discussion of agricultural problems. Among his main points on this score were the following:

"The yields per hectare of land are going up, though slowly. For instance, in 1949 we had 30 pigs per 100 hectares of arable land, while in 1956 the figure rose to 53 pigs; in 1938 there were only 29 pigs. The milk yield per cow is going up, and their numbers are also increasing. . . . We must tell the peasants that we cannot renounce the overdue deliveries and taxes because the State must have the means for implementation of economic plans which equally serve the interests of peasants and workers, the interests of the entire nation. But the time will come when we will completely abolish the compulsory deliveries. . . . We shall recommend collectives, but we are not going to impose them. . . ."

Polish-Soviet Clashes at Youth Festival

Some of the more interesting scenes of the Moscow Youth Festival (July 28-August 11) were the disagreements, arguments and debates between the Polish delegates, upholding the "liberal" Gomulka line on art, agriculture and a number of other subjects, and delegates from the Soviet Union and most of the Satellites, to whom the Gomulka line was, as it is to their regimes, strongly suspect. With notable vigor, the 1,200-member Polish delegation denied charges that the Polish line deprecated "the achievements of Communism," totally rejected Soviet art, embraced "revisionism." The attitude of the Soviet hosts appears to have been very aggressive, and though the intensity of the debates was somewhat minimized in the official reporting, there was no attempt to hide the fact that real ideological disputes had taken place (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], August 6).

Radio Warsaw reported on August 12 that Alexei Surkov, Secretary of the Soviet Writers' Union, had stated: "Although a number of too strong formulations were unnecessarily uttered in the course of a hot discussion . . . the meetings [with the Polish writers] were very useful to us." Surkov made one revealing precondition for the establishment of friendly relations with Polish writers: "We want to speak to our Polish comrades on the understanding that they recognize that we have a living and active literature and are not a cemetery created since 1934."

Some of the most heated arguments developed after the showing of the Polish motion picture "City That Cannot Perish." *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), a publication aimed at youth, reported the controversy on August 10-11, as follows:

"This film tells of a town ruined by its inhabitants who let it decay. . . . Its National Council is helpless and apathetic. The film's message runs: help our city, it must not perish. . . .! The film was dubbed a pessimistic one. Our Soviet and Romanian colleagues asked us, 'Why don't you show films about new cities and new beautiful houses? This would be characteristic of the new reality, and decaying ruins are not.'

"Similar accusations were leveled against 'Knifegrinder,' a film about an old man who wanders around with his useless grinding machine, too old a man to begin a new life. We were asked, 'Why do you never show such things as youth in the task of building Socialism? Why do you go back into the past? Why do you present helpless situations?'

"In the lobbies there were more remarks exchanged than during the official meetings. Soviet undergraduates approached and congratulated us upon our films, praising their sincerity and passion. It has turned out that we are not alone, after all."

Polish Agriculture Attacked

The disagreements between the Poles and the official Soviet representatives at the conference appear to have been widespread. The Warsaw daily *Głos Pracy's* Moscow correspondent reported in his paper on August 11 that there was "a clash of opinion on almost every subject," but added significantly that there was no attempt to settle controversies in the classic Stalinist way; there was general freedom to air all views. However, when the Polish delegation at the law seminar stated that juvenile crime was on the upgrade, "our opponents, including, among others,



Two scenes from the Moscow Youth Festival.

Swiat (Warsaw), August 11, 1957



the Bulgarian chairman of the meeting, replied that such statistics should not be divulged to such a large and international audience." (*Sztandar Młodych*, August 6.) The same source revealed that the Polish report delivered at the agricultural seminar was described as "revisionistic" by other members of the forum, probably because it belittled collectivization. The Poles replied that "we are severing ties with unrealistic economic practice."

A workers' delegation from what Radio Warsaw, in an August 10 broadcast, called the "pro-Gomulka" Zeran Automobile Plant, discussed with their Soviet counterparts topics which included the workers' councils in Poland, the 20th CPSU Congress, the "cult of the individual" and the American loan to Poland. The broadcast said that although the atmosphere was less than sympathetic at the beginning of the meeting, there were "many warm handshakes and modest gifts" from the Soviet workers after they had heard the Poles' "explanations."

Previous Journalists' Clash

The divergence of views between Polish and Soviet intellectuals was manifested previous to the conference by the reports of a group of Polish journalists who spent a month in the Soviet Union. *Prasa Polska* (Warsaw), July, stated:

"We must all realize more fully the great harm caused by the [false] manner in which Soviet reality has been presented in the past years by our press. Everyone who has seen [in Russia] this diligent and difficult life, full of privations—although it could be debated whether these privations were always justified—must admit that this [propaganda] paints . . . the situation better than it really is. It blurs the real picture of struggle and difficulties surmounted. As a result it can often create disillusionment on the part of foreigners, which would be deeply harmful to the people of the USSR.

"The resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress dealing with economic and living problems are being speedily put into effect . . . but the speed in understanding problems other than economic is slower; for example, in the comrades' ways of thought and reaction to various views in the fields of literature, art and the press.

"There is a great hunger for knowledge about Poland in the Soviet Union. . . . It must be said, however, that among many [Soviet] comrades, journalists as well as others, aside from a great sympathy for our achievements, something in the nature of doubt was shown about our views and the fate of our revolution [i.e., the October events]. . . . Our fellow debaters were worried by the divergence of opinion on such problems as the existence or non-existence of non-antagonistic differences in 'managing the masses.' We tried to develop these discussions, but they tended rather to reduce the question to one of the struggle against the bureaucracy. Some of them showed quite obvious doubts, for example, about whether the workers' councils are really favorable factors in Socialist building. Naturally, we eventually agreed on many debatable topics."

Strike in Silesia

The workers of the largest chemical factory in Lower Silesia, the Rokitnica Works, were out on strike August 2-8, it has been revealed. *Głos Pracy* (Warsaw), August 15, the trade union organ, reported that the losses caused by the suspension of production were in excess of four million *zloty*. According to the journal, the men returned to work "only after hearing the report of the delegation which had a five-hour talk in Warsaw with [Party chief] Gomulka, who convinced us that a general wage increase was impossible at present."

The strikers demanded a general wage increase of almost 80 percent, improved safety conditions, health benefits and working conditions. The paper stated that Gomulka was "surprised that the rest of the demands [other than the wage demands] had not as yet been attended to."

The labor front still fermented with the repercussions of the Lodz strike (see *East Europe*, September 1957, pp. 28-29). The Party organ, *Trybuna Ludu*, in its August 15 issue, resented Western dispatches which, the journal

averred, "gave the impression that a civil war, at least, had broken out in Poland." Radio Warsaw on August 14 called the Lodz strikers' demands "unfair," said that "the State authorities were not lacking in good will," and gave figures of general wage increases throughout the country, as follows:

"In 1955 the wage fund amounted to 92 billion *zloty*. In 1956 it was 107 billion *zloty*. This year it has reached the sum of 122 billion. Thus in two years, the wage fund has risen by 33 percent. It is a rate of increase unknown in any country. . . . To maintain it over a long period without a considerable rate of increase in production is economically impossible."

Report on the Economy

A report on the fulfillment of the economic plan for the first six months of 1957 was released by the Central Statistical Office on August 19. Industrial production, it

"If Things Are So Good . . . ?"

COMMENTING ON THE UNITED NATIONS Statistical Yearbook of 1956, *Swiat*, the Warsaw weekly, wrote in its July 28 issue, "This is the most interesting book of the year." The journal continued: "We know very little about contemporary capitalism, for our knowledge depends on anachronistic clichés of the Nineteenth Century and ignores new formulas which do not 'revise' but merely supplement the Marxist economics." The writer tells how he "impatiently" scanned the columns relating to Poland, how in doing so, he experienced "something bordering on shock and stupefaction."

"Poland, we read in the Yearbook, occupies the fifth place in world production of coal [after the U.S., Great Britain, USSR and West Germany], the same place in the world production of zinc . . . sixth in the production of coke. . . . Her sulphur deposits occupy the second or third place in the world. We manufacture more fertilizers than rich and agricultural Canada. To cut a long story short, careful and objective statistics of the UN present our country as a strongly industrialized one, possessing rich natural resources.

"You must be joking, a reader might say; for, if things are so good, why are they so bad? If we are so rich, why are we so poor?"

"From the same source we learn that Poland, a country of highly developed industry, has no more automobiles than Ceylon and fewer than Rhodesia and Singapore, that our [living] accommodations are the most crammed in the whole world (1.8 persons per room, the average for the entire country; i.e. twice as many persons as in Holland, France or Switzerland); that our housing production is the lowest in the world (three rooms per 1,000 inhabitants were constructed in 1955); our air transport is six times less economical than Switzerland's; the productivity of the Polish worker in the textile, coal, and chemistry industries is probably the world's lowest, and is getting still lower."

stated, was 8.6 percent greater than in the corresponding period of last year. Steel was up 7.1 percent, machine tools 10.4 percent, passenger cars up 42.4 percent, cement 10.5 percent. The report noted that electric power production, which had risen 7.5 percent, was nonetheless lagging behind the requirements of industry, chiefly because of delays in installing new equipment. It also pointed out that coal production had declined by 1.8 percent since last year, partly because of reductions in Sunday shifts. On the other hand, coal production per working day had risen by over 3 per cent.

In agriculture the report was modestly optimistic. Spring wheat yields were expected to be on the same level as last year's good harvest, and yields of winter wheat somewhat higher. Crops of potatoes and sugar beets were expected to be better than average. Livestock numbers were higher than a year ago, although the number of calves had decreased. Sales of farm machinery were claimed to be markedly higher than in 1956.

Shortage of Consumer Goods

Average money wages in industry, according to the report, had risen by 26 percent. "Over one million workers received pay raises in the first half of 1957. . . ." The report did not state to what extent this had been offset by higher prices for consumer goods, although it claimed that retail sales had also risen by 26 percent. "Despite the increase in retail turnover, a number of . . . difficulties were caused by temporary disturbances in the supply of certain articles, as well as by the fact that the structure of the volume of goods did not fully correspond to the increased demand for high quality goods." Sales of butter and meat were up by a third, but supplies of wheat flour, rye bread and fats were below last year's level. Sales of cereals and cloth had increased between 10 and 20 percent. The number of private retail stores was 25,000 in June—an increase of 10,000 since January. Total employment in the "Socialist" sector had risen more than 3 percent in the last year. The report criticized the "recent growth of absenteeism in industry," saying that there had been "an exceptionally marked increase in the number of hours of unjustified absence from work." (See p. 52.)

Foreign trade increased by 7.5 percent, reflecting a 14.5 percent increase in the value of imports and a slight decline in the value of exports. Imports of consumer goods, food and agricultural supplies had risen about 40 percent.

Poor Wage Discipline

The Party newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* said on August 20 that the report was a testimony to the progressiveness of the Polish economy, and added that it refuted "the wishful thinking of some foreign correspondents who reported on the low morale in Polish industrial centers and on Poland's dwindling industrial production." However, in a separate item the paper warned against unjustified wage increases. Since 1955, it said, total wage payments had risen by 33 percent in the nationalized economy, but not all of the increase was to be explained by official increases in wage rates. For example, average industrial wages in the first

quarter of 1957 were 28 percent higher than in the first quarter of 1956, but the official increases had been less than 15 percent. The rest of the increase was due to "a breakdown of financial discipline in many plants" which took the form of softer norms, falsification of records and the payment of unearned premiums. In the oil industry there had been no wage increase, yet average wages rose by 23.4 percent, and in the food industry—likewise without official increases—average wages rose by 30 percent.

Anti-Speculation Drive Stepped Up

The alarming growth of black marketeering in the Gomulka period is now under constant discussion in the Party press and, since July, when the Sejm (Parliament) passed a law increasing penalties for speculation, the government has waged a concerted campaign to halt economic "abuses" (see September 1957 issue, p. 35). A clue to the extent of illegal economic activity was provided by Radio Warsaw. August 17, which reported that as a result of some 4,200 inspections conducted in July in State and privately-owned shops, over 1,000 cases of fraud had been submitted to the public prosecutors and some 1,400 additional cases to adjudication panels. In view of this situation, *Polityka* (Warsaw), August 25, insisted that emergency measures be applied: "The time has come to carry out the promise to set up extraordinary commissions for the fight against corruption and black marketeering."

Party Members Involved

According to the press, the culprits are often Party members and high officials who have used their positions for personal gain. Remarking on the large number of "rogues" in high places, *Swiat* (Warsaw), August 11, stated that:

"Here, the Vice-Chairman of the Szczecin National Council becomes the leader of a gang. There, the Chairman of the Lomza National Council makes merry with firearms. In Cracow, a band which practiced graft included among its members two prosecutors, the Chief of the Militia's Interrogation Department, etc. In still another place, the director of the Executive Committee of Pharmacies and the Director of the Office of the President of the Main Statistical Bureau, both gentlemen, were caught in a large smuggling affair between Poland and the Soviet Union."

Radio Warsaw, August 25, disclosed a number of other cases in which Party members had been caught in financial abuses. One scandal was revealed in Lodz and resulted in

Hurt on the Job

"IN COAL MINES last year 510 miners were killed, 4,029 seriously injured, and 61,347 slightly injured and forced to lay off work for a period of twenty-eight days or more.

"In the building industry a worker is killed every second day.

"Things are still worse in foundries and in the chemical industry." (*Tygodnik Demokratyczny* [Warsaw], July 30, 1957.)

Modern Art in Moscow



These are photographs, appearing in a Polish periodical, of the modern art show held in Moscow during the Youth Festival. The show was the first occasion most Muscovites had been exposed to non-objective art. Most of the viewers reacted unfavorably, *Swiat* stated. The Polish periodical went on to criticize the Moscow critics in the following significant terms: "One is struck [in the Muscovites' criticism] by their intolerance, dogmatism and use of the discussion-stopping phrase 'degenerate art.' If anyone timorously disagrees with them, stating that the creator has the right of free choice, the surrounding crowd will noisily over-ride his objections." The Polish paper speculated on the effect these works will have on young Soviet painters, who, almost alone, have reacted favorably to the innovations: "What will be the work of these young painters? Will they develop their own individual talents? Will they break with the conventional officially accepted and approved art standards? 'Abstract art,' said the Soviet critic Prokopiew, 'denotes capitulation in life.' Will these young Soviet painters taste the forbidden fruit?" Such criticism of Soviet artistic shibboleths is, of course, unique to Poland in the area.



Photos and quoted text from *Swiat* (Warsaw), August 18, 1957

the removal of the first and second Secretaries of the District Party Committee in Rawa Mazowiecka:

"The Rawa affair is not the only one of its kind uncovered recently. . . . The Provincial Party Control Committees in Rzeszow [expelled] three Party members who committed abuses involving millions in a . . . [local] agricultural collective. The Party Control Commission in Lublin recently dealt with an affair involving a group of men who exploited the liquidation of tractor stations and the sale of harvesting machines for their own personal gain. All have been expelled from the Party and are now in prison. [Similar expulsions have been effected] by provincial Party control commissions in Olsztyn, Bydgoszcz and Zielona Gora. . . . There cannot be two justices in Poland. . . . Those who entertained the notion that they could use their Party cards as a smokescreen for frauds and abuses will be disappointed. . . . There cannot be room in the Party's ranks for men with sticky fingers and elastic morals."

In another broadcast of the same day, Radio Warsaw added to its annals of economic crime the case of the First Secretary of the Party organization in Zgierz who appropriated an unspecified quantity of cement and wire netting for his own use: "[Zaczek] also bought a television set from the [Party] committee funds and later sold it, using the cash to buy himself a motorcycle." Zaczek was dismissed from his post and expelled from the Party.

Regulations on Gifts

The swindlers' activities, it was charged, have not been limited to Poland but have taken on an international character. Radio Warsaw, September 4, disclosed that a certain Stefania Husiatynska had made about 10 million *zloty* in two years as a result of her activities in rackets connected with the sending of US parcels to Poland. Her colleague in the United States, a man called Hulak, was alleged to have accumulated \$30,000 from the transaction.

To prevent "crimes" connected with the sending of gifts from abroad, the government, on August 24, increased the custom duties on such products as chewing gum, razor blades, pepper, head scarves, plastic products, artificial jewelry, watches, fountain pens and motor cars (2,000 of which were imported in the first six months of 1957).^{*} *Trybuna Ludu* stated that most of these items had found their way to the black market or were used in speculative manipulations. At the same time, the government also introduced export duties on certain goods sent out of the country. The purpose of this action, according

^{*} There were no increases made in duties on drugs, staple foods and other necessities which have been sent to Poles from relatives and friends outside the country. Duties on these items were reduced last May (see August issue, p. 53).

to *Trybuna Ludu*, was to prevent private schemers from competing with State export firms.

Courts Charged with "Liberalism"

The regime has confronted two chief problems in its anti-speculation drive: the leniency of the courts and the apathy of the population. *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), August 6, 1957, bitterly described the extent of corruption in Cracow Province where, it stated, the authorities have handled cases of theft with unjustified tolerance:

"During the second quarter of this year, 960 cases of theft of social property appeared in Cracow Province—586 concerning speculation and 60 involving abuse of authority. Only 273 persons were arrested. The rest were not held in custody . . . and [thus] had the opportunity of 'adjusting' the testimony of witnesses, etc., in preparing their defense. Almost as a rule the sentences for such crimes are no higher than three years in prison. Many cases are drawn out for months, even for years. Why?

"The property of speculators is still not confiscated after the court has passed sentence. Why was it permitted for the court to regard the millionaire speculator Dziadon as an 'indigent' shoemaker, from whom it was not possible to take anything, when it was generally known that the greater part of his wealth was distributed among his family, girl friends, and other people? . . .

"[The existence of such a situation is to a large degree due to] the indifference of the broad masses . . . towards the government's struggle against economic crimes. This indifference forces . . . the authorities to be 'all alone' in their fight. . . . And here the authorities are normally defeated. On the other hand, without the control of the people, the authorities became bureaucratic, corrupt, and isolated from the masses."

Zycie Literackie (Cracow), August 25, discussed the growing problem of speculation and official leniency from another point of view: "It is an irrefutable fact that the post-October freedom is being taken advantage of by the blackest elements. . . . [who] consider October . . . [a] guarantee of their immunity. The worst, however, does not seem to be the attempt to use October as blackmail, but the growth of liberalism in . . . organs of justice. I do not know whether liberalism is the result of fears of being accused of pre-October methods of behavior, of Stalinism, etc."

By September, the Party had taken further steps to combat speculation. According to Radio Warsaw, September 3, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers extended the scope of the organs of financial control and auditing, enabling them to investigate all persons suspected of having illegal sources of income and to secure payment of sums owed the State treasury from the property of such persons.

Fight Against Absenteeism

Large-scale absenteeism constitutes further evidence of the prevailing economic chaos. The Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions recently stated that because of unjustified absences from work in the first half of 1957,

some 26 million man-hours were lost to the economy; this figure represents a more than twofold increase over similar losses in the first six months of 1956 (*Głos Pracy* [Warsaw], August 10-11, 1957). Both press and radio have tried to explain the alarming increase in absenteeism in the post-October period. Chief among the reasons given have been the general breakdown in discipline since Gomulka's liberalization, and the workers' rebellion against the dimness of the prospects for an immediate improvement in their living standard.

Aside from blaming absenteeism on alcoholism, "laziness," irresponsibility, and hooliganism, the Party press has pointed out the connection between absenteeism and low wages. While Gomulka has granted substantial concessions to agriculture, making it a profitable occupation, the average worker in industry still has difficulty in making ends meet. As a result, he either has turned to speculation or has sought to supplement his income by taking on extra jobs in private industry, where pay is higher; thus, a large percentage of workers who report "sick" are actually using the time to earn money elsewhere.

Radio Warsaw, August 12, discussed various aspects of the absenteeism problem in a broadcast on conditions in Poznan. According to the commentator, workers in the Poznan Harvesting Machine Factory have broken all records for unjustified absences: "Over twenty percent of the staff fails to report daily. As a result, the factory loses about 7,500 manpower-days per month." Similarly, in the Cegielski Works, 40,000 man-hours were lost because of unexplained absences in the first half of 1957, and 1,077,012 man-hours because of "sickness":

"It is a public secret that much of the absence due to illness is a disguised form of loafing. Doctors, both those working in the factories and those in the general health services, grant certificates much too willingly; they frequently yield to the demands of those who claim to be ill and allow themselves to be bamboozled."

Workers' Double Life

Radio Warsaw pointed out that the largest incidence of "illness" in Poznan occurred on Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays:

"The explanation is simple. The 'sick' persons work . . . in private workshops [during this time] . . . where they earn 100 to 150 *zloty* daily. In their factories . . . they obtain sick leave benefits for three days. This pays quite well. . . . When I asked one of the workers . . . why he was doing some work on the side, he told me with naive frankness that it really did not pay to work in the factory. The only reason he kept his job was so that he would not lose his rights to several benefits, such as family allowances, medical treatment and holidays. 'Others steal,' he said. 'I make a bit of money on the side honestly.'

". . . The present state of labor discipline is also connected with foremen's loss of authority. Many of them, fearing unpleasantness, play the part of kind uncles, close their eyes to various practices, give leaves, and certify work as done without verifying it."

Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), August 22, declared that absenteeism was particularly evident among skilled workers earning some 2,000-3,000 *zloty* a month, because they had

greater opportunities than unskilled workers to boost their earnings by taking extra jobs:

"Workers in textile factories and on the railroads add to their earnings by trade. Builders and miners work in private building. Skilled workers often keep secret workshops, obtaining their raw materials illegally from their place of work. . . . Former farmers are again returning to farming, which has become profitable since October. . . .

"An [industrial] worker receives about 50 *zloty* in the State building enterprise, while a private employer will give him about 300 *zloty* for one day's work. When a worker reports with 'his own' material, his reward is even greater. And although it is necessary to work hard for this money (output must be many times greater than in a State enterprise) the difference between the income for occasional and permanent work is unusually large."

To put a stop to absenteeism, the government recently ordered individual factories and enterprises to prepare new rules on the "rights and duties of employees." Radio Warsaw, August 18, stated that the new regulations, as generally conceived by the government, are to involve disciplinary measures in the form of "admonitions, warnings, fines, transfers to lower-paid jobs, dismissal with notice, and finally summary dismissal," for those who violate labor regulations. The new rules to be worked out


in detail by each factory are also aimed at putting a stop to collusion between managers and employees. "The heads of enterprises have the duty to apply penalties to persons who treat their work negligently. Chiefs who tolerate violations of labor discipline will be held responsible."

Decrease in Collectivization

There has been a continuation of the decrease in agricultural collectives, not only in number but also in resemblance to the highly organized Soviet *kolkhoz* type. According to the August 7 *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Poland now has 1,926 agricultural collectives. This is 246 less than was claimed by the Party paper on July 5. The more recent source states that only 14.4 percent of the agricultural organizations are true *kolkhozes* (type II and III). Types I and Ib (54.1 percent and 26.3 percent, respectively) predominate, and these may be classed more as cooperatives than collectives.

The differences in all agricultural organizations have become less and less distinct, due to basic administrative changes. Many Type II and III collectives have completely or partially abandoned collective livestock-raising and instituted profit-sharing only according to the amount of work the individual member chooses to put in.

Admission of new members to the collectives appears



"Festival in Sopot"; the reference is to the Jazz Festival held in Sopot, Poland, in July.

Szpilki (Warsaw), August 11, 1957

now to be a rather rare occurrence. "On the whole, older organizations manifest tendencies toward closing and not admitting new members," *Trybuna Ludu* stated, and then went on to speak of a new phenomenon, a raise in the entrance fees, particularly in the reactivated groups: "Up to now the members' fee, as provided by the statutes, was 15 zloty; presently it is being raised to 100 or even 1,000 zloty."

Trybuna Ludu stated that its article was based on material obtained from the Agriculture Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It concluded by saying:

"An inconsequential number of cooperatives still should be disbanded. These are the ones which conduct no co-operative activity, yet take advantage of all the privileges accorded legitimate groups. They may also be organizations of a speculative character."

"Poprostu" Fails to Appear

The famous anti-Stalinist student weekly, *Poprostu*, which had been reprimanded by the Gomulka regime for going too far in demanding liberalization shortly before its editors suspended publication in July and August, failed to appear as scheduled in September (see *East Europe*, September 1957, p. 34). It is reported that the first issue for September met with opposition from the State censorship office, which insisted that the paper confine itself to student matters and avoid controversial issues. Previously, there had been speculation that *Poprostu's* long summer vacation had been ordered by the authorities.

Private Enterprise in the Building Industry

To meet the need for building materials, over 2,000 small private enterprises have been established since the beginning of the year. These include brick kilns, lime factories, plants for manufacturing pre-fabricated building materials, as well as quarries and companies manufacturing crushed stone (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], August 14). There are now approximately 3,000 such establishments, according to the journal, which goes on to give statistics on the new private production. This year there will be 180 million bricks manufactured by private industry; last year there were only three million. Cement production by private sources will jump from 6,000 tons in 1956 to 140,000 tons in 1957. No figures on State-owned factories were given in the article.

Emigres Outnumber Immigrants

In the past three months, according to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), August 13, over 28,000 persons of German "nationality" left Poland for East and West Germany. The paper forecasts that in August an additional 8,900 will depart, 7,000 of them to West Germany. In the first half of this year, 94,000 persons left Poland permanently (see *East Europe*, September 1957, p. 33), chiefly of German and Jewish origin. 30,000 Jews will have left Poland by the end of August. During this period the Soviet Union sent back approximately 48,000 Poles, one-third of that number being under the age of seventeen. Thus, the emigres far outnumbered the immigrants.

Czechoslovakia

Further Trials and Arrests


The campaign of intimidation-by-example continued with a variety of arrests and sentences for "espionage" and "treason." Radio Prague reported on August 8 that Vladimir Vesely, a radio and television commentator, had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, loss of civic rights and confiscation of his property. He was accused of collaborating, while a Czechoslovak radio correspondent in West Germany in 1948, with elements of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in West Germany and with the United

Rare Religious Controversy Aired

A seventeen-year-old boy wrote a letter which was published by *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), the organ of the Czechoslovak Youth League, July 20, thus sparking an interesting religious controversy on the journal's pages. The boy was very critical of the constant "peace campaigns" indulged in by the regime. He based his adverse judgment on his study of the Bible, from which he had concluded that God "scoffs at those who think that man is a being capable of accomplishing anything." In his opinion peace can be found "only in our Savior and his firm promises."

More than three hundred answering letters were received by the paper. On August 2, 18 of these were published, 14 expressing anti-religious beliefs, only four agreeing with the original contributor. (Significantly, the latter were published in small excerpts, the former far more fully treated.) The most varied arguments were used to refute the religious point of view; these ranged from abuse of God to attempts at "scientific" discussion. On August 11, seven more anti-religious letters were published, against two which expressed belief in God, and one which was agnostic in substance. In the August 18 issue of the paper there was a full-page resume and analysis of the first 220 letters received by the journal. These contained 235 (sic) opinions. As many as 103 writers admittedly "defended" religion, 115 expressed themselves against it. The upholders of religion allegedly were older on the average, and there were relatively more women in this group than among the opposition. There were also reportedly more intellectuals in the "anti" group. However, all types and backgrounds were represented on both sides of the controversy.

The newspaper's "analyst" was clearly against the believers in his discussion of the problems raised by the letters, but his conclusions were moderate and conciliatory. One must differentiate among the various kinds of religious persons, he decided: "Those young comrades err who throw all religion into one bag as a part of the same obscurantism."



Architect (to visiting architect): "Modern, isn't it? No, not the one on the right. That one is pre-war."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), July 1957

States intelligence service. He is also charged with having "supplied information . . . to the diplomatic representative of a NATO member" in 1956.

Father Vaclav Filipec, a member of the Roman Catholic Salesian order, was sentenced to nine years in prison (Radio Prague, August 21), and two nuns who allegedly hid him received sentences of four-and-a-half and five years (Radio Prague, August 27). (For details of charges against Father Filipec, see *East Europe*, August 1957, pages 55-56.)

A West German businessman, Alfons Lieberls, was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for "misusing his business trips to Czechoslovakia for hostile activities." (Radio Prague, August 23.) A Swiss citizen, Friedrich Jegerlehner, "confessed" over Radio Prague, August 10, that he had been a "spy for American imperialism." No trial or sentence was announced for him, but Dr. Josef Maier (see *East Europe*, June 1957, page 57) was sentenced to eighteen years for "espionage" on behalf of NATO, and 67-year-old Robert Nettel received twelve years on charges of "spying" for Britain.

Milos Pech, who was accused of unspecified "activities" among the youth and of having "educated young people in the spirit of Scouting," was jailed for three years at Pilsen (Radio Prague, August 31).

Collectivization Stressed

Speaking to a meeting of regional Party workers at Hradec Kralove on August 9, Premier Siroky called for renewed efforts to collectivize agriculture (Radio Prague, August 10). He said that in July 400 new collectives had been set up covering 80,000 hectares of agricultural land. "This means that in one month we have literally achieved the same results as in the first half of 1957." He added that since July of 1955 some 2,069 collectives (Types III and IV) have been established, and that together with State farms and other publicly owned land they now embrace more than half of the total agricultural land in Czechoslovakia. (The number of collectives was said to be 6,478 in June 1955 and 8,016 in December 1956.)

Siroky pointed out that the Second Five Year Plan calls for a 30 percent increase in agricultural production by 1960. Because of this he urged that collectivization be pushed hard in 1957 and 1958, since "collectives set up in 1959 and 1960 will hardly be able to contribute by their production to the attainment of the agricultural production targets in the Second Five Year Plan." He lectured the Party workers of the Hradec region on the fact that their region is "seriously lagging" behind other regions in its rate of collectivization.

Slovakia's Economy

A similar exhortation was made to Slovak Party workers in a report delivered on August 22 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia (Radio Bratislava, August 23). Pavol Majling, a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee, stated that collectives comprise 32.5 percent of all agricultural land in Slovakia, and that together with the State-owned sectors of agriculture they have 43.7 percent of all agricultural land. He compared the latter figure unfavorably with the 50 percent figure given for all of Czechoslovakia.

Industrial Shortcomings

The report was a general appraisal of the Slovak economy in the light of tasks set forth last February by the national Central Committee (see April issue, p. 46). The Committee had pointed to the need for more efficiency in the Czechoslovak economy in order to meet the high production targets of the Five Year Plan. Majling declared that while gross production targets were being generally fulfilled, the aims of the February resolution had not been achieved. He found the most serious difficulties in the production of coal, building materials and "certain engineering products." For example, poor labor organization in the mines had resulted in 65,000 absentee shifts during the first six months of 1957. In building materials, inefficient methods had led to a shortage of 19 million bricks in the first seven months. While the engineering industry had fulfilled its plan in all branches, Majling criticized it for inefficiency in making deliveries, poor cooperation between enterprises, slowness in the introduction of new production programs and failure to make the best use of capacities. He also criticized the construction industry for bad coordination and for starting houses faster than it finished them.

"THE GENERAL ACCOMMODATION situation as regards living and office quarters is not so good in Prague, although it is better than it is in Warsaw. There are 690,000 rooms for Prague's 970,000 citizens; this shows an average of 1.4 persons per room. Although it is true that only 0.2 percent of the population lives (quite literally) in cellars, there are 5.3 percent in basements. One-room apartments comprise 31 percent of all apartments." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], July 28.)

Some of his harshest criticism was directed at the consumer goods industries. They "produce few articles of outstanding quality, in spite of receiving qualitatively expensive raw materials such as wool, cotton, leather and wood. . . . Our furniture used to be an important item of export to the most fastidious customers abroad. We are now producing much badly styled and poor quality furniture, which differs greatly from the requirements and tastes of our customers. . . . Similar problems and weaknesses can also be found in . . . ready-to-wear clothing and woolen materials. . . . Moreover, the growing demands of our workers are not being satisfied, either as far as services, or as far as the supply of goods are concerned, by either industrial enterprises or producers' cooperatives."

Romania

Polish Philosophers Rebuked

Contemporanul, the Bucharest social and cultural weekly of the Romanian Ministry of Culture, used the occasion of the Warsaw Philosophers' Conference of July 17-22 to berate the Polish Party intelligentsia for their "revisionism." After commenting on the report of Raymond Aron, "one of France's oldest and most outspoken opponents of Marxism," the July 26 edition of the journal took the Poles to task as follows:

"One must remark with regret, in regard to the Polish philosophers, that their contribution cannot be considered as positive. Speaking only on the last day of debate on Aron's report, the Polish participants did not in the least oppose the thesis presented by the author. On the other hand, wrong theses were repeated, like those regarding the elimination of Marxist theories from natural sciences, and especially regarding the character of the so-called 'mythology' of present Marxist thinking. . . ."

High Trade Union Official Ousted

Ion Andrei has been released from his post as President of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Mine Workers. The ouster, which was confirmed at the Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, June 28-July 3 (the Plenum which also ousted Miron Constantinescu and Josif Chisinevski from the Party's Politburo) was belatedly discussed in *Munca* (Bucharest), August 15, the organ of the Trade Unions. Andrei was called a former Iron Guardist (a pre-war Fascist organization), a "careerist," and a "hypocrite." He was censured for "introducing a petit bourgeois spirit into the Presidium's work and ignoring criticism and self-criticism." The paper stated that "his intrusion into the Party ranks, and later into responsible positions of the trade unions, is the result of the liquidating policy pursued by the factionalist, anti-Party, right-wing, deviationist V. Luca-A. Pauker [movement], which opened wide the Party's gates and enabled enemy and careerist elements to sneak into the Party."

National Victory Again Celebrated

This year for the first time since it assumed power the regime ordered an official celebration of the Romanian victory over the Germans at the Battle of Marasesti, August 6, 1917. The festivities duplicated, in some of their implications, those held in Poland to commemorate the Warsaw Uprising (see *East Europe*, September 1956, pages 33-34). Somewhat like the Soviet Army in the Polish campaign of 1944, the Russian forces of 1917 stood aside from the Romanian battle, though in the latter case their relative non-combativeness was due to the deterioration wrought by the Bolshevik Revolution then current in Russia. The Romanian feat of arms, though victorious, resembled the Polish in its nationalist, rather than ideological, character: in the years before the Communist coup celebrations of the victory symbolized Wilson's principles and the nation's expectations that all Romanians would henceforth be united in one, free, independent national entity.

A minority delegation of French officers who had served in the Berthelot Mission at the Battle attended the functions. The majority had refused to appear because of the propagandistic nature of the proceedings. The principal speech was delivered by Lt. General Constantin Verdes of the Romanian Army, who stressed the "injustice" of World War I, but praised the "heroism and courage" of the Romanian soldiers (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], August 7).

Bulgaria

Continued Party "Vigilance"

"The Bulgarian Communist Party is no club for the discussion and propagation of all possible ideas," declared *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), August 27, the official Communist Party organ. Continuing its anti-liberalization line, the paper denounced those who "exaggeratedly emphasized the mistakes made during the time of the cult of personality," but it still refrained from particularizing on the alleged offenses of Chankov, Terpechev and Panov, the officials purged last July.

Officials Shifted

Politburo member Encho Staikov was appointed to head the Fatherland Front on August 19. He replaces Dimeter Ganev who, according to the August 20 *Rabotnichesko Delo*, will continue in his job as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Staikov, also a member of the Central Committee Secretariat, has been replaced on the latter body by former Agriculture Minister Stanko Todorov. No denunciations, no "purges" appear to have been made in connection with these changes.

Recent and Related

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, by Henry A. Kissinger (*Harpers*: \$5.00). In an effort to develop a theory of foreign policy and diplomacy adequate to the perils of a nuclear age, the author has set forth the considerations on which policy and strategy may be based, and the inadequacy of many of our traditional concepts of the nature of peace and security. This book argues that our military strength can support our political objectives without risk of all-out war. It discusses the diplomacy and strategy necessary to deter aggression and to defeat it should the need arise. Dr. Kissinger believes that in all wars of the future nuclear weapons are likely to be employed; however, he states, the consequences need not be disastrous if the proper doctrine is followed. In the light of his new strategy, he examines the implications in our relations with our allies and with the uncommitted countries of the world, and analyzes the nature of the Soviet challenge in terms of ideology, diplomacy and military policy. He argues for more communication of our intentions to the enemy, believing that if our strength is not known we will have lost the asset of a deterrent. Bibliography.

Polish Postwar Economy, by Thad Paul Alton (*Columbia Univ.*: \$5.75). Drawing for the most part upon information gathered from Polish publications, this study seeks to appraise the character of Polish economic planning and its success in solving problems of economic development. Although the book focuses on the period after World War II, especially after 1946, Polish economic development up to 1939 and the effects of World War II are included to provide background and comparison. Major portions of the study deal with the evolution and ideology of the postwar government as a determinant of economic policy; the extension of State control over production, planning and performance in the economy as a whole and in different sectors of activity. An attempt is made to analyze the economic changes through 1953 and economic plans through 1955, the end of the Polish Six Year Plan. The author has restricted the study primarily to comparisons within the Polish economy, with reference to Soviet experience since Polish economic organization and planning have been increasingly patterned on the Soviet model. Bibliography, index.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956, edited by Paul E. Zinner (*Harpers*: \$6.75). Presented in convenient reference form, this book contains the outstanding raw materials pertaining to America's world relations during 1956. It offers an expert and authoritative selection of major treaties, international agreements, diplomatic notes, policy statements, and public speeches bearing on foreign policy. Highlighting this volume are the documents pertaining to the Middle East crises and Eastern Europe, including the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the military actions in Egypt. In addition, excerpts of speeches made by the presidential candidates, relevant material on the Soviet campaign of de-Stalinization and its international repercussions, and the exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Bulganin receive prominent attention. Mr. Zinner has also included ample documentation of the continuing disarmament talks, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the search for new patterns of NATO cooperation, the perennial problem of German unification, and many other vital international issues. Index.

The Kremlin, The Jews, and the Middle East, by Judd L. Teller (*Thomas Yose-loff*: \$3.50). Beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution, the author traces the efforts of Soviet Russia to stamp out any traces of Jewish culture within its domain. Based upon such Soviet sources as governmental edicts and statements by Communist leaders as well as verified reports brought out of Russia by Jews and non-Jews, this volume sets forth the entire record of Soviet anti-Semitism, revealing that beneath the propaganda facade of democratic liberalism and acceptance of minority groups, Russia never hesitated to resort to violence and threats against the Jews. Aside from examining the ever-broadening pattern of restrictive anti-Semitism within the Soviet Union, Mr. Teller deals with Communist intrigue in the state of Israel and throughout the Middle East. This section offers an explanation of the ferment in this troubled area, where Communist machinations, in keeping with internal Soviet policy, have been responsible for much of the tension between Israel and the Arab states. Index.

Communism in Latin America, by Robert J. Alexander (*Rutgers Univ.*: \$9.00). The growing strength of Communism in Latin America, and the possibility of the emergence there of a major Communist State, are problems which Mr. Alexander discusses in this documented survey. The author believes that native movements dedicated to reform represent the most effective opposition to Communism in the area. He feels that the United States makes a mistake in backing regimes devoted to preserving the status quo. The book, however, does not merely set forth the opinions and observations of the author. It is a thorough exposition of facts which have never been analyzed elsewhere. The author describes the background, history, leaders, and potential dangers of the Communist movement, and then deals with Communist movements in each individual country. An important theme of the book is that the Latin American Communists cannot be understood unless we realize that they are part of the world-wide Communist movement, that they are not "different" or merely "agrarian reformers." Footnotes, index.

Factory and Manager in the USSR, by Joseph S. Berliner (*Harvard Univ.*: \$7.50). In this book the author has taken us behind the official world into the heart of the Soviet factory for a close-up of the working lives of the men who run Soviet industry and the realities of the world in which the nation's business is conducted. The book covers the period from 1938 to the most recent post-Stalin reforms. By the use of documented illustrations from Soviet publications and personal interviews with former Soviet managerial officials, the author gives us a picture of Soviet business life and the risks involved in successful management. The Soviet factory manager, constantly faced with high production quotas, shortages of materials and unrealistic orders, is forced to engage in such practices as under-reporting his production capacity, cutting the quality of production and giving gifts to officials for helping his firm out of difficulties. Mr. Berliner shows that such practices are the inevitable consequence of the demands made upon the manager and of the nature of the economic work in which he works. With the Soviet economy undergoing a vast reorganization, this book furthers our understanding and evaluation of the nature and implications of the changes.



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